行政管理外文翻譯--- 社會契約論

1、<p>　　畢 業(yè) 設 計（論 文）外 文 參 考 資 料 及 譯 文</p><p>　　譯文題目： 社會契約論（ 讓-雅克·盧梭 ）</p><p>　　The Social Contract （Jean-Jacques Rousseau）</p><p>　　學生姓名： 施 偉 學 號： 0721110933 <

2、;/p><p>　　專 業(yè)： 行 政 管 理（高級文秘） </p><p>　　所在學院： </p><p>　　指導教師： </p><p>　　職 稱：

3、 講 師 </p><p>　　2011年 4月 8 日</p><p><b>　　社會契約論</b></p><p>　　讓-雅克·盧梭 第三篇</p><p><b>　　1．政府總論</b></p><p>　　我要提

4、醒讀者，這一章要仔細地閱讀，否則，我無力進一步說明我的觀點。任何自由的行動一定要擁有兩個同時發(fā)生的因素，一個是決定行動的主觀意念，另一個是執(zhí)行意念的客觀力量。如果我想走向一個目標，首要的條件是我要有此意愿，其次是我要有行走的能力。一個想走的癱瘓病人或是不想走的健康人都只會原地不動。政體的行為也有同樣的兩個因素，也可以對它做出這種同樣的力量和意志之劃分，后者稱為立法權力而前者是行政權力。政體的任何行動沒有此兩者同時的作用都是不能進行的。&

5、lt;/p><p>　　我們已經(jīng)看到立法權力必須也只能屬于人民。從我已建立的原則，顯然行政權力不能象立法者或主權者一樣具有集體的特性，因為其權力是局限于特殊行為的，因此它超出了法律的范疇，更超出了主權者的范疇，后者的行為必然是法律。</p><p>　　因此公權力需要自己的機構，在一般意志的指導下，統(tǒng)一地付諸行動，在國家和主權者之間駕起通訊的橋梁；就像靈魂和肉體結(jié)合成為個人那樣，把國家和主權者

6、結(jié)合成一個集體的法人。國家之有政府，根本原因在此。有時政府被錯誤地指認為主權者，但它應只是主權者的代理人而已。那么，什么是政府呢？它是主權者和臣民之間相互通訊的中介媒體，其責任是執(zhí)行法律和維護公民的和政治的自由。</p><p>　　那么，什么是政府呢？它是主權者和臣民之間相互通訊的中介媒體，其責任是執(zhí)行法律和維護公民的和政治的自由。</p><p>　　政府的成員稱為官員（ｍａｇｉｓｔｒ

7、ａｔｅｓ）或國王（ｋｉｎｇｓ），也就是，管理者（ｇｏｖｅｒｎｅｒｓ），而總體稱為統(tǒng)治者（ｐｒｉｎｃｅ）。有人堅信人民服從統(tǒng)治者的行為不是一種契約，這是相當正確的。它不過是一種任命一種雇傭而已。統(tǒng)治者不過是主權者的代理人，以主權者的名義行使主權者賦予的權力。主權者能夠在任何適當?shù)臅r候限制、改變、或否決這種權力；這種否決權利的放棄是和社會機體的本質(zhì)不相容的，它違背了社會協(xié)約的目的。</p><p>　　我因此把行政權

8、力的合法實施稱為政府或最高行政當局，把此最高行政當局中負責的個體或集體稱為統(tǒng)治者或官員。</p><p>　　在政府內(nèi)部，存在著中間媒介的力量，它們的關系構成了總體對總體的關系，或說主權者和國家的關系。這后一種關系可被視為介于連續(xù)比例的兩極，而政府是其幾何平均。政府從主權者接受它發(fā)向人民的命令，如果國家處于正常的平衡，考慮到所有因素，政府本身拿走的產(chǎn)品和權力就一定要和公民拿到的產(chǎn)品和權力相等，因為公民一方面是主權

9、者，而另一方面是臣民。</p><p>　　再者，上述三方的關系只要有一個改變，就必然破壞了比例關系。如果主權者要直接統(tǒng)治，或者官員要立法，或者臣民拒不從命，秩序就瓦解而成為混亂，力量和意志不再和諧，國家從而解體，不是沉淪于專制政府就是無政府狀態(tài)。最后，正如在兩個數(shù)字間只能有一個幾何平均值，一個國家也只能有一個好的政府。但是紛紜的事務時時在改變?nèi)嗣耖g的關系，不同的人民就會有不同的政府形態(tài)，就是人民在不同的時期，也

10、會有不同的政府。</p><p>　　為了更清楚地說明在兩極間能夠存在的各種關系，我就舉人民的人口數(shù)字為例，因為它的關系很易表達。</p><p>　　我們假定一個國家擁有一萬公民。主權者只能被考慮為一個整體，但每個人，作為臣民，要被考慮成一個個體。因此主權者比于個人是一萬比一；就是說，每個國家一員只分享一萬分之一的主權權威，盡管他是完全從屬于主權者的。如果人民數(shù)目增到十萬，臣民的狀態(tài)不變

11、，他們還是要完全在法律的主宰下，只是每人只有十萬分之一的表決權，也就是十倍少的去影響法律的內(nèi)容。既然臣民總是作為單一個體，他和主權者的比例也就隨著公民總數(shù)的增加而增加。因此說，國家越大，自由越少。</p><p>　　當我說比例升高，我是指它更加遠離平等。因此，把'比例'作為數(shù)學上的概念并把'關系'作為普通意義理解，可以說，隨著比例升高，關系在減少。比例在此是一個數(shù)值可由數(shù)值的商來

12、表達，而關系被看成相似可以由相似性來判斷。</p><p>　　個體意志和一般意志之間，也就是道德和法律之間的相似越少，強制的力量就得越大。因此，如果政府要保持良好，隨著公民人數(shù)的增加，它就得相應變強。</p><p>　　另一方面，既然國家的擴張給以公權力的掌握者更大的濫權的誘惑和方法，政府對人民的控制越強力，主權者對政府的控制也一定要越強力。在此我講的不是絕對的力量，而是國家不同部分間

13、的相對力量。</p><p>　　從此雙重比例中，在主權者、統(tǒng)治者、人民間的連續(xù)比例并不是一個任意的概念，而是政體本身性質(zhì)的必然結(jié)果。還可以說既然連續(xù)比例的一端是作為臣民的人民，它的值是固定的一，一旦雙重比例增加或減少，單比例同樣的增加或減少，結(jié)果中間項就要變化。這說明，沒有一個絕對的單一的政府形式，而是隨著國家大小的不同，會有許多不同的政府形式。</p><p>　　要嘲笑此體系，有人會

14、說，根據(jù)我的說法，為找?guī)缀纹骄鶃硇纬烧畬嶓w，只要做一個人口的平方根就行了。我的回答是我只是用數(shù)值作為一個例子；我所說的比例不只要看人口，一般的說，還要看由眾多原因產(chǎn)生的行為數(shù)量；再者，如果我一時借助幾何術語以精煉地說明我的觀點，我當然是知道幾何的精確并不適合于道德的參數(shù)。</p><p>　　包含于政體中的政府是政體的小型化。它是擁有某些功能的團體法人；它主動時如主權者，被動時如國家，可以被解構成同樣的其他關系

15、。從這些關系中會產(chǎn)生新的比例關系，其內(nèi)還可以依官員的官階再依樣劃分，直到我們達到不可分的中間項，也就是，單一的統(tǒng)治者或最高官員，他在這逐級演進中作為在這一系列分數(shù)和一系列整數(shù)的第一位。</p><p>　　為免我們在這些項目中攪擾不清，我們就簡單地把政府看作是國家內(nèi)部的新的實體，一個不同于主權者不同于人民的兩者之間的中間體。</p><p>　　在這兩個實體間有如下重要的差別：國家可以自存

16、，而政府通過主權者而存在。因此政府的主導意志是，或說應該只是一般意志，或法律，它的權力只是集中起來的公權力；一旦它試圖擅權進行絕對獨立的行動，聯(lián)結(jié)整體的紐帶就松散了。如果政府的個體意志最終比主權者的意志還活躍主導，并用攫取的公權力強制對其特殊意志的服從，結(jié)果就有了兩個主權者，就是說，一個是法律上的，一個是事實上的，社會紐帶立刻消亡，政體也就瓦解了。</p><p>　　然而，如果政府實體要能存在，擁有一個不同于國

17、家實體的真正的生命，如果它的成員要能夠統(tǒng)一行動達到它應有的目的，它就必須擁有一個其特定的自我，其成員間的共識，其權力，其保障自身存在的意志。這種特殊的存在需要的是集會、委員會、考量和決定權、權利、官階、政府專有的特權和其與官員的艱辛對應的榮譽地位。困難的是如何安排這個從屬于更大的整體的實體，以保證它不要為了加強自身而破壞總體結(jié)構，以保障它總是清楚地區(qū)分它為保存自身的特殊權力和為保存國家的公權力，總之，以保障它總是可以為了人民而犧牲政府而

18、不是為了政府而犧牲人民。 政府的法人實體雖然是另一個法人實體的結(jié)果，只擁有可稱之為借來的從屬的生命，它還是能夠或多或少地同樣地行動，在或大或小的程度上保持健康。最后，不是直接遠離它的正當?shù)哪繕耍榔浣Y(jié)構方式，它能夠在某種程度上有所偏離。</p><p>　　因為這些原因，隨國家改變所依賴的偶然和特定關系，政府和國家實體就有著很多不同的關系。如果其關系不能隨著它所屬的政體的缺陷而變更，本身良好的政府往往成為

19、最糟的政府。</p><p>　　2. 各種政府形式的構成原則</p><p>　　為了說明這些差別的一般原因，我在此必須如我區(qū)分國家和主權者一樣的區(qū)分統(tǒng)治者和政府。</p><p>　　官員實體可以包含或多或少一定數(shù)目的成員。我們己經(jīng)說過主權者和臣民的比例隨著臣民的數(shù)目增加而增長，依相似的類比，我們可以說同樣的比例也存在于政府和官員之間。</p>&

20、lt;p>　　既然政府的全部權力總是國家的權力，它是一個恒量。因此，政府對自己成員使用越多的權力，它為整個人民所剩的權力就越少。</p><p>　　因此，官員越多，政府越弱。因為這是一個基本格言，我們不妨把它先研究清楚。</p><p>　　我們可以在每個官員的身上分出三種完全不同的意志。第一種是他自己的個體意志，總是導向他的私利。第二種是官員的整體意志，和統(tǒng)治者的利益有關，可以稱

21、之為團體意志；對政府而言它是一般的，對政府從屬的國家而言它是特殊的。第三種是人民的意志，或主權者意志；它不論是對于整體上講的國家還是對于只是整體之一部分的政府都是一般的。</p><p>　　在完善的法律系統(tǒng)下，特殊的或個人意志不起作用，政府的團體意志是極端從屬性的，結(jié)果，一般意志或主權者意志總是主導的，并唯一地指導其他的一切。</p><p>　　然而，在自然規(guī)律中，這些不同的意志在更集

22、中的條件下會變得更活躍。因此，一般意志總是最弱的，團體意志強些，而個體意志總是第一位的，結(jié)果在政府中，每個成員他首先是他自己，然后才是官員，最后才是公民。這一次序和社會秩序所要求的正好相反。</p><p>　　弄清楚這一點，我們來假定政府是在一個單一的個人手里。此時個人意志和團體意志完全地統(tǒng)一，結(jié)果是團體意志有著可能的最強烈的力度。既然權力的實施依賴于意志的力度，而政府的絕對權力是一個恒量，結(jié)論是最強有力的政府

23、形式是一個人的政府。</p><p>　　我們來考慮另一種情況，政府和立法權威結(jié)為一體，主權者就是統(tǒng)治者，每一個公民都是官員。此時團體意志和一般意志結(jié)合起來，兩者一般地不比對方強大，而個人意志因之維持其原來的力度。政府此時雖然還有著同樣絕對的權力，卻處于相對力量或活力的最低點。</p><p>　　這些條件是久經(jīng)考驗的，它們可為其他考察進一步證實。顯然，官員在政府中的行為要比公民在國家中的

24、行為要有效得多，個人意志對政府行為的影響也就比其對主權者的影響更多更大，這是因為官員總是有一些政府職能，而單個的公民對主權者卻無此功能。再者，國家越擴展，它的的實力也越增加，雖然不是和大小成比例；然而，當國家大小不再變化時，政府不能再依靠增加其成員來增加自己的實力，因為它的實力來自國家，是恒定的。于是，政府的相對力量或活力下降，而實力或絕對的力量不再增加。</p><p>　　當更多人參與負責時，公共事務的處理肯

25、定也大為減慢；他們強調(diào)審慎而不要冒險，讓機會白白溜走，過久的考量往往反而失去了考量的成果。</p><p>　　我剛證明了政府隨成員增加而效率下降，以前我還證明過人口越多，就需要更多強制的力量。從此，我們得出結(jié)論，官員和政府的比例要和臣民和主權者的比例相反；就是說，國家越大，政府就要越小，所以，官員人數(shù)的減少要比例于臣民人口增加。</p><p>　　我所講的是政府的相對權力而非絕對權力，

26、因為反過來說，官員人數(shù)越多，團體意志就越接近一般意志，而在單個官員下，如我已述，團體意志成了只是個人意志。于是，我們在一個方向上會失去我們在另一方向所得的東西，制憲人的藝術就是要尋求如何統(tǒng)籌政府的互成反比的力量和意志，使其最有利于國家。</p><p><b>　　3. 政府分類</b></p><p>　　在前一章我們已經(jīng)看到為什么各種政府形式要根據(jù)其構成的成員人數(shù)

27、劃分；在這一章，我們會看到如何作此劃分。</p><p>　　首先，主權者可以把政府放在全體人民，或大多數(shù)人手中，結(jié)果公民官員多于普通的公民。這種政府形式稱之為民主制。</p><p>　　其次，主權者可以把政府放在一小部分人手里，結(jié)果普通公民要多于官員數(shù)目，這種形式稱之為貴族制。</p><p>　　最后，主權者可以把整個政府集權于一個官員手里，其他官員從他手里分

28、得權力。這第三種形式是最常見的，稱之為君主制，或皇室制。</p><p>　　應該注意，所有這些形式，至少是前兩種，可以存在很寬數(shù)值上的浮動。民主制程度可以從全體人民到半數(shù)人民；貴族制程度可以從半數(shù)人民到極少數(shù)人；就是君主制政府在一定程度上也可以分享。斯巴達依憲法總是有兩個國王，羅馬帝國有時同時有八個皇帝而不會破壞統(tǒng)一。于是，在某一點上一種政府形式轉(zhuǎn)變成下一種政府形式，雖然我們只有三種定義，政府的不同形式可以多如

29、國家擁有公民的數(shù)目。</p><p>　　再者，既然政府在某些方面可以細分成不同的部門，每一部門依不同方法進行管理，這三種政府形式的各種混合就可產(chǎn)生很多種混合形式，每種混合形式又可以被混以任何單一的形式。</p><p>　　縱觀歷史，人們常爭論什么是最好的政府形式，卻忘了每種特定形式都是在一定條件下最好而在另一些條件下最壞。</p><p>　　如果在一個國家中最

30、高官員的數(shù)額應該反比于公民的人數(shù)，由此可以導出，就一般而言，民主制應最適合城邦，貴族制適合中等國家，而君主制適合于大國。這一法則直接來自我們已建立的原則；但是我們?nèi)绾尾拍芸疾毂姸鄺l件下可能出現(xiàn)的例外呢？</p><p><b>　　4. 民主制度</b></p><p>　　立法者比任何人都更知道如何執(zhí)法和釋法。于是乎最好的國家組織形式應該是執(zhí)法權力和立法權力的結(jié)合。

31、但是，正是這種結(jié)合使這種政府在某些方面不利，因為本應分離的權力被統(tǒng)一了起來，既然統(tǒng)治者和主權者合一，他們形成了一種，比方說，沒有政府的政府。</p><p>　　由立法者來執(zhí)法，或者人民作為整體不是集中精力于一般性的對象而是面對具體的目標對象，這并不合適。再沒有比私人利益對公眾事務的影響更危險的事了，由政府對法律的濫用與其說是一種邪惡不如說立法者的墮落，而此墮落是追求特殊對象的必然結(jié)果。當這樣的墮落存在時，國家的

32、基礎就在瓦解之中，任何改造都無計于事。從未濫用政府權力的人民永遠不會濫用其獨立；一個總是統(tǒng)治得體的人民也不需要被統(tǒng)治。</p><p>　　從最嚴格的意義上，真正的民主制從未存在過，也永遠不會存在。大多數(shù)人統(tǒng)治少數(shù)人是違反自然規(guī)律的。人民要不斷集會來處理公眾事務也難于想象，為此目的建立任何機構也就改變了管理方式。</p><p>　　我確信這是一條公理：當政府機能被分配給若干機構，那些人數(shù)

33、少的機構慢慢地會獲得最大的權威，這是因為他們處理事務的能力的自然結(jié)果。</p><p>　　再者，一個民主制政府會有很多事難于統(tǒng)一。首先，需要小國寡民，人們易于集會而公民彼此認識。次之，習俗和道德的極大簡化，以防出現(xiàn)過多的公眾事務和棘手的討論。第三，高度平等的社會等級和財產(chǎn)，否則權威權利上的平等勢難持久。最后，少于奢侈，因為奢侈或者是財富的結(jié)果或者使財富成為必需；它對富人窮人有著同樣的腐蝕：前者面對吝嗇，后者面對

34、貪心；它把國家出賣給了懶惰和虛榮；它使一些人成為他人的奴隸，而所有人成為公眾輿論的奴隸，從而使公民喪失了國家。</p><p>　　這就是為什么一個著名作家把美德作為共和國的基本原則；因為所有其他的東西無美德就無以存在。但因為他沒做必要的區(qū)分，那個偉大的天才常常疏于精確，有時甚至不清晰，他沒有看到既然主權權威要處處一致，同樣的原則便應該在每個構成良好的國家都適用，盡管或多或少，還要取決于政府的形式。</p&

35、gt;<p>　　我們還要補充，民主制政府，或群眾政府，比其他形式更可能出現(xiàn)內(nèi)戰(zhàn)或動亂，因為它比其他形式有著更經(jīng)常和強烈的傾向改變自己的形式，或需求同樣的警覺和勇氣維持現(xiàn)有的形式?？傊?，在民主制里，公民要把自己武裝以力量和堅定，他要發(fā)自內(nèi)心地，終其一生地，每天重復德高望眾的帕拉汀在他波蘭食譜中說的：'我寧要危險中的自由，不做平安中的奴隸。</p><p>　　如果曾有神氏的子民，它會民主地統(tǒng)

36、治自己。這樣完美的政府并不適于人類。</p><p>　　The Social Contract </p><p>　　Jean-Jacques Rousseau BOOK III</p><p>　　1. Government in General</p><p>　　I warn the reader that this chapte

37、r requires careful reading, and that I am unable to make myself clear to those who refuse to be attentive. Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral, i.e., the will which determines the ac

38、t; the other physical ,i.e., the power which executes it. When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I should will to go there, and, In the second place, that my feet should carry me. If a paralytic wills

39、to run and an active man w</p><p>　　We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong to it alone. It may, on the other hand, readily be seen, from the principles laid down above,

40、 that the executive power cannot belong to the generality as legislature or Sovereign, because it consists wholly of particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law, and consequently of the Sovereign, whose

41、acts must always be laws.</p><p>　　The public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bind it together and set it to work under the direction of the general will, to serve as a means of communication be

42、tween the State and the Sovereign, and to do for the collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for man. Here we have what is, in the State, the basis of government, often wrongly confused with t

43、he Sovereign, whose minister it is.</p><p>　　What then is government? An intermediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of

44、the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political.</p><p>　　The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say governors, and the whole body bears the name prince. Thus

45、those who hold that the act, by which a people put it under a prince, is not a contract are certainly right. It is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exer

46、cise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. This power it can limit, modify or recover at pleasure; for the alienation of s</p><p>　　I call then government, or supreme administratio

47、n, the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and prince or magistrate the man or the body entrusted with that administration.</p><p>　　In government reside the intermediate forces whose relations make

48、up that of the whole to the whole or of the Sovereign to the State. This last relation may be represented as that between the extreme terms of a continuous proportion, which has government as its mean proportional. The g

49、overnment gets from the Sovereign the orders it gives the people, and, for the State to be properly balanced, there must, when everything is reckoned in, be equality between the product or power of the government t</p

50、><p>　　Furthermore, none of these three terms can be altered without the equality being instantly destroyed. If the Sovereign desires to govern, or the magistrate to give laws, or if the subjects refuse to obey

51、, disorder takes the place of regularity, force and will no longer act together, and the State is dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy. Lastly, as there is only one mean proportional between each relation, there

52、 is also only one good government possible for a State. But, as countless eve</p><p>　　In attempting to give some idea of the various relations that may hold between these two extreme terms, I shall take as

53、an example the number of a people, which is the most easily expressible.</p><p>　　Suppose the State is composed of ten thousand citizens. The Sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body; but

54、each member, as being a subject,is regarded as an individual: thus the Sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand to one, i.e., each member of the State has as his share only a ten-thousandth part of the sovereign autho

55、rity, although he is wholly under its control. If the people numbers a hundred thousand, the condition of the subject undergoes no change, and each equally</p><p>　　When I say the relation increases, I mean

56、that it grows more unequal. Thus the greater it is in the geometrical sense, the less relation there is in the ordinary sense of the word. In the former sense, the relation, considered according to quantity, is expressed

57、 by the quotient; in the latter, and considered according to identity, it is reckoned by similarity.</p><p>　　Now, the less relation the particular wills have to the general will, that is, morals and manners

58、 to laws, the more should the repressive force be increased.The government, then, to be good, should be proportionately stronger as the people is more numerous.</p><p>　　On the other hand, as the growth of t

59、he State gives the depositaries of the public authority more temptations and chances of abusing their power, the greater the force with which the government ought to be endowed for keeping the people in hand, the greater

60、 too should be the force at the disposal of the Sovereign for keeping the government in hand. I am speaking, not of absolute force, but of the relative force of the different parts of the State.</p><p>　　It

61、follows from this double relation that the continuous proportion between the Sovereign, the prince and the people, is by no means an arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. It follo

62、ws further that, one of the extreme terms, viz., the people, as subject, being fixed and represented by unity, whenever the duplicate ratio increases or diminishes, the simple ratio does the same, and is changed accordin

63、gly. From this we see that there is not a single unique a</p><p>　　If, ridiculing this system, any one were to say that, in order to find the mean proportional and give form to the body of the government, it

64、 is only necessary, according to me, to find the square root of the number of the people, I should answer that I am here taking this number only as an instance; that the relations of which I am speaking are not measured

65、by the number of men alone, but generally by the amount of action, which is a combination of a multitude of causes; and that, further, if, t</p><p>　　The government is on a small scale what the body politic

66、who includes it is on a great one. It is a moral person endowed with certain faculties, active like the Sovereign and passive like the State, and capable of being resolved into other similar relations. This accordingly g

67、ives rise to a new proportion, within which there is yet another, according to the arrangement of the magistracies, till an indivisible middle term is reached ,i.e., a single ruler or supreme magistrate, who may be repre

68、sen</p><p>　　Without encumbering ourselves with this multiplication of terms, let us rest content with regarding government as a new body within the State, distinct from the people and the Sovereign, and int

69、ermediate between them.</p><p>　　There is between these two bodies this essential difference that the State exists by itself, and the government only through the Sovereign. Thus the dominant will of the prin

70、ce is, or should be, nothing but the general will or the law; his force is only the public force concentrated in his hands, and, as soon as he tries to base any absolute and independent act on his own authority, the tie

71、that binds the whole together begins to be loosened. If finally the prince should come to have a particula</p><p>　　However, in order that the government may have a true existence and a real life distinguish

72、ing it from the body of the State, and in order that all its members may be able to act in concert and fulfill the end for which it was set up, it must have a particular personality, a sensibility common to its members,

73、and a force and will of its own making for its preservation. This particular existence implies assemblies, councils, power and deliberation and decision, rights, titles, and privileges belo</p><p>　　Furtherm

74、ore, although the artificial body of the government is the work of another artificial body, and has, we may say, only a borrowed and subordinate life, this does not prevent it from being able to act with more or less vig

75、or or promptitude, or from being, so to speak, in more or less robust health. Finally, without departing directly from the end for which it was instituted, it may deviate more or less from it, according to the manner of

76、its constitution.</p><p>　　From all these differences arise the various relations which the government ought to bear to the body of the State, according to the accidental and particular relations by which th

77、e State itself is modified, for often the government that is best in itself will become the most pernicious, if the relations in which it stands have altered according to the defects of the body politic to which it belon

78、gs.</p><p>　　2. The Constituent Principle in the various Forms of Government</p><p>　　To set forth the general cause of the above differences, we must here distinguish between government and its

79、 principle, as we did before between the State and the Sovereign.</p><p>　　The body of the magistrate may be composed of a greater or a less number of members. We said that the relation of the Sovereign to t

80、he subjects was greater in proportion as the people were more numerous, and, by a clear analogy, we may say the same of the relation of the government to the magistrates.</p><p>　　But the total force of the

81、government, being always that of the State, is invariable; so that, the more of this force it expends on its own members, the less it has left to employ on the whole people.</p><p>　　The more numerous the ma

82、gistrates, therefore, the weaker the government. This principle being fundamental, we must do our best to make it clear.</p><p>　　In the person of the magistrate we can distinguish three essentially differen

83、t wills: first, the private will of the individual, tending only to his personal advantage; secondly, the common will of the magistrates, which is relative solely to the advantage of the prince, and may be called corpora

84、te will, being general in relation to the government, and particular in relation to the State, of which the government forms part; and, in the third place, the will of the people or the sovereign will, w</p><p

85、>　　In a perfect act of legislation, the individual or particular will should be at zero; the corporate will belonging to the government should occupy a very subordinate position; and, consequently, the general or sove

86、reign will should always predominate and should be the sole guide of all the rest.</p><p>　　According to the natural order, on the other hand, these different wills become more active in proportion as they a

87、re concentrated. Thus, the general will is always the weakest, the corporate will second, and the individual will strongest of all: so that, in the government, each member is first of all himself, then a magistrate, and

88、then a citizen—in an order exactly the reverse of what the social system requires.</p><p>　　This granted, if the whole government is in the hands of one man, the particular and the corporate will are wholly

89、united, and consequently the latter is at its highest possible degree of intensity. But, as the use to which the force is put depends on the degree reached by the will, and as the absolute force of the government is inva

90、riable, it follows that the most active government is that of one man.</p><p>　　Suppose, on the other hand, we unite the government with the legislative authority, and make the Sovereign prince also, and all

91、 the citizens so many magistrates: then the corporate will, being confounded with the general will, can possess no greater activity than that will, and must leave the particular will as strong as it can possibly be. Thus

92、, the government, having always the same absolute force, will be at the lowest point of its relative force or activity.</p><p>　　These relations are incontestable, and there are other considerations which st

93、ill further confirm them. We can see, for instance, that each magistrate is more active in the body to which he belongs than each citizen in that to which he belongs, and that consequently the particular will has much mo

94、re influence on the acts of the government than on those of the Sovereign; for each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental function, while each citizen, taken singly, exercises no fu</p><p&

95、gt;　　Moreover, it is a certainty that promptitude in execution diminishes as more people are put in charge of it: where prudence is made too much of, not enough is made of fortune; opportunity is let slip, and deliberati

96、on results in the loss of its object.</p><p>　　I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more numerous th

97、e people, the greater should be the repressive force. From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, th

98、e larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion</p><p>　　It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the go

99、vernment, and not of its rectitude: for, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, m