外文翻譯--公司治理對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)價(jià)值關(guān)系的影響

1、<p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文</b></p><p><b>　　一、外文原文</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The influence of corporate governance on the relation between capi

2、tal structure and value </p><p>　　Capital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streams</p><p>　　When looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation

3、 between capital structure and value, as illustrated in Figure 1, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones.</p><p>　　Modiglian

4、i and Miller (1958), who had originally asserted that there was no relationship between capital structure and value ; in 1963, instead, reached the paradoxical and provocative conclusion that a maximum level of debt woul

5、d mean a maximum level of firm value, due to the fact that interest is tax deductible . Many later contributions pointed out that this effect is compensated when considering personal taxes (Miller, 1977),an eventual lack

6、 of tax capacity, due to the presence of economic l</p><p>　　Furthermore, it can be observed that debt increases in correspondence with the better the firm’s reputation is on the market (Chevalier, 1995). Re

7、search has shown similarities between firms that belong to the same sector (Titman and Wessels, 1988); in other words, capital structure tends to be industry-specific.</p><p>　　The empirical comparison betwe

8、en the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory seems to be controversial. On one hand, empirical evidence shows moderate coherence with the trade-off theory, when revenue and agency problems are taken into consider

9、ation contextually; on the other hand, the negative relation between leverage and firm profit does not seem to support the trade-off theory, as it confirms a hierarchical order in financial decision making.</p>&l

10、t;p>　　It is, thus, clear that the topic of capital structure is anything but defined and that there are still many open problems regarding it.</p><p>　　As many authors have noted (Rajan and Zingales, 1995

11、) capital structure is a ‘‘hot’’ topic in finance. By analyzing international literature the main research priorities and new analytical approaches are related to:the important comparison between ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘behav

12、ioural’’ finance (Barberis and Thaler, 2002);a lively comparison made between the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999);the attempt to apply these theories to small firms (Berger and

13、 Udell, </p><p>　　The behavioural approach, that considers the pecking order of financial resources in terms of ‘‘irrational’’ preferences, caused an immediate reaction from Stewart Myers in 2000 and 2001 an

14、d jointly with Shyam-Sunder in 1999 (Myers, 2000; 2001; Shyam-Sunder and Myers,1999). Stewart Myers is the founder of the pecking order theory[7]. Problems of information asymmetry, together with transaction costs, would

15、 be able to offer a rational explanation to managerial behaviour when financial choices are</p><p>　　Moreover, studies on capital structure have also been done looking at small and medium size firms (Berger

16、and Udell, 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999, Romano et al., 2000, Fluck, 2001),due to the relevant economic role of these firms (in Europe they are 95 percent of the total firms operating). Zingales (2000) as well has emphas

17、ized the fact that today ‘‘ . . . the attention shown towards large firms tends to partially obscure firms that do not have access to the financial markets . . . ’’. In one o</p><p>　　Finally, the observatio

18、ns of Michael Jensen (1986), made throughout his many contributions on corporate governance, as well as those of Williamson (1988), have encouraged a line of research that, revitalized in the second part of the nineties,

19、 seems to be quite promising as a means to analyze how corporate governance directly or indirectly influences the relation between capital structure and value (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Myers, 2000, De Jong, 2002,Berger

20、and Patti, 2003, Brailsford et al., 2</p><p>　　Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value.</p><p>　　Capital structure can be analyzed by looking at the

21、 rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity, governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and c

22、orporate governance instruments (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when

23、 capital </p><p>　　Coase (1991), in a sort of critique on his own work done in 1937, points out that it is important to pay more attention to the role of capital structure as an instrument that can mediate a

24、nd moderate economical transactions within the firm and, consequently, between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders (corporate governance relations).</p><p>　　As explicitly pointed out by Bhagat and Jefferis

25、 (2002), when they pay particular attention to the relations between cause and effect and to their interactions recently described on a theoretical level (Fluck, 1998, Zhang, 1998, Heinrich, 2000, Brailsford et al., 2004

26、,Mahrt-Smith, 2005), a ‘‘research proposal’’ that future empirical studies should evaluate should be, how corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value

27、, with an ef</p><p>　　The five relations identified in Figure 2 describe:the relation between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through a role of corporate governance ‘‘mediation’’ ; the relation

28、 between capital structure and firm value (relation A) through the role of capital governance ‘‘moderation’’ (relation D);the role of corporate governance as a determining factor in choices regarding capital structure (r

29、elation E).</p><p>　　All five relations shown in Figure 2 are particularly interesting and show two threads of research that focus on the relations between:corporate governance and capital structure, where t

30、he dimensions of the corporate governance determine firmfinancing choices, causing a possible relation of co-causation Whether management voluntarily chooses to use debt as a source of financing to reduce problems of inf

31、ormation asymmetry and transaction, maximizing the efficiency of its firm governance decisions</p><p>　　On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firm governance activities by mo

32、difying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance

33、decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when defining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantl</p><p>　　On the other hand, e

34、ven corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure (relation E). Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firmfinancing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in th

35、is case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt.Internal resource financing allows

36、management to prevent other subjects fro</p><p>　　In this light, firm financing decisions can be strictly deliberated by managers-entrepreneurs or else can be induced by specific situations that go beyond th

37、e will of the management.</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　This paper define a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance an

38、d value, while they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital structure represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create valu

39、e.Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation,financing policies, together with other gov</p><p>　　In other words, various authors (Borsch-Supan and Koke,

40、2000, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002 and Berger and Patti, 2003) point out the necessity to analyze the relation between capital structure and value by always taking into consideration the interaction between corporate govern

41、ance variables such as ownership concentration, management participation in the equity capital, the composition of the Board of Directors, etc.</p><p>　　Furthermore, there is a problem in the way to operatio

42、nalize these constructs, due to multidimensional nature of these. It is quite difficult to identify indicators that perfectly correspond to theoretical constructs; it means that proxy variables, or empirical measures of

43、latent constructs, must be used (Corbetta, 1992).</p><p>　　Moreover, it must be considered possible that there may be distortions in the signs and entities of the connections between variables due to endogen

44、eity problems, or rather the presence of co-variation even when there is no cause, and reciprocal cause, where the distinction between the cause variable and the effect variable are lacking, and the two reciprocally infl

45、uence each other.</p><p>　　From an econometric point of view, therefore, it would seem to be important to further investigate the research proposal outlined above, by empirically examining the model proposed

46、 in Figure 2 using appropriate econometric techniques that can handle the complexity of the relations between the elements studied. Some proposals for study can be found in literature; the use of lagged variables is crit

47、icized by Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000) that affirm that it would be better to determine instrumental </p><p>　　In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to clarifying the relation

48、s between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting,as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this model through application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms

49、and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms,the researcher has to take into account t</p><p>　　Source: Mauriz

50、io La Rocca,2007 “The influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and value”. corporate gorernance,vol.7,no.3april,pp.312-325.</p><p><b>　　二、翻譯文章</b></p>&l

51、t;p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　公司治理對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)價(jià)值關(guān)系的影響</p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu): 關(guān)系到公司價(jià)值及其主要研究趨向</p><p>　　當(dāng)查看關(guān)于描述資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)價(jià)值兩者之間總體關(guān)系的最重要的理論文獻(xiàn)時(shí)，會(huì)明顯感覺(jué)到早期的理論與新近的理論有實(shí)質(zhì)性的不同。</p><p>

52、;　　莫迪里亞尼和米勒(1958年),宣稱(chēng)原本資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值沒(méi)有關(guān)系的理論者，在1963年得出了與此前自相矛盾的結(jié)論,最大程度的債務(wù)由于可以申請(qǐng)扣減稅項(xiàng)將意味著公司的價(jià)值的最大化。很多晚期的文獻(xiàn)中指出了這種效果是在考慮補(bǔ)償個(gè)人所得稅(米勒,1977),但是由于最終缺少付稅能力,以及增進(jìn)直接或間接的財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)成本使得最終由于債務(wù)資金成本的增加，導(dǎo)致利潤(rùn)的減少。表明了一個(gè)最理想水平的債務(wù),由于財(cái)務(wù)杠桿的增加將導(dǎo)致債務(wù)的增長(zhǎng)。此外,這個(gè)非單調(diào)的

53、關(guān)系會(huì)被修改甚至考慮了代理金融災(zāi)難成本。最后,還有研究(麥爾斯,梅爾斯1984年)指出管理偏好在于融資資源的選擇。在這種情況下沒(méi)有最理想客觀的水平債務(wù),但這是由于不同的情形而使得經(jīng)營(yíng)者不得不這樣處理。功能管理的偏好由于特定的相關(guān)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng),所以對(duì)企業(yè)債務(wù)水平的切線將會(huì)由企業(yè)之間的價(jià)值功能和管理曲線相切而成。</p><p>　　此外，我們可以觀察到，在市場(chǎng)中，企業(yè)的債務(wù)增加和企業(yè)的聲譽(yù)變好是一致的。研究表明，公司

54、之間的相似在相同的部門(mén)，換句話說(shuō)，資本結(jié)構(gòu)是趨于特定行業(yè)的。</p><p>　　實(shí)證證明交換理論和順序理論是有爭(zhēng)議的。一方面，研究顯示，一貫穩(wěn)定的交換理論允許考慮收入與代理問(wèn)題。另外一方面，公司的利潤(rùn)與財(cái)務(wù)杠桿的負(fù)面影響，似乎并沒(méi)有支持交換理論，因?yàn)樗诖_定財(cái)務(wù)決策了有了等級(jí)的秩序。</p><p>　　這也因此清楚地表明，資本結(jié)構(gòu)除了定義呀還有好多值得研究的話題。</p>

55、<p>　　許多作者所著的文獻(xiàn),如拉詹(1995)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論是一種“熱”的金融話題。通過(guò)國(guó)際文獻(xiàn)的主要研究重點(diǎn)和新的分析方法涉及到：比較重要的“理性行為金融”是一個(gè)順序理論和交換理論(Shyam-Sunder和梅耶,1999),我試圖把這些理論運(yùn)用到中小公司和大公司的治理，最終體現(xiàn)出資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值的關(guān)系?！?lt;/p><p>　　行為方法認(rèn)為順序金融資源的偏好“非理性”條款,造成了斯圖爾特在2000

56、年和2001年會(huì)同Shyam-Sunder提出在1999年所做出的反映，斯圖爾特是順序融資理論的創(chuàng)始人之一。信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)結(jié)合交易成本,將提供一個(gè)合理的解釋?zhuān)?cái)務(wù)管理行為做出選擇是分等級(jí)的。換句話說(shuō),根據(jù)梅爾斯的理論,應(yīng)該有一種“理性”所觀測(cè)到現(xiàn)象的解釋。</p><p>　　此外,有些學(xué)者研究過(guò)中小企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的理論(柏格與Udell,1998,Michaelas等,1999,2000年,羅馬Fluck等)后發(fā)現(xiàn),

57、由于這些公司有關(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)的作用(在歐洲,他們是95%的總數(shù)公司經(jīng)營(yíng))，現(xiàn)在強(qiáng)調(diào)的是“…這種關(guān)注表明大型企業(yè)將趨向那些沒(méi)有進(jìn)入金融市場(chǎng)的企業(yè)……”。最有趣的一個(gè)關(guān)于這個(gè)主題所做的研究是赫和Udell(1998)所宣稱(chēng)的“公司的財(cái)務(wù)行為取決于他們生活循環(huán)的階段。”事實(shí)上, 相關(guān)生命周期階段的公司應(yīng)該有一個(gè)最優(yōu)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。</p><p>　　最后邁克爾·杰森(1986年)對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值及公司治理關(guān)系的研究有許

58、多貢獻(xiàn)，威廉姆斯(1988)在90年代也鼓勵(lì)研究了公司治理與資本結(jié)構(gòu)這兩個(gè)部分內(nèi)容,使之很有希望成為公司治理與資本、企業(yè)價(jià)值的直接或間接關(guān)系的分析方法(Fluck,1998年, Jong,2002,柏格與帕蒂,2003, 2004年,等)。確認(rèn)合成是可能的,因?yàn)樵诮忉尮局饕獎(jiǎng)?chuàng)造價(jià)值的能力時(shí)聯(lián)合分析公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和公司治理是有必要的(Zingales,2000,海因里希,2000,Bhagat和Jefferis,2002)。這方面的考慮

59、可以幫助克服在理論和經(jīng)驗(yàn)層面之間的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值的爭(zhēng)議。</p><p>　　公司治理影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值的關(guān)系</p><p>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)可以在權(quán)利和屬性的前瞻性特點(diǎn)下進(jìn)行公司資產(chǎn)以及不同層次的管理活動(dòng)的影響下進(jìn)行分析。因此，股票和債券必須被視為兩種金融工具與治理工具(威廉姆森,1988): 債券的管理活動(dòng)更加嚴(yán)格，而股票有更大的靈活性和更多的決策能力，由此可以推測(cè),當(dāng)資本結(jié)構(gòu)成

60、為企業(yè)治理的影響因素,眾所周知債務(wù)和股權(quán)的混合體要考慮稅收的影響?，F(xiàn)金流量的方法是分配現(xiàn)金(現(xiàn)金流權(quán)),更重要的是,做出如何決定對(duì)這家公司的管理權(quán)(選舉權(quán))的管理方法也是必須研究的。例如,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家們對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)和金融合同是怎樣布局特別敏感,這樣，最佳企業(yè)管理將得到保證，而管理激勵(lì)機(jī)制和約束機(jī)制也可同時(shí)建立。</p><p>　　科斯（1991）在他1937完成的一篇文章里，明確指出,它是很重視資本結(jié)構(gòu)的作用,并將

61、其作為可以調(diào)整經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)務(wù)的工具,因此,企業(yè)家之間以及其他利益相關(guān)者之間具有很重要的作用。</p><p>　　正如Bhagat and Jefferis (2002)明確指出，當(dāng)他們重點(diǎn)注意因果關(guān)系和在理論水平上的相互作用時(shí)，提到一個(gè)未來(lái)應(yīng)評(píng)估實(shí)證研究的“研究計(jì)劃”。公司治理如何影響公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　圖二中清晰的描述了五種關(guān)系：資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)價(jià)值之間的

62、關(guān)系通過(guò)公司治理來(lái)“調(diào)解”（關(guān)系A(chǔ)）；資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系通過(guò)角色的資本治理關(guān)系穩(wěn)定（關(guān)系D），選擇一個(gè)確定的因素對(duì)資本結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司治理的作用進(jìn)行分析（關(guān)系E）。</p><p>　　圖二中顯示的五種關(guān)系特別有趣并且體現(xiàn)兩個(gè)線性關(guān)系：企業(yè)治理與資本結(jié)構(gòu)，其中對(duì)公司的治理的規(guī)模來(lái)確定企業(yè)的融資的選擇，造成了因果關(guān)系的可能。無(wú)論管理層是否自愿選擇使用管理的一種債務(wù)融資來(lái)降低信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)和交易的問(wèn)題,最大程度的提高

63、公司決策的效率，或迫于股東的行為提高債務(wù)水平作為一種政策，以保證公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)的良好發(fā)展，資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響公司治理（關(guān)系E），反之亦然（關(guān)系B）。</p><p>　　一方面，如何處理債務(wù)和股權(quán)變更，是通過(guò)影響公司管理活動(dòng)改變激勵(lì)機(jī)制和管理來(lái)控制的。如果，通過(guò)債務(wù)和股權(quán)的組合，各種不同種類(lèi)的投資者都在收斂公司，在那里他們對(duì)不同類(lèi)型的治理決定上產(chǎn)生影響，然后經(jīng)理往往會(huì)用自己的偏好決定這些類(lèi)別的公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)。更重要的是通過(guò)

64、具體設(shè)計(jì)的債務(wù)和股權(quán)的合同有可能大幅度提升公司治理效率。</p><p>　　另一方面，甚至公司治理影響著資本結(jié)構(gòu)（關(guān)系E）。梅爾斯(1984)展示了這種關(guān)系，選擇都是由管理層的偏好決定的，在這種情況下,，如果經(jīng)理選擇的融資可以認(rèn)為是可以避免決策能力降低。內(nèi)部資源融資允許管理者防止其他部門(mén)介入他們的決策過(guò)程。德容(2002)宣布荷蘭經(jīng)理盡量減少使用債務(wù)，使他們的決策權(quán)力仍然集中。茨威貝爾(1996)觀察到經(jīng)理不自

65、覺(jué)接受“紀(jì)律”的債務(wù)，其他治理機(jī)制實(shí)施也是有爭(zhēng)議的。杰森(1986)指出，決定自愿增加公司債務(wù)由管理當(dāng)局者“消除”利益相關(guān)者的決定，其決定是“正確”的。</p><p>　　有鑒于此，公司融資決策可以嚴(yán)格審議管理人員，企業(yè)家或其他可以被超越的管理將有具體情況引起。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　本文定義一種理論方

66、法,可以有助于理清與資產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和價(jià)值的關(guān)系, 同時(shí)也推動(dòng)實(shí)證研究的精確設(shè)計(jì)。公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)治理代表了保持合適效率和保護(hù)它創(chuàng)造價(jià)值的能力的許多工具之一。因此,這個(gè)論文的研究肯定了在投資政策允許下，價(jià)值創(chuàng)造、融資政策,再加上其他的治理方法,可以確保投資政策有效地使公司價(jià)值最大化。</p><p>　　換句話說(shuō),許多作者(Borsch-Supan和Koke，2000，Bhagat和Jefferis，2002

67、，柏格與帕蒂，2003)指出了分析資本結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值關(guān)系的必要性，以及分析了公司通過(guò)公司價(jià)值與治理的交互作用的考慮變量，如股權(quán)集中度、管理參與股權(quán)資本、組成董事會(huì)等。</p><p>　　此外，因?yàn)檫@些裝置之間有多維性，處理這些結(jié)構(gòu)存在一定的問(wèn)題。很難確定具體的指標(biāo)完全符合理論的構(gòu)建，意味著代理變量或經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的措施潛在的構(gòu)造風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　除此之外，它還必須考慮到可能扭曲變量之間的

68、實(shí)際問(wèn)題，或由于在他們面前缺乏區(qū)別原因變量和變量的的影響，這兩種理論彼此之間產(chǎn)生相互影響。</p><p>　　從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)來(lái)看，進(jìn)一步探討實(shí)證研究是非常重要的，在圖2的模型中建議處理元素關(guān)系的復(fù)雜研究可以采用適當(dāng)?shù)慕?jīng)濟(jì)計(jì)量技術(shù)。一些研究的建議可以在一些文獻(xiàn)中找到；Borsch-Supan and Koke(2000)對(duì)采用間隔變量是一種批評(píng)的態(tài)度，他們認(rèn)為論證它們最好是使用兩個(gè)研究原理中的其中一個(gè)決定變量。柏

69、格與帕蒂(2003)和陳和納(1999)引進(jìn)結(jié)構(gòu)模型方程來(lái)應(yīng)用解決這些問(wèn)題，那是一種適當(dāng)?shù)睦碚?，?lái)研究測(cè)試多指標(biāo)的一維或是多維變量的因果關(guān)系，</p><p>　　在結(jié)論部分,本文定義了一個(gè)理論模型,對(duì)明確資本結(jié)構(gòu)之間的關(guān)系、公司治理與公司價(jià)值的研究，從而促進(jìn)了為今后的研究驗(yàn)證分析企業(yè)與公司之間樣本范圍有效性模型的應(yīng)用分析。為了研究分析公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值之間的相互作用關(guān)系，研究者不能不考慮表2所顯