小微企業(yè)融資行為外文文獻翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3050字,1850單詞，1萬英文字符</p><p>　　文獻出處:Daskalakis N, Jarvis R, Schizas E. Financing practices and preferences for micro and small firms[J]. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 2013,

2、 20(1): 80-101.</p><p>　　http://www.wenku1.com/news/9183F48ED10B3E7B.html</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Financing practices and preferences for micro and small ?rms</p&

3、gt;<p>　　Nikolaos Daskalakis;Robin Jarvis;Emmanouil Schizas</p><p><b>　　獻Abstract</b></p><p>　　Purpose – The aims of the paper are three-fold: ?rst, to analyse how small and m

4、icro ?rms ?nance themselves; second, to investigate what their ?nancing preferences are; and third, to explore their opinions on how they evaluate the ?nancing sources and the various obstacles they face in accessing tho

5、se sources.</p><p>　　Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a sample of Greek small and micro ?rms, which cover 99.6 per cent of the total number of ?rms operating in Greece. The data are derived from

6、the answers in a structured questionnaire.</p><p>　　Findings – The main conclusions are as follows. Regarding equity ?nancing, ?rms rely heavily on their own funds and would not raise new equity from sources

7、 outside the family; thus, there is a reluctance to use new outside equity (venture capital, business angels, etc.). Regarding debt ?nancing, ?rms denoted that they would use more debt, speci?cally long-term debt, than t

8、hey currently do. Thus, there are limitations in accessing long-term debt ?nancing. Regarding grant ?nancing, micro and small</p><p>　　Originality/value – The paper uses a sample of Greek micro and small ?rm

9、s and a survey methodology to tackle the lack of quantitative published data for most small ?rms in Greece. It incorporates distinct sources of funds that are very important for small ?rms (family funds, grants provided

10、by the state and micro-loans). It investigates preferences, not just practices.</p><p>　　Keywords: Capital structure, Micro and small ?rms, Survey, Greece, Small to medium-sized enterprises</p><p&

11、gt;　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　The growing recognition of the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to economies in the European Union (Commission of the European Communities, 2008) and the

12、acknowledgement that SMEs are relatively ?nancially constrained have resulted in a surge of interest in SME ?nancing prior to and during the current ?nancial turmoil.</p><p>　　A major area of interest, from

13、an academic and policy perspective, is analysis of the different types of ?nance that are used by SMEs, and their preferences. This subject is conventionally captured under the term “capital structure theory”. The litera

14、ture emphasises that the capital structure theory of large ?rms has very limited applicability to SMEs (Michaellas et al., 1999). There is substantial evidence that small ?rms have less access to formal sources of extern

15、al ?nance (e.g. Beck and Demi</p><p>　　In terms of SMEs it is very dif?cult to generalise about capital structure issues because of the differing size of SMEs, nature of the ?rm, the external environment and

16、 context diversity. In particular, smaller ?rms (i.e. “micro” and “small” according to the EU de?nition of SMEs[1]) are more numerous and make a signi?cant contribution to EU member state economies, but, as indicated abo

17、ve, are more constrained in raising external ?nance. The focus of this paper is on issues relating to the capita</p><p>　　The paper simultaneously addresses two important factors for small ?rm ?nancing. Firs

18、tly, the literature to date relating to SME ?nancing tends to focus on the traditional main external sources of capital for large enterprises, namely equity and debt. Although several authors acknowledge that small busin

19、esses are not “scaled-down versions” of large businesses (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997), when investigating the capital structure of SMEs, they focus on the very same sources used by large ?rms. The</p><p>　　Th

20、e study also investigates the ?nancing preferences of small ?rm owners. Respondents were asked how they would ?nance their investments and daily operations if they faced no barriers to accessing ?nance. The comparison of

21、 these preferences with their current sources of ?nance gave an important insight into the so-called “SME ?nance gap”[2]. Thus, the survey sheds light on how the entrepreneurs themselves evaluate various ?nancing sources

22、 and the corresponding obstacles they face in to gaining a</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brie?y presents some background data on the European and the Greek SME sector; Section

23、3 provides a brief background of the ?nancing patterns of micro and small ?rms. Section 4 presents the data and the methodology employed. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while section 6 concludes the paper.<

24、/p><p>　　2. SMEs in Europe and Greece</p><p>　　As mentioned previously, SMEs represent 99 per cent of the total number of enterprises in Europe and employ 67 per cent of the total number of employe

25、es in the private sector. Table I presents interesting data on numbers and percentages of enterprises and employees for EU-27 and Greece for 2008. The data are divided into size groups based on the de?nition of the Europ

26、ean Commission.</p><p>　　Table I shows that there are 19 million micro ?rms in the EU-27, which account for 91.8 per cent of the total number of enterprises and provide jobs for 39.6 million people, namely,

27、29.7 per cent of total employment. With small ?rms added, they represent 98.7 per cent of the total number of ?rms and provide half the jobs. The Greek economy is based on micro and small ?rms with even larger ?gures in

28、terms of total ?rm numbers and percentages. Speci?cally, in 2004[3] there were 902.631 ?rms operat</p><p>　　3. Financing patterns for micro and small ?rms</p><p>　　Following previous research an

29、 appropriate starting point in exploring the theory of the ?nancing of small and micro entities is through the traditional theories of the factors that determine capital structure of ?rms. A key to this theoretical frame

30、work is the consideration as to how the size of the business entity affects their ?nancial structure. The in?uence of size has been investigated by a number of researchers from a large ?rm perspective (Marsh, 1982; Benne

31、tt and Donnelly, 1993; Rajan a</p><p>　　The most in?uential explanations for the difference are:</p><p>　　. the use of the debt tax shield;</p><p>　　. asymmetric information; and<

32、;/p><p>　　. agency costs.</p><p>　　The following paragraphs expand on these explanations.</p><p>　　In the case of debt tax shields, Pettit and Singer (1985) have argued that tax consid

33、erations are of little importance for SMEs, particularly micro and small entities, as these ?rms are less likely to generate high pro?ts and therefore less likely to bene?t from using debt for tax shield reasons. Similar

34、 ?ndings were derived from later research by Michaellas et al. (1999), who argued that tax considerations do not in?uence the debt level of SMEs. Small and micro ?rms are therefore unlikely to be</p><p>　　Re

35、garding asymmetric information, the ?nancing pattern implied by this approach is the well-known pecking order theory developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Ang (1992), Holmes and Kent (1991), and Cosh and

36、 Hughes (1994) have emphasised that the pecking order theory can be detected in the choice of ?nance by SMEs. Speci?cally, small ?rms are often opaque and therefore bear high information costs per se (Psillaki, 1995). Th

37、ese costs (i.e. the information costs) can be considered n</p><p>　　Agency costs, the costs of preventing agents (mangers) pursuing their own interest at the expense of their principals (e.g. shareholders) a

38、re not likely to be in?uential from a equity perspective in the case of SMEs. Invariably SMEs are owner managed and do not have access to equity markets. In the case of external debt taken on by SMEs, for example bank ?n

39、ance, agency costs may be particularly severe, mainly due to ?rm opaqueness (Van der Wijst, 1989; Ang, 1992).</p><p>　　In summary, micro and small ?rms are expected to rely heavily on internal equity ?nancin

40、g, avoid debt ?nancing and use external equity ?nancing as a last resort.</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　小微企業(yè)的融資行為及偏好</p><p>　　尼古勞斯·扎斯卡拉基斯;羅賓·賈維斯;席察斯</p>&

41、lt;p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　目的——本文研究的目的有三個：首先,分析小微型企業(yè)融資方式;第二,調(diào)查他們的融資偏好;第三,探求他們對于如何評估融資來源的看法，以及他們獲取這些資源的過程中面臨的各種障礙。</p><p>　　設(shè)計/方法/方法——本文選取希臘小微型企業(yè)作為樣本，他們在希臘公司中所占的比例是99.6%。這些數(shù)據(jù)來自結(jié)構(gòu)式問卷

42、。</p><p>　　調(diào)查結(jié)果——主要結(jié)論如下。關(guān)于股權(quán)融資,公司嚴(yán)重依賴自己的基金，而不會從自身以外的來源籌集新股本;因此,他們不愿使用外界新股本(風(fēng)險資本,天使投資人等等)。關(guān)于債務(wù)融資,公司表示,他們將使用比現(xiàn)在更多的債務(wù),尤其是長期債券。因此，獲取長期債務(wù)融資就受到一定的限制。關(guān)于補助金資助，小、微型企業(yè)應(yīng)該更好的了解并鼓勵更多去參與國家撥款和項目計劃，因此,補助金資助存在一定的信息缺口。</p&

43、gt;<p>　　創(chuàng)意/價值——本文以希臘小、微型企業(yè)為樣本，運用調(diào)查方法解決希臘小、微型公司缺乏定量數(shù)據(jù)這一問題。它包含了對小公司來說非常重要的不同的資金來源 (家庭基金,國家提供的贈款和貸款)。它調(diào)查融資偏好，而不只是實踐。 關(guān)鍵詞：資本結(jié)構(gòu)，小、微型企業(yè)，調(diào)查，希臘，中小型企業(yè)</p><p><b>　　1、前言</b></p><p>　　當(dāng)前

44、，歐盟已經(jīng)越來越認(rèn)識到中小企業(yè)(SME)的重要性(歐洲共同體委員會,2008)，同時, 歐盟已承認(rèn)，中小企業(yè)的相對財務(wù)約束導(dǎo)致了金融動蕩期間他們?nèi)谫Y興趣的高漲。</p><p>　　從學(xué)術(shù)和政策的角度來看, 他們主要感興趣的領(lǐng)域在于分析中小企業(yè)不同類型的融資及偏好。這個主題是傳統(tǒng)術(shù)語“資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論”。文獻強調(diào),大公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論對中小企業(yè)的適用性非常有限(Michaellas et al .,1999)。有大量

45、證據(jù)表明,中小企業(yè)很難獲得正式的外部融資來源(例如貝克和Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,2006年,Kuntchev et al .,2012年 發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟體)。貝克以及其他人(2006)發(fā)現(xiàn)，年輕的小公司報告有更高的融資障礙,在下文中，貝克及其他人(2008)認(rèn)為,小型企業(yè)會使用更少的外部融資,尤其是銀行融資。</p><p>　　很難概括中小企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)問題，因為中小企業(yè)的不同規(guī)模、公司

46、的性質(zhì)、外部環(huán)境和背景具有多樣性。特別是規(guī)模較小的公司(即“微觀”和“小”，根據(jù)歐盟中小企業(yè)的定義[1])數(shù)量更多,并對歐盟成員國經(jīng)濟體做出了重要貢獻,但是,如上所述,在提高外部融資上有更多的約束。本文的重點是對希臘微型和小型企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)問題進行分析, 這些公司在歐盟中小企業(yè)的分類中擁有更高比例，且在成員國較小的中小企業(yè)財務(wù)問題中得到優(yōu)選探討。研究文獻為此做出了巨大的貢獻，并為決策者提供了重要的洞察力方向，此外，其他小公司利益相關(guān)

47、者更加關(guān)心提高初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的數(shù)目,小型企業(yè)在希臘的生長與存活率,；就作者的知識而言，關(guān)于希臘中小企業(yè)的融資渠道問題還沒有其他的個案研究研究。此外,通過研究中小企業(yè)的定義,其研究結(jié)果應(yīng)當(dāng)給其它國家相同規(guī)模企業(yè)的融資模式一個更好的理解。</p><p>　　這篇文章同時指出小公司融資的兩個重要因素。首先,在迄今的研究文獻中，有關(guān)中小企業(yè)的融資往往集中在傳統(tǒng)的大型企業(yè)的主要外部資金來源上,也就是股票和債券。盡管有些作者承認(rèn)

48、，小型企業(yè)不是大型企業(yè)的“縮小版”(克雷西與歐佛森，1997),當(dāng)調(diào)查中小企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)時,他們關(guān)注的是與大公司相同的來源。他們需要需要整合資源而不是在中小企業(yè)的融資模式中的傳統(tǒng)融資來源，貝克及其他人(2008)。本文同時對不同來源的資金加以考慮，他們對規(guī)模較小的公司是非常重要的。這些包括來自家庭的基金、貿(mào)易信貸、政府和其他地區(qū)的機構(gòu)提供的各種資助和小額信貸。本研究認(rèn)為這些和其他資金來源反映出了小公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)問題。</p>

49、<p>　　這項研究還調(diào)查小公司所有者的融資偏好。受訪者被問及如果他們沒有金融壁壘時如何進行金融投資和日常運營。比較這些首選項與他們當(dāng)前的融資來源，其給所謂的“中小企業(yè)融資缺口”提供了洞察方向[2]。因此，這項調(diào)查揭示了企業(yè)家本身如何評價他們的各種融資來源以及他們在獲得這些資源時面臨的障礙。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分如下。第二部分簡要提出了一些關(guān)于歐洲和希臘中小企業(yè)部門的背景資料；第三部分

50、對小、微型企業(yè)的融資模式背景進行了簡要介紹；第四部分介紹了數(shù)據(jù)和使用的方法；第五部分提出了實證結(jié)果；第六部分總結(jié)了全文。</p><p>　　2、歐洲與希臘的中小企業(yè)</p><p>　　如前所述，中小企業(yè)在歐洲占企業(yè)總數(shù)的99%，私營部門雇傭的雇員為總數(shù)的67%。表1展示了有趣的數(shù)據(jù)，歐盟企業(yè)和員工的百分比數(shù)據(jù)為27。企業(yè)和員工。根據(jù)歐盟委員會(European Commission)的

51、定義數(shù)據(jù)分為不同大小。</p><p>　　表1顯示, 在歐盟有1900萬個微型企業(yè),占企業(yè)總數(shù)的91.8%,為3960萬人提供就業(yè),即為就業(yè)總?cè)藬?shù)的29.7%。隨著小型企業(yè)的加入，它們占了公司總數(shù)的98.7%，并提供了將近一半的工作。在公司總數(shù)和百分比上，希臘經(jīng)濟在小、微型企業(yè)上具有更大的優(yōu)勢。具體地說,在2004年[3]，在希臘運轉(zhuǎn)的公司有902.631,為大約二百萬人提供工作。絕大多數(shù)企業(yè)是微觀企業(yè)(96.

52、5%),為58%的從業(yè)人員提供工作，大大高于歐盟27國的29.7%?？偠灾?、微型企業(yè)多達(dá)50名雇員代表商業(yè)經(jīng)濟的一個非常重要的區(qū)域。他們創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機會的能力,容易適應(yīng)經(jīng)濟環(huán)境的靈活性以及耐力是近年來研究的主題。然而，這是一個巨大的領(lǐng)域，根據(jù)數(shù)據(jù)顯示，還需要進一步探討。</p><p>　　3、小、微型企業(yè)的融資模式</p><p>　　在先前的研究中合適的探索小、微型企業(yè)的融資理論的起

53、點是通過傳統(tǒng)的理論因素確定公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。這個理論框架的關(guān)鍵是考慮企業(yè)實體的大小如何影響他們的金融結(jié)構(gòu)。企業(yè)實體大小的影響已被許多研究人員研究，從大型公司的角度(馬爾什,1982;班納特和唐納利,1993; 拉詹和津加萊斯,1995;潘諾博士,2003; 曼里克，2005;希臘,艾迪斯與其他人，2007)，從中小型企業(yè)的角度(科特，1999；邁克爾，在希臘的具體情況, 扎斯卡拉基斯,2008;帕薩利，扎斯卡拉基斯,2009)。文獻分析表

54、明，實體大小也影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)的決策。解釋資本結(jié)構(gòu)的差異,由于企業(yè)的規(guī)模已經(jīng)確定 (佩蒂特和桑熱,1985; 奇滕登，1996; 克雷西和歐福森,1997;</p><p>　　喬丹，1998;貝克，2008)。</p><p>　　最具影響力的解釋差異是：</p><p><b>　　使用債務(wù)稅盾；</b></p><p>

55、;<b>　　信息不對稱；</b></p><p><b>　　代理成本。</b></p><p>　　以下段落對這些解釋進行了詳盡闡釋。</p><p>　　對于債務(wù)稅盾，佩蒂特和桑熱(1985)認(rèn)為，稅收因素對中小企業(yè)影響小、微，特別是小、微型企業(yè)，因為這些公司不太可能產(chǎn)生高額利潤，因此不太可能受益于使用債務(wù)稅盾。類似

56、的研究結(jié)果來自后來邁克爾等人.(1999)的研究，他們認(rèn)為，稅務(wù)考慮不影響中小企業(yè)的債務(wù)水平。小微型企業(yè)因此不太可能受到稅收考慮資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策的影響。債務(wù)稅盾的另一個維度是專門為希臘環(huán)境創(chuàng)造的，指避稅和逃稅。例如，馬克金和弗拉特莫(2010)認(rèn)為，作為個體，收入漏報的比率約為24%，因而導(dǎo)致稅收收入不足26%。因此，利用債務(wù)稅盾對希臘的重要性并不明顯。</p><p>　　關(guān)于信息不對稱，融資模式所隱含的這種方法是

57、邁爾斯(1984)和邁爾斯、邁基里夫(1984)提出的眾所周知的優(yōu)序融資理論。昂(1992)，福爾摩斯和肯特(1991)，休斯(1994)強調(diào)，中小企業(yè)融資選擇中優(yōu)序融資理論已得到運用。具體地說,小公司往往是不透明的，因此承受著較高的信息成本 (Psillaki,1995)。這些費用(信息成本)可以被認(rèn)為是零供但非常高的內(nèi)部資金，當(dāng)發(fā)行新資本而債券通過一個中間位置而存在時，例如,資產(chǎn)證券化(Jobst,2006)。因此,小型和微型企業(yè)預(yù)

58、計將嚴(yán)重依賴內(nèi)部資金,利用較低的債務(wù)水平和避免外部股權(quán)融資。不受外部干擾的經(jīng)營企業(yè)是對于中小企業(yè)的所有者或管理者來說是一個非常重要的問題。尤其當(dāng)內(nèi)部資金不足：公司將更喜歡債務(wù)新股，主要是因為債務(wù)帶來了低水平的入侵。</p><p>　　代理成本，防止代理人(經(jīng)理)追求他們自己的利益而犧牲主體(如股東)的成本，從公平的角度來看中小企業(yè)不太可能具有影響力。中小企業(yè)通常是通過所有者管理而沒有進入股票市場。中小企業(yè)在負(fù)有