外文翻譯---公司治理與會(huì)計(jì)信息失真

1、<p><b>　　中文3464字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　題 目 </p><p>　　專(zhuān) 業(yè)

2、 會(huì) 計(jì) 學(xué) </p><p>　　外文題目 The Corporate Governance and the </p><p>　　Distorted Accounting Information </p><p>　　外文出處 Asian Social Science. July20

3、08, Vol. 4, No. 7 </p><p>　　外文作者 Qiufei Wang </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The Corporate Governance and the Distorted Accounting Inform

4、ation</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Distorted accounting information of the public company becomes the main element restricting our country’s economic development. Hence, how to

5、improve accounting information quality becomes a hot topic. This study in brief analyzes some factors, which affect accounting information quality from the direction of corporate governance. Moreover it gives out several

6、 different mathematical models and proposes a base train of administering thought, in order to establish a few foundations for research on</p><p>　　Keywords: Corporate governance, The Distorted accounting in

7、formation</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　The distorted accounting information is the “Chronic illness” of securities markets. Because it endangers government Marco-control, disturbs tax reven

8、ue and does harm to functioning of optimizing capital resource disposal, many governments attempt to resole this problem. Yet even to this day, varieties of events about distorted accounting information still disturb the

9、 whole world. For example “Enron” in United States, and “Ying guangxia” and “l(fā)antian” in China. This study concludes that the reas</p><p>　　Corporate governance is an arrangement of law, culture, usual pract

10、ice and systems, which are use for harmonizing and controlling the relationship and action between every participant. So the most fundamental problem, which will be resolved, is the action of the agent problem. For this

11、reason, it is emergence to benefit conflict between “principal” and “agent” and asymmetric information. All of those evoke distorted accounting information. Reports published by COSO, on the basis of the research,</p&

12、gt;<p>　　Figue 1. Financial Affairs Malpractices Corporation</p><p>　　In view of the above, we think the reason that induces the distorted accounting information is defects in corporate governance pat

13、terns. Because of those defects, some mechanisms cannot supervise and penalize the action. So accounting information cannot be creditable. This study in brief analyzes some factors, which affect accounting information qu

14、ality from the direction of corporate governance. Moreover it gives out several different instances that directly cause accounting information distort</p><p>　　2. Ownership structure and distorted accounting

15、 information</p><p>　　Generally speaking, ownership structure contains two implications: firstly, varied percent possessed by different stockholders; secondly, owner ship structure concentration degree. It i

16、s the significant component and the ownership base of corporate governance. Rational ownership structure decides if the basis function by which corporate governance ensures the credible financial report can work well. St

17、ockholders as owners of capital have to make contacts with managers according to the accounting</p><p>　　Through the ownership structure research on the public company with financial report malpractice actio

18、ns, we discover that there are two distinguishing feature in those companies: first the proportion of circulative stock is to low, and second the first stockholder are nation and “ legal person”, with the highest proport

19、ion being 51%(Figure 2). In Japan banks are the most important stockholders, with centralized ownership structure being only possess 15% ( Figure 3).Government and manager depart</p><p>　　Figure 2 . Corporat

20、e identity</p><p>　　Figure 3 . Ownership Structures in Japan</p><p>　　3. Improper incentive mechanisms is the direct cause that creates the distorted accounting information</p><p>　

21、　The problem of incentive mechanism is very significant in corporate governance. Because ownership and managerial authority are separate in modern company.</p><p>　　The interest of the stockholder and the ma

22、nagerial authority has diverged. For this reason, owners design incentive mechanism to make the action of managerial authority agree with stockholder’s benefit. In the U.S. the incentive mechanism of the public company w

23、as most obvious. By the end of 2001, 90%of the great business of the U.S. sent non-qualified stock options to managers, 60% of the revenue of managers came from stock. Yet incentive mechanism is “two blade swords”. On on

24、e hang it makes ma</p><p>　　Swindles which happened in the U.S. confirm that the action of giving excessive motivation to inspire managers just like “drinking poison to quench thirst”. The benefits of manage

25、rs should not be combined together with company benefit. This is the cause of the distorted accounting information. To some degree, non-qualified stock options are the main reason of the American accounting swindles law

26、cases. We consider that improper incentive mechanism is the direct cause that creates the distorted a</p><p>　　Nowadays, the revenue form in China is comparatively simple (Tab 1). Monthly pay and bonus are t

27、he most common form that the companies adopt. There is an intimate relationship between bonus and accounting benefit, so in the case of insider control, use bonus as incentive means usually leads the publish distorted ac

28、counting information to control benefit. </p><p>　　On the other hand, the traditional viewpoint of Chinese is “The government official is most important”. Some managers’ goal is to become an official or poli

29、tician, so for those people accounting becomes a chess piece. It is not strange for a company to appear to “turn hostile suddenly”. Though analysis of those financial malpractice cases, we may discover that the improper

30、incentive mechanism impels managers to control the profit, thereby cause the distorted accounting information.</p><p>　　Table 1. Corporation administration person year revenue together revenue shape</p>

31、;<p>　　4. The unqualified supervisory mechanism is the external cause that creates the distorted accounting information</p><p>　　The supervisory mechanism of public company consists of exterior superv

32、ision and interior supervision. Exterior supervision means the company restricts the managers’ action through outside marketplace. These marketplaces chiefly are the product marketplace, the manager marketplace, and the

33、capital marketplace. Interior supervision means that companies restrict the managers’ action through specific system design. Exterior supervision will take a long time to be established, and tradition, culture</p>

34、<p>　　The act also has stiffened penalties for corporate and criminal fraud by company insiders. The law makes it a crime to destroy, alter or falsify records in a federal investigation or if a company declares ban

35、kruptcy. The penalty for those found guilty includes fines, or up to 20 years imprisonment, or both.</p><p>　　No personal loans or extensions of credit to company executives either directly or though a subsi

36、diary, except for certain extension of credit under an open –ended credit plan or charge card, home improvement and manufactured home loans, or extensions of credit plan by a broker or dealer to its employee to buy, trad

37、e or carry securities.</p><p>　　Any CEO or CFO who “recklessly” violates his or her certification of the company financial statement. If “willfully” violates, fine of up to $1,000,000 and /or up to 10 years

38、imprisonment. Fine of up to $5 million and /up to 20 years imprisonment.</p><p>　　The act vests the audit committee of a publicly traded company with responsibility for the appointment, compensation and over

39、sight of any registered public accounting information to perform audit services.</p><p>　　The supervisory mechanism of the public company in China consists of stockholder board, corporate board and superviso

40、r board. But those boards cannot supervise the manager efficiently. When the outstanding achievement is not very good, certainly the manager will utilize different measures and announce the distorted accounting informati

41、on to attain individual and political aims.</p><p>　　5. Pattern of the relationship between the corporate governance and the distorted accounting information and some proposals</p><p>　　Accounti

42、ng information is orient to advance efficiency and improve performance of company though using the mechanism to control the accountant datum. If this corporate mechanism brings into play efficiently, the accounting infor

43、mation must combine well with capital market. Because the price of stock can identify effort of manager and the possibility of controlling the surplus, the accounting index may sieve the unconventional influence of non-e

44、conomic factors. The other way round, the corporate </p><p>　　The relationship can be described by Figure 4.</p><p>　　Figue 4 . Relationship of Accounting Information and the Corporate Governanc

45、e</p><p>　　After the accounting information is announced by the manager, through the stockholder board\ the corporate board and the supervisor board, it finally becomes the public record. By means of the ana

46、lysis of the foregoing paragraphs, we think the main elements affecting quality accounting information are the ownership structure, the supervisory mechanism and the incentive mechanism. According to the formula below, t

47、he real accounting information is measured to A, the improperly ownership structure,</p><p>　　Y = A[1-α][1-β][1-γ] （1）</p><p>　　（0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1,0≤λ≤1, j

48、ustγ≤α,β）</p><p>　　To be fit for Chinese the conditions; solving problem of the distorted accounting information involves changing ownership structure, and establishing incentive mechanism. Moreover this pro

49、cess involves improving the setup of interior and exterior supervisory mechanism.</p><p>　　The following steps may be taken in the process:</p><p>　　Reducing the proportion of the national stock

50、 and personal stock in the specified situation, and then adding to the proportion of circulation stock.</p><p>　　Improving the essential system makes the valid demand accounting information a priority.</p

51、><p>　　Improving the standard achievement evaluation target and the personal payment system, relieving the need to announce the distorted accounting information.</p><p>　　Establishing more kinds of

52、 incentive mechanism.</p><p>　　Speeding up product market, director man and capital market establishment.</p><p>　　Establishing improved stockholder statute for their protection.</p><

53、p>　　Establishing the independent audit commission, with strange built-in control.</p><p>　　Improving the supervisor board system.</p><p>　　6. Conclusions</p><p>　　The distorted a

54、ccounting information possesses two general direction financial report malpractice and profit control. The scope of the study is restricted to the relationship between the financial report malpractice and corporate gover

55、nance. As to the corporate government, the study only carries on preliminary research through three main respects. The study proposes the easy mathematical model of the accounting information quality. That the relationsh

56、ip between the supervisory of the exterior, s</p><p>　　Source: Asian Social Science. 2008,7 (4)：69-73.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　公司治理與會(huì)計(jì)信息失真</p><p>　　摘要：

57、制約我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展的主要因素是上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。因此,如何提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量成為熱門(mén)話(huà)題。本研究簡(jiǎn)要分析了影響因素、會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量公司治理的方向，而且提出了幾種不同的數(shù)學(xué)模型，提出了一種基本思路, 目的是建立一個(gè)研究一些基礎(chǔ)會(huì)計(jì)信息失真問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵字：公司治理 會(huì)計(jì)信息失真</p><p><b>　　1. 引言</b></p>&l

58、t;p>　　被扭曲的會(huì)計(jì)信息是“慢性疾病”的證券市場(chǎng)。因?yàn)樗＜罢暧^調(diào)控，擾亂稅收和有害于運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的優(yōu)化資本資源處理,許多政府試圖解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題。然而，即使到今天，關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的事件仍擾亂了整個(gè)世界。例如美國(guó)的“安然”,而“銀廣夏”和“藍(lán)天”在中國(guó)。該研究報(bào)告的結(jié)論是：研究的是會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的治理不能獲得突破是它忽視了這個(gè)問(wèn)題的根源。委托代理關(guān)系導(dǎo)致會(huì)計(jì)信息失真, 所以只能在會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和會(huì)計(jì)制度而定的方法是不是最有效的方法來(lái)解決問(wèn)題

59、。</p><p>　　公司治理是法律、文化、慣例和制度，這是協(xié)調(diào)和控制之間的關(guān)系和每一位參與者行動(dòng)中使用的安排。所以最根本的問(wèn)題將得到解決，是代理的問(wèn)題采取行動(dòng)?；谶@個(gè)原因，它是有利于出現(xiàn)“主體”、“代理人”和信息之間不對(duì)稱(chēng)的沖突，這些都引起會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。COSO的出版研究涉及200個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊2003年至1007年上市公司的基礎(chǔ)，報(bào)告顯示：72％的案件涉及的CEO中，43％都與財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)，25％的人對(duì)公司沒(méi)

60、有設(shè)立審計(jì)委員會(huì)。這項(xiàng)研究的研究樣本包括50個(gè)1994至2000年上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊，根據(jù)證監(jiān)會(huì)的處罰，在那些關(guān)系到董事及經(jīng)理79％的案件，表明有79％的案件涉及到會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。（圖1）</p><p>　　圖1：財(cái)務(wù)公司營(yíng)私舞弊的</p><p>　　基于上述觀點(diǎn)，我們認(rèn)為引起會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的原因是公司治理模式的缺陷。由于這些缺陷，一些機(jī)制不能監(jiān)督和懲罰的行動(dòng)。</p><

61、;p>　　因此，會(huì)計(jì)信息不能扣抵。本研究簡(jiǎn)要分析了影響因素，會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量公司治理的方向。此外，它給出了幾種不同的情況直接會(huì)導(dǎo)致會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。在此基礎(chǔ)上,研究設(shè)計(jì)了一種數(shù)學(xué)模型的設(shè)計(jì)思路，提出一種基礎(chǔ)管理思想,以建立研究會(huì)計(jì)信息失真問(wèn)題的一些基礎(chǔ)訓(xùn)練。</p><p>　　2. 所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和會(huì)計(jì)信息失真</p><p>　　一般來(lái)說(shuō)，所有制結(jié)構(gòu)包含兩種意義:首先，由不同的股東擁有百分之

62、多樣；其次，業(yè)主船體結(jié)構(gòu)集中程度，這是一個(gè)重要組成部分與公司治理股權(quán)基地。在合理的所有制結(jié)構(gòu)決定功能的基礎(chǔ)上，其中的企業(yè)管治確保能提供可信的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告工作。股東作為主人資本與經(jīng)理根據(jù)企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息聯(lián)系，實(shí)現(xiàn)最大的資本利潤(rùn)。因此股東是會(huì)計(jì)信息的檢查，但是股東有明確的比例，有不同的要求。</p><p>　　我們認(rèn)為大股東是會(huì)計(jì)信息主體。在這一主體中，經(jīng)濟(jì)利益之間的關(guān)系和會(huì)計(jì)信息比別人更重要，所以他們擁有更多的權(quán)力來(lái)管理

63、和控制會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量。例如，首先發(fā)現(xiàn)“安然”案的是在投資機(jī)構(gòu)的財(cái)務(wù)分析師。合理的所有制結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生會(huì)計(jì)信息需求者與會(huì)計(jì)信息失真會(huì)減小。</p><p>　　通過(guò)對(duì)與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊行為的上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的研究，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)有兩個(gè)顯著特征的公司：首先，流通股比例低，其次是國(guó)家股東和“法人”，最高比例是51％（圖2）。在日本銀行最重要的股東與股權(quán)集中僅擁有15％（圖3）結(jié)構(gòu)。</p><p>　　政府和經(jīng)理

64、部門(mén),作為國(guó)家股票的股東及業(yè)主，產(chǎn)權(quán)不能夠提出剩余時(shí)間,所以它是沒(méi)有足夠的動(dòng)力監(jiān)督和評(píng)價(jià)他們。所以在中國(guó)“內(nèi)部人控制”已成為一個(gè)重要的問(wèn)題。因此，“內(nèi)部人控制”成為中國(guó)的一個(gè)重要問(wèn)題。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)控制，內(nèi)幕必須使用會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。因此，這成為不正當(dāng)所有制的會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的來(lái)源。</p><p><b>　　圖2：公司特征</b></p><p>　　圖3：在日本的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)&l

65、t;/p><p>　　3. 不適當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)機(jī)制是創(chuàng)建的直接原因是會(huì)計(jì)信息失真</p><p>　　激勵(lì)機(jī)制的問(wèn)題是很重要的意義,在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。因?yàn)樗袡?quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離是現(xiàn)代公司。</p><p>　　股東的利益和管理當(dāng)局已經(jīng)偏離。因此, 管理機(jī)關(guān)同意股東的利益，業(yè)主設(shè)計(jì)激勵(lì)機(jī)制來(lái)完成動(dòng)作。在美國(guó)，公眾公司的激勵(lì)機(jī)制最為明顯。到2001年底，90％美國(guó)偉大的企業(yè)派出非限定股

66、票期權(quán)的經(jīng)理，管理人員60％的收入來(lái)自于股票。然而激勵(lì)機(jī)制是“兩刃刀”，在一個(gè)方面它促使管理人員的工作效率，但另一方面，它促使管理人員提供會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。</p><p>　　騙取這在美國(guó)發(fā)生的事情證實(shí)，確認(rèn)給予過(guò)多的動(dòng)機(jī)采取行動(dòng)，激勵(lì)經(jīng)理人就像“喝毒藥解渴”。管理者的利益不應(yīng)該與公司利益相結(jié)合，這是會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的原因。在某種程度上，非合格股票期權(quán)是美國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)欺詐違法案件的主要原因。</p><p

67、>　　我們認(rèn)為，不適當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)機(jī)制創(chuàng)建的直接原因是會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。美國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)欺詐的法律案例起源來(lái)自賠償，但對(duì)在中國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息失真僅僅是至關(guān)重要的短期的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。</p><p>　　如今，中國(guó)的收入形式是比較簡(jiǎn)單的（表1）。該公司采用的每月工資和獎(jiǎng)金是最常見(jiàn)的形式。獎(jiǎng)金和會(huì)計(jì)之間的親密關(guān)系，使受益的內(nèi)部人控制的情況下，用紅利作為獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)手段通常會(huì)導(dǎo)致會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的發(fā)布控制受益。</p><p

68、>　　另一方面，中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)的觀點(diǎn)是：“政府官員是最重要的”。一些管理者的目標(biāo)是成為一個(gè)官方或政客，所以對(duì)于這些人會(huì)計(jì)成為棋子。公司出現(xiàn)的“翻臉”是不奇怪的。通過(guò)這些財(cái)務(wù)舞弊案件的分析，我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，不當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)機(jī)制促使管理人員來(lái)控制利潤(rùn)，從而導(dǎo)致會(huì)計(jì)信息失真。</p><p>　　表1. 公司管理人員年收入（收入形式）</p><p>　　4. 外因是不合格的監(jiān)督機(jī)制，創(chuàng)造了會(huì)計(jì)信息失真

69、</p><p>　　上市公司監(jiān)督機(jī)制包括外部監(jiān)督和內(nèi)部監(jiān)督。外部監(jiān)督是指公司限制了經(jīng)理人通過(guò)外部市場(chǎng)的行動(dòng)。這些市場(chǎng)主要是產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)、經(jīng)理市場(chǎng)、資本市場(chǎng)。內(nèi)部監(jiān)督的手段，通過(guò)具體制度設(shè)計(jì)，制約企業(yè)管理者的行動(dòng)。</p><p>　　外部監(jiān)督需要很長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間才能建立，傳統(tǒng)、文化、政治環(huán)境將有很大的影響。因此，它是為外部監(jiān)督，解決會(huì)計(jì)信息失真需要很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間，不能快速完成它。在這種情況下，盡快解

70、決問(wèn)題將取決于內(nèi)部監(jiān)督。</p><p>　　美國(guó)的辦法是值得研究的。在經(jīng)歷了一系列會(huì)計(jì)丑聞的情況下，美國(guó)政府通過(guò)薩班斯——奧克斯利2002年行動(dòng)，解決會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量。該法有幾個(gè)方面，如下：</p><p>　?。?）該企業(yè)行為也有助于對(duì)公司內(nèi)部欺詐的刑事處罰。該法使犯罪毀滅，篡改或偽造在聯(lián)邦調(diào)查記錄，或者如果一個(gè)公司宣布破產(chǎn)。對(duì)于那些被判有罪的刑罰包括罰款，最多20年監(jiān)禁，或兩者兼而有之。

71、</p><p>　?。?）任何個(gè)人貸款或直接授信公司高管或子公司，除了一定的信用擴(kuò)展下一個(gè)不限成員名額信貸計(jì)劃或簽賬卡，家居裝修及住房貸款，由經(jīng)紀(jì)人或經(jīng)銷(xiāo)商的雇員購(gòu)買(mǎi)，進(jìn)行證券交易或信貸計(jì)劃的擴(kuò)展。</p><p>　　（3）任何行政總裁或首席財(cái)務(wù)官“魯莽”違反其對(duì)公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的證明。如果“蓄意”違反，罰款高達(dá)100萬(wàn)元及（或）最多10年監(jiān)禁，罰款高達(dá)500萬(wàn)元及最多20年監(jiān)禁。<

72、/p><p>　?。?）該行為為一個(gè)任命責(zé)任與上市公司的審計(jì)委員會(huì)，補(bǔ)償任何注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)行審計(jì)監(jiān)督，以信息服務(wù)。</p><p>　　該公司在中國(guó)的公眾監(jiān)督機(jī)制有股東董事會(huì)、公司董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)。但是，這些議會(huì)不能有效地監(jiān)督經(jīng)理。當(dāng)成績(jī)不是很好時(shí)，管理者就利用不同的措施公布會(huì)計(jì)信息失真以實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人和政治目的。</p><p>　　5.公司治理和會(huì)計(jì)信息失真之間的關(guān)系模式，提

73、出一些建議</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)信息是東方推進(jìn)效率，改善使用的機(jī)制來(lái)控制會(huì)計(jì)公司業(yè)績(jī)的數(shù)據(jù)。如果會(huì)計(jì)信息必須與資本市場(chǎng)結(jié)合起來(lái)，這個(gè)企業(yè)的機(jī)制發(fā)揮作用，帶來(lái)了高效。由于股票價(jià)格可以識(shí)別經(jīng)理的努力和控制過(guò)剩的可能性，可篩的會(huì)計(jì)指標(biāo)的非經(jīng)濟(jì)因素產(chǎn)生非傳統(tǒng)的影響。反過(guò)來(lái)，公司治理能促進(jìn)經(jīng)理報(bào)告真實(shí)的會(huì)計(jì)信息。這種關(guān)系可以說(shuō)是圖4。</p><p>　　圖4. 會(huì)計(jì)信息的關(guān)系及企業(yè)管治<

74、/p><p>　　公布的會(huì)計(jì)信息是管理者通過(guò)股東板\公司董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)，它之后終于成為公共記錄。通過(guò)對(duì)上述段落的分析手段，我們認(rèn)為，影響會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的主要因素是股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，監(jiān)督機(jī)制和激勵(lì)機(jī)制。</p><p>　　根據(jù)下面的公式，真正的會(huì)計(jì)信息衡量為A，在所有制結(jié)構(gòu)不當(dāng)，監(jiān)督機(jī)制和激勵(lì)機(jī)制影響會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量等級(jí)為α，β，γ，可信的會(huì)計(jì)信息是Y：</p><p>　　Y =

75、A[1-α][1-β][1-γ] （1）</p><p>　?。?≤α≤1,0≤β≤1,0≤λ≤1, 只是γ≤α,β）</p><p>　　適合中國(guó)條件，解決會(huì)計(jì)信息失真的問(wèn)題包括改變股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、建立激勵(lì)機(jī)制。而且這種過(guò)程包括建立內(nèi)部和外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制。可以采取以下步驟：</p><p>　　

76、（1）在指定的情況下減少?lài)?guó)家和個(gè)人持股比例，然后加入到流通股比例。</p><p>　?。?）提高基本制度，是會(huì)計(jì)信息的有效需求的一個(gè)優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。</p><p>　?。?）提高業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)和個(gè)人繳費(fèi)制度的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，減少需要公布的失真的會(huì)計(jì)信息。</p><p>　?。?）建立更多種類(lèi)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。</p><p>　?。?）加快產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)、總監(jiān)與資本

77、市場(chǎng)的建立。</p><p>　?。?）建立改進(jìn)的股東保護(hù)條例。</p><p>　?。?）建立獨(dú)立的審計(jì)委員會(huì),特別的內(nèi)部控制。</p><p>　?。?）完善監(jiān)事會(huì)制度。</p><p><b>　　6. 結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)信息失真具有兩個(gè)大方向：財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊和利潤(rùn)控制。這