外文翻譯---關(guān)于油輪事故處理的安全事件法

1、<p><b>　　附錄Ⅱ 外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　Developing a Safety Case Approach for the Treatment of Tanker Incidents</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　In this paper

2、we examine new methods for investigating and evaluating marine accidents at the internationa level. The main feature is the assessment of risks because ship safety regulations have so far failed to address the risks caus

3、ed by ships. In decision-making process criteria may be used to determine whether risks are acceptable or tolerable. The Safety Case Approach is a risk-management methodology that may assist ship operators to reduce risk

4、s to as low as reasonably practicable. It does</p><p>　　Keywords: Tanker incidents, risk-based techniques, new rule-making culture, safety case approach</p><p>　　1.Introduction </p><p

5、>　　It has been acknowledged, based on past experience, that accident investigations in the maritime field are not an easy task. Parties involved, namely shipowners, underwriters, cargo owners and flag state authoritie

6、s seemed reluctant or were unable to release information with respect to marine accidents or near-miss situations, the main reason being the future legal implications particularly when negligence or liability arises. No

7、further improvement has been made over the last years despite the </p><p>　　It has been noted that, Intertanko (1998) the intemational legal framework for shipping is directed mostly at handling claims than

8、the preventing of accidents. This situation graduallychanges with the adoption of new safety culture and quality management techniques mostly expressed through the International Safety Management (ISM) Code which require

9、s shipping companies to operate on-board a safety-related incident reporting system including events that did not occur. However, in practice it woul</p><p>　　2. Risk-Based Techniques and Related Legislation

10、 </p><p>　　According to Australian/New Zealand Standards Organisations, "risk management" is the systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying,

11、 analyzing, assessing, treating and monitoring risk, whereas "risk assessment" is the process used to determine risk management priorities by evaluating and comparing the level of risk against predetermined sta

12、ndards, target risk levels or other criteria Bailey (1999). </p><p>　　It would undoubtedly be better to examine risk before accidents occur rather than reaching the stage of cure, where political pressure us

13、ually followed by human or environmental tragedies is forced. To draft or amend regulations is a time-consuming process (including the stage of implementation) and should not be based on subjective opinions of regulators

14、 but rather on a systematic and rational examination of the issues and reliable information dependent on true statistics. Risk assessment is a </p><p>　　It has been demonstrated that prescriptive rules favou

15、red an attitude closely related to a "compliance culture". The new target should be to become more pro-active in pursuit of a "safety culture" Parker (1999). The beginning could be attributed to IMO

16、and the ISM Code introduced in 1993, incorporated in the SOLAS convention in 1994 and implemented in 1998 as a "quality management system". "The ISM Code" is laying down requirements for a strong link

17、 between shore and sea staff and introduces th</p><p>　　"Formal Safety Assessment" (FSA) was proposed by the UK Marine Safety Agency to IMO in 1993, and it has it roots in the nuclear industry. It

18、is a risk assessment process identifying potential hazards in a system and assessing the risk levels of these hazards. Its basic objective is to improve prescriptive safety rules and regulations. </p><p>　　O

19、n the other hand, the "Safety Case Approach" (SCA) is not aiming at the traditional ship safety policy such as the application of statutory rules and regulations (prescriptive approach) because the latter inhib

20、its innovative approaches, can allow development of responsibility and has problems keeping up to date with new technology. The SCA is based on the goal-setting principle. According to Kuo (1998), it is a document prepa

21、red by the operator of an installation (likely a ship) to demonstrate</p><p>　　The SCA and the FSA both involve identification of hazards, assessment of the risk levels of key hazards and methods of risk red

22、uction. Their fundamental differences are primarily in their basic objective, that is to say, the FSA is based on the prescriptive principle, and secondly the SCA is generally applied to a particular ship whereas FSA is

23、applied to safety issues common to a particular type or to a particular hazard. With regard to the SCA and ISM Code, they are both devised to improve th</p><p>　　3. The Safety Case Approach</p><p&

24、gt;　　One of the principle advantages of risk assessment is that the technique can be applied before an incident has taken place. However, before referring to risk management methodologies, it is useful to explain what i

25、s meant by risk. "Risk" is the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. Risk is measured in terms of consequence and likelihood. "Hazard" is a source of potential harm o

26、r a situation with a potential to cause loss. According to Kuo, before applying or im</p><p>　　(i) The international dimension: ships and other marine vehicles are not fixed locations, they travel from place

27、 to place and in order to maximize their profits they wish to reduce time spent into ports. It is obvious that international rules are applied to ships and not legislation of one state. That worsens the possibility of re

28、aching common international standards at least through a short or medium process. </p><p>　　(ii) The existing marine experience: the shipping industry has gained over a long period of time sound experience

29、and many international regulations were based on those principles. It is of no doubt that we cannot ignore this source of information let alone that alternative solutions do not exist. </p><p>　　(iii) The sa

30、fety culture: this element targets the human factor. When applying different methodologies it is not an easy task to quickly alter human behaviour and attitude. Education and training are the key aspects in this task. &l

31、t;/p><p>　　The central element of the SCA is the Safety Management System (SMS) which has five components: (a) policy formulation, (b) organize resources and the communication of information, (c) implement the

32、agreed policies, (d) measure that the required standards are met and,(e) review performance and make relevant refinements. It must be noted that the SMS is functioning as a continuously improving feature. </p><

33、;p>　　4. Applications of the Safety Case Approach </p><p>　　Although most ship-accident databases are not including complete reports and accurate information owing to parameters such as the inconsistency o

34、f new entries, the ill-recorded specific data, the non-existence of a common procedure for the quality of data, in the tanker industry serious accidents are caught in the middle of world wide coverage on account of the c

35、argoes carried and the possible negative results and so statistics are fairly reliable. It has been suggested that, the amount of avai</p><p>　　We have examined a total of 79 tanker accidents that were caus

36、ed by fire or explosion during a 20-year period (1980-2000). The available data were related only to crude carriers over 10,000 G.R.T. and did not include mixed accidents, i.e. a fire or explosion triggered by collisions

37、 or groundings or contacts or war operations Alexopoulos et A1. (2002). The specific parameters used for assessment and analysis purposes were the year of built, flag and GRT of the vessel, the date and geographical ar&l

38、t;/p><p>　　Each hazard could be classified into groups by its type, e.g. which are the most familiar, popular or less popular types or which is the most common or rare in terms of severity. This classification

39、 will assist in the selection of risk assessment techniques for establishing the risk level of each identified hazard. </p><p>　　The element of "risk assessment" is shown by constructing and quanti

40、fying a "risk contribution tree" which is based on fault and tree structures and determined from accident or failure data. The target is to link potential hazards with events in the form of a tree with a number

41、 of branches. At every junction of two or more branches, two options (logic gates) are used: option 1: OR and option 2: AND. The first option is satisfied if one or more of the events are fulfilled whereas the second opt

42、io</p><p>　　The outcomes when a tanker was in a critical condition, facing catastrophic consequences in terms of the highest risks involved where: </p><p>　　(i) In case of a tanker being loaded,

43、 a fire/explosion, particularly in the cargo tanks, resulted in a serious pollution incident and loss of human lives. </p><p>　　(ii) In case of a ballast voyage, the fire/explosion was provoked either while

44、cleaning cargo tanks or executing repairs. Under these circumstances usually the oil spill was minor (i.e. bunker leakage) but human lives again were lost. </p><p>　　(iii) Many fires/explosions have occurre

45、d in the engine room but, apart from a few cases, there were no human lives lost and pollution depended on whether the tanker had carried cargo. </p><p>　　(iv) There were a number of cases when fire/explosio

46、n while discharging led to loss of lives (crew and terminal workers) and to significant oil spills. The potential result of this method is the location of each hazard associated with risk levels covering intolerable, to

47、lerable and negligible regions. This was done by using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and related statistica information. It will help the next task which aims at reducing the risk levels of selec

48、ted haza</p><p>　　By presenting the categories and sub-categories of fire/explosion in terms of the frequency of accidents and the magnitude of accident outcomes quantified in risk terms we have identified t

49、he high risk areas and the principal influences that affect the level of risk. The next element is "risk reduction" in order to produce a range of risk control measures being effective against risk reduction. I

50、n determining how much risk reduction should be done and whether possible solutions are cost-effectiv</p><p>　　From the matrix we can observe the hazards belonging to the intolerable, tolerable and negligibl

51、e regions. In our study we focus on a combination of specific measures for risk reduction: </p><p>　　(i) Management method (related to human factor). Tanker crews must be aware of the dangers encountered th

52、rough better training, communication and knowledge of handling crisis situations on board.</p><p>　　(ii) Engineering method (related to hardware failure). Particularly when operating the COW and IGS and othe

53、r systems (either built or added on within a design). </p><p>　　(iii) Operational method (related to procedures). All measures to mitigate risks must be followed according to written procedures and./or polic

54、ies adopted by the company. The output of this phase is that all hazards included in the intolerable risk region are reduced and relocated to the tolerable region. Also, some of the hazards located in the tolerable risk

55、region could be further reduced.</p><p>　　By considering the risks and enforcing the risk control measures in the previous steps we proceed to the estimate of costs and benefits for all risk control options.

56、 The aim is to rank risk control options from a "cost-benefit perspective" so as to facilitate the management decisions, because to move a hazard from an intolerable region to the negligible one it might involv

57、e a huge cost so as to render the whole research too expensive. A comparison should be made between the total cost of the con</p><p>　　The next element is "emergency preparedness". In this case res

58、ponsibility for safety issues while the vessel is sailing vests in the master. Steps to follow should include, the alarm is raised, the incident is located and assessed and the manpower and equipment required to deal wit

59、h the incident is organized Galbraith (1999). He must be aware of situations arising, even when reduced hazards previously belonging to intolerable risk level may create an emergency again, In parallel, the shipping co&l

60、t;/p><p>　　Borrowed from the database, an 11-year-old tanker while in a ballast voyage, broke in two following an explosion and later sank. From the crew members, 18 were rescued by a passing vessel whereas 3 d

61、ied. Some of the crew was engaged in tank cleaning operations preparatory to loading another cargo when the explosion occurred. In more detail, once it has become known that a fire/explosion occurred on board: An "i

62、nvestigation" must take place to determine the causes. Then, a "decision" must be made</p><p>　　Finally, the element of the "safety management system" is including the key steps of &

63、quot;policy" which concentrates on the generation of safety culture leading to staff (crew and shore) commitment to work, to control risk levels and to support positive initiatives. The "organize" procedu

64、re is based on good communication systems on safety matters between all interesting parties, i.e. shiponwers, classification societies, port authorities, cargo owners, etc. The "implementation" procedure deals

65、with</p><p>　　5. Conclusions </p><p>　　The ex-former secretary-general of the IMO, W. O'Neil stated that human error is responsible for almost 90% of marine accidents, directly or indirectly

66、, through actions, decisions and violations. The response so far has been to tinker with the technology and change the hardware. In other words, the prescriptive approach has serious limitations as a safety assessment to

67、ol. The need for a shipping company to proceed from prescriptive regulations to a safety case approach requires a radical change </p><p>　　Issues such as training/education linked with the hard/soft skills o

68、f shore and sea personnel, management skills and review procedures have been recognized as fundamental elements of a need for new safety approaches. Particularly for the tanker operations, which is considered as a highly

69、 dangerous working environment identified hazards (such as fire and explosion) sometimes lead to total loss of ship or her cargo, to serious damage, and to loss of life. </p><p>　　The main advantage of apply

70、ing a safety case approach in the shipping industry is that it is directed to any stage of the ship's life cycle (technical, operational and managerial). In addition, it relates safety levels to specific potential ha

71、zards and it would assist the ship operator to apply the SCA into the existing SMS of the fleets already established by the ISM Code.</p><p>　　關(guān)于油輪事故處理的安全事件法</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p

72、><p>　　在這篇論文中我們討論關(guān)于調(diào)查和評(píng)估國際海運(yùn)事故的新方法。主要是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估，因?yàn)榇暗陌踩?guī)章至今未能解決船舶造成的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在決策過程中的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可用于確定是否風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是可以接受或容忍的。安全事件法是一個(gè)可協(xié)助船舶運(yùn)營商減少了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管理方法。它并不是指規(guī)范的規(guī)則和條例，而是使用了目標(biāo)設(shè)定的原則。迄今為止，它已應(yīng)用于高速船，以便為安全合理地操控這些船提供高級(jí)別安全保障。我們致力于油輪工業(yè)，特別是大火或爆炸所造成的事件，

73、因?yàn)樗鼈兩婕皣?yán)重的環(huán)境破壞和生命損失的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：油輪事故，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為基礎(chǔ)的技術(shù)，新規(guī)則的文化，安全事件法</p><p><b>　　1．引言</b></p><p>　　根據(jù)以往的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，我們不得不承認(rèn)，在海事領(lǐng)域的事故調(diào)查也并非易事。有關(guān)各方即船東，承銷商，貨主及船旗國當(dāng)局似乎不情愿或不能發(fā)布關(guān)于海上意外事故或危險(xiǎn)情況的

74、消息，主要原因是未來的法律問題，特別是當(dāng)出現(xiàn)失誤或不利于自己情況時(shí)。事故調(diào)查在過去幾年沒有改善了，盡管事實(shí)是多數(shù)進(jìn)行調(diào)查僅僅是為了查明人員傷亡的原因而不是分配責(zé)任。</p><p>　　據(jù)指出，國際航運(yùn)的法律框架——油輪船東協(xié)會(huì)（1998）相對(duì)于預(yù)防事故更多是針對(duì)于處理賠償。這種情況是通過采用通過要求船舶公司按照包括未發(fā)生事故的事故報(bào)告體系有關(guān)的“船上安全”操作的國際安全管理章程表述的新的安全文化和質(zhì)量管理技術(shù)逐

75、步地改變。然而，在實(shí)踐中不難按照國際安全管理規(guī)則制定政策和程序，而困難的是落實(shí)安全管理體系（SMS）和實(shí)現(xiàn)其目標(biāo)。更有趣的各方卷入海上事故為現(xiàn)實(shí)的做法更多的需求是必要的?；趯?duì)職員或法院訴訟的訪談或自我報(bào)告的調(diào)查技巧已經(jīng)受到批評(píng)，主要因?yàn)槠淝皟蓚€(gè)重點(diǎn)在于執(zhí)行力和可靠性，之后才是責(zé)任。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估為基礎(chǔ)的新方法已成了由不愿意彌補(bǔ)缺陷造成的損失的承銷商的首選，但有在工業(yè)中對(duì)各種方法適用性的限制，通常由于在安全問題中人為因素占主導(dǎo)因素。</

76、p><p>　　2. 基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的技術(shù)和相關(guān)立法</p><p>　　依據(jù)澳大利亞/新西蘭標(biāo)準(zhǔn)組織，“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理”是管理政策進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)的應(yīng)用，規(guī)程和確定任務(wù)，分析，評(píng)估，處理和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)控的通常做法，而“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理”是用來優(yōu)先通過評(píng)估和比較風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等級(jí)與預(yù)訂標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，目標(biāo)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等級(jí)或者其他標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來確定的工序。</p><p>　　它無疑將是更好地在事故發(fā)生前來研究風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而不是為了事后挽回，在人

77、類和環(huán)境的悲劇之前的政治壓力是強(qiáng)迫的。起草或修訂條例是一個(gè)耗時(shí)的過程（包括執(zhí)行階段），不應(yīng)基于監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的意見，而應(yīng)基于系統(tǒng)的和合理的對(duì)問題和來自真實(shí)數(shù)據(jù)的可靠信息的檢查。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估是一種能夠更加有效的安全決定手段。</p><p>　　已經(jīng)證明，規(guī)范的規(guī)則和“合規(guī)性文化”密切相關(guān)。新的目標(biāo)應(yīng)該是更加主動(dòng)追趕“安全文化”。開始可以歸因于國際海事組織和國際安全管理規(guī)則實(shí)施于1993年，國際海上人命安全公約成立于1994

78、年，并于1998年實(shí)施“質(zhì)量管理體系”。 “國際安全管理規(guī)則”為在海岸和海上人員之間的強(qiáng)有力的聯(lián)系制定要求，介紹PDA的規(guī)則以加強(qiáng)那個(gè)聯(lián)系。結(jié)果是，船公司必須擁有一個(gè)可核查的安全管理。</p><p>　　“安全評(píng)估”（FSA），是由英國海事安全局的海事組織于1993年提議的，它的根源在核工業(yè)。這是一個(gè)識(shí)別系統(tǒng)中的潛在危險(xiǎn)評(píng)估這些危害的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估程序。其基本目標(biāo)是提高安全規(guī)章和制度的規(guī)范性。</p&

79、gt;<p>　　另一方面，“SCA”不針對(duì)于如申請(qǐng)法定規(guī)則和條例的傳統(tǒng)船舶安全規(guī)程，因?yàn)橥硇r(shí)候出現(xiàn)的抵制的新辦法能夠允許責(zé)任發(fā)展和利用新技術(shù)跟上發(fā)展。SCA是基于目標(biāo)設(shè)定法原則的。通過Kuo，那是裝置（可能是船）的操控員準(zhǔn)備的來說明潛在問題已經(jīng)被降低到合理可行的級(jí)別，他們會(huì)被有效地管理，并且被操控通過裝置的生命周期。它是一個(gè)可以評(píng)價(jià)自己，但交叉引用到其他支撐研究和計(jì)算中。</p><p>　　S

80、CA和FSA的都涉及危害鑒定，主要危害的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等級(jí)和減少風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的方法。它們的根本不同主要是在他們的基本目標(biāo)，也就是說，F(xiàn)SA是以規(guī)范性原則為基礎(chǔ)的，而當(dāng)FSA被應(yīng)用于對(duì)特殊船型或特殊的危害時(shí)SCA通常應(yīng)用于一種特殊船型。至于SCA和ISM規(guī)則，他們都是設(shè)計(jì)以提高船系統(tǒng)的安全性，但應(yīng)急準(zhǔn)備程序有顯著性差異。</p><p><b>　　3. SCA</b></p><p>

81、　　對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估的原則，好處之一是該技術(shù)可以應(yīng)用在事件已經(jīng)發(fā)生。不過，在談到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理方法前，解釋什么是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是非常有用的?！帮L(fēng)險(xiǎn)”是將有一個(gè)目標(biāo)的影響時(shí)可能發(fā)生的事情?！拔ｋU(xiǎn)”是一種潛在的傷害或可能造成的損失的情況來源。從Kuo我們能知道，申請(qǐng)前或?qū)嵤﹨f(xié)議的航運(yùn)業(yè)，特別是對(duì)船舶的運(yùn)作，我們必須注意三個(gè)具體問題：</p><p>　　國際方面：船舶和其他海洋設(shè)備沒有固定的位置，他們?yōu)楂@取最大利潤從一個(gè)地方旅行到另一個(gè)地

82、方，，他們希望減少到港口的時(shí)間。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)有的海洋經(jīng)驗(yàn)：航運(yùn)業(yè)已經(jīng)獲得的良好的長期時(shí)間經(jīng)驗(yàn)和許多國際規(guī)例是以這些原則為基礎(chǔ)。</p><p>　　安全文化：這個(gè)因素是針對(duì)人得影響因素。</p><p>　　該協(xié)議的核心內(nèi)容是安全管理系統(tǒng)（SMS）有5個(gè)組成部分：(a)政策制定，(b)組織資源和信息交流，(c)執(zhí)行商定的政策,(d) 達(dá)到措施要求的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),

83、(e) 檢討公司的表現(xiàn)，并作相應(yīng)的改進(jìn)。</p><p>　　4．應(yīng)用安全個(gè)案的方式</p><p>　　雖然大多數(shù)船舶事故數(shù)據(jù)庫不包括完整的報(bào)告和準(zhǔn)確的信息，如不一致的新條目，不良記錄的具體數(shù)據(jù)，對(duì)質(zhì)量數(shù)據(jù)通常不存在的過程，在油輪工業(yè)中嚴(yán)重事故陷入嚴(yán)重的意外是在世界中對(duì)貨物的帳戶進(jìn)行廣泛報(bào)道和可能的負(fù)面結(jié)果，所以，統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)是相當(dāng)可靠的。由火災(zāi)或爆炸引起的79起油輪事故?，F(xiàn)有的數(shù)據(jù)只涉及超

84、過1萬總噸原油運(yùn)輸船并不包括混合事故，即碰撞或擱淺或接觸或戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)行動(dòng)。評(píng)估和分析所用的具體參數(shù)是一年建成，旗幟和船只，日期和事故，石油泄漏，人員損失，船上的事件的確切位置和地理區(qū)域噸位。</p><p>　　每一個(gè)災(zāi)害可按它的類型分類，例如，哪些是最相似的，最受歡迎的或欠受歡迎的類型，或者哪些是最通常的或在特殊地位上罕見的。這一分類將有助于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估技術(shù)選擇建立每一個(gè)確定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平。</p><p

85、><b>　　5.結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　前國際海事組織秘書長奧尼爾說，近90％的海上事故是直接或間接地通過行動(dòng)，決定和行為等人為錯(cuò)誤造成的。至今已經(jīng)影響到改善技術(shù)，改變硬件。換句話說，該規(guī)范的做法已成為一個(gè)安全評(píng)估工具嚴(yán)重的局限。貨運(yùn)公司從規(guī)范性法規(guī)到安全事件做法運(yùn)行下去的需要，要求公司自身從頂層管理人員到底層工作人員實(shí)施一個(gè)新的安全法規(guī)而進(jìn)行一個(gè)徹底的改變。</p&

86、gt;<p>　　問題如與海安人員和海員的硬件及軟件的技能、管理技能和審查程序有聯(lián)系的培訓(xùn)、教育已經(jīng)被人為是新安全辦法最基本的需要。尤其是被認(rèn)為是工作環(huán)境確實(shí)存在危險(xiǎn)因素（如火災(zāi)，爆炸等）的危險(xiǎn)工作——油輪作業(yè)，有時(shí)會(huì)導(dǎo)致船舶或其貨物損失，嚴(yán)重破壞，以及人員傷亡。</p><p>　　應(yīng)用在航運(yùn)業(yè)的安全問題方法的主要優(yōu)點(diǎn)是，它是針對(duì)船舶生命周期的任何階段（技術(shù)，運(yùn)營和管理）。此外，它和特定潛在危害的