外文翻譯---股利政策和組織的資本市場

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Dividend policy and the organization of capital markets </p><p>　

2、　How firms determine their dividend policy has been a puzzle to financial economists for many years. Miller and Modigliani (1961) (M&M), showed that under certain assumptions the payment of a cash dividend should hav

3、e no impact on a firm’s share price. M&M assumed that the firm’s investment is fixed, since all positive net present value projects will be financed regardless of the firm’s dividend policy. Consequently, the firm’s

4、future free cash flow is independent of the firm’s financial policies</p><p>　　Several strands of research have developed to explain actual dividend policies,focusing on relaxing some of the M&M assumpti

5、ons. Brennan (1970), for example,relaxed the equal tax assumption. However, in Brennan’s model the higher thedividend the higher the tax penalty. Consequently, a tax wedge drives up the pre-tax investor required rate of

6、return for high payout firms. Despite extensive empirical investigation this hypothesis does not seem to be borne out by the data.Moreover,Poterba (1987) ha</p><p>　　While the impact of taxes remains inconcl

7、usive, increasing attention has been given to the problem of information asymmetries. Miller and Modigliani explicitly suggested that dividend changes could have an informational impact.Subsequent research by Watts (1973

8、) and others have documented that initiating a dividend increases the share price and cutting a dividend generally leads to a price decline. Information asymmetries have also given rise to agency cost explanations for pa

9、ying dividends. Wit</p><p>　　A central message of asymmetric information models is that dividend payments are important both as a pre-commitment device to reduce agency costs and as a signal of management’s

10、expectations of future earnings. Both models have been used to justify Lintner’s observation (1956) that actual dividend policies tend to follow a slowly adaptive process. However, the viability of both of these mechanis

11、ms depends on other aspects of the institutional and contracting environment. For example, if the firm</p><p>　　There are a variety of ways of characterizing institutional differences, but Mayer(1990) hit on

12、 one key difference: the ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ capital markets model compared to the ‘‘Continental-German-Japanese’’ banking model. The critical difference as Rajan (1992) pointed out is that the capital markets perspective re

13、lies on</p><p>　　arms length contracting by ‘‘uninformed’’ investors, whereas bank debt is a contract between an informed investor frequently privy to confidential information not available in the capital ma

14、rket. We would expect these marked differences in the organization of the financial system to impact corporate financial policy, particularly</p><p>　　the use of dividends as both a signaling and pre-commitm

15、ent device.</p><p>　　In this paper, we take advantage of the recent development of an international database by the World Bank that allows for cross-country comparisons of dividend policy. Financial data is

16、available for the largest firms from eight emerging market countries: Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe between</p><p>　　1980 and 1990. We analyze the dividend policies of firms

17、 from these countries, as well as the key institutional features of each country, and compare them with a control sample of US firms. </p><p>　　Dividend signaling models offer valuable insights about the rol

18、e of dividends. In particular they explain why dividends are more stable than earnings and why firms</p><p>　　are reluctant to cut dividends. In the former case, as long as underlying permanent earnings are

19、more stable than actual earnings, the dividend will also be more stable,</p><p>　　since management is signaling its view as to the underlying permanent earnings. In</p><p>　　the later case, a di

20、vidend cut indicates that the corresponding earnings decline is</p><p>　　permanent, not temporary and cyclical.</p><p>　　Informational asymmetries and contracting costs can also generate agency

21、costs.</p><p>　　Consider, for example, a firm that is financed with 100% equity with insiders or management as a control group and a widely dispersed group of outside stockholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976)

22、 illustrate that with little external control, managers and insiders will indulge in excessive perquisite consumption either through outright consumption of corporate resources or through inefficient management and inapp

23、ropriate investment policies. In such a framework outsiders may prefer a high dividend po</p><p>　　The implication of both these arguments is that dividend payments will be higher</p><p>　　where

24、 there are dispersed outsider investors, as long as the firm is in continuous need of equity capital and thus forced to interact with the capital market.The role of the institutional structure through which the firms rai

25、ses capital is thus important for dividend policy.</p><p>　　Rajan (1992) showed the difference between bonds and bank debt is in the</p><p>　　information acquisition process and the potential fo

26、r renegotiating the contract. The</p><p>　　key is that bank debt is a contract between an informed provider of debt capital who</p><p>　　has access to current corporate information, much of it c

27、onfidential. The banking relationship usually requires the filing of quarterly financial information in a standardized form, as well as regular site visits by the lending officer, so that the lending officer is familiar

28、with the company. Moreover, much of the bank debt is either short term or involves ‘‘material adverse conditions’’ clauses that effectively</p><p>　　give the bank an almost continuous call option on its loan

29、. Consequently, there is a</p><p>　　significant reduction in the extent of the moral hazard problem, as well as of agency costs. This risk reduction is accentuated by the practice of recovering the loan prin

30、cipal through monthly mortgage type payments. In essence this practice serves the same pre-commitment function as a dividend. It is not surprising therefore, that James (1987) found that the announcement of a credit faci

31、lity was accompanied by a 1.7% 2-day abnormal equity return. In many ways initiating a banking relationship i</p><p>　　In contrast to bank debt (‘‘inside’’ debt), Diamond (1991) characterizes public debt or

32、bonds as involving less monitoring. As a result there is less emphasis (and cost) on information gathering and on the renegotiation process discussed by Rajan. The key features instead are the existence of a track record

33、 and a public reputation. In stark contrast to bank debt, bond investors tend to rely heavily on public information reflected in bond ratings, a history of dividend payments, and simple financ</p><p>　　We te

34、rm this role for dividend payments the substitute hypothesis, in the sense that the dividends substitute for direct communication with the external investors in the firm, both debt and equity. This substitute hypothesis

35、implies that there should be significant differences in dividend policy across countries with different institutional structures. In particular, dividend policy should be more important for firms operating in arms length

36、 capital markets, rather than in ‘‘internal’’ bank cent</p><p>　　In contrast to the substitute hypothesis, one could argue that dividends reinforce rather than substitute for other mechanisms in controlling

37、agency and information problems. We term this the complement hypothesis. La Porta et al(1998) argue that the lack of transparency, inadequate legal infrastructure, and weak investment protection in emerging markets all e

38、nhance the role of dividends as a reputation mechanism. In this case, and despite the close banking relations and closely held nature of t</p><p>　　With the substitute hypothesis we would expect dividends to

39、 be more predictable in arms length capital markets to provide the assurance to external investors that the firm’s operations are sound. In contrast, in bank centric markets we would expect this communication to be imme

40、diate and the dividends to reflect the firm’s unpredictable internal cash flow. In particular, we test</p><p>　　1) Do firms in these emerging markets have less predictable dividend payments</p><p&

41、gt;　　than firms in the USA? and</p><p>　　2) Are dividends for firms in emerging markets less sensitive to past dividends and more sensitive to current earnings than US firms?</p><p>　　We know th

42、at Lintner style dividend smoothing characterizes the policy of many US firms and that this stems from an arms length capital markets perspective. With the substitute hypothesis we would not expect Lintner’s model to hol

43、d as well for emerging market firms.</p><p>　　These hypotheses are inter-related, but if we find the answer is generally yes, we take this as support for the ‘‘substitute’’ theory of dividend policy. On the

44、other hand, if we find that dividend policy in these emerging markets is predictable and can be characterized quite accurately by a Lintner model, we take this as support for the ‘‘complement’’ theory of dividend policy.

45、</p><p>　　Table 4 provides summary statistics on dividend policy and some key financial ratios for companies in each of our eight emerging countries and the USA. Since all the values are ratios, they are som

46、etimes skewed when dividing by small numbers. For this reason the median and mean are both reported, along with the standard deviation. As well, all observations lying outside three standard deviations from the mean were

47、 removed. The standard ratios for analyzing dividend policy are the dividend yield,</p><p>　　For the eight emerging markets the median payout ratios are similar to those of the US firms, with only Turkish co

48、mpanies obviously higher, and Pakistani firms lower. In contrast, median dividend yields are higher in all these emerging market countries than in the USA. This indicates that the emerging market firms tend to payout app

49、roximately the same as their US counterparts but the much greater depth in the US stock market values these dividends much higher. This again is an indicator of the r</p><p>　　A major conclusion from the dis

50、criminant analysis and the sample statistics is that there is greater dividend instability, in the sense of unpredictability, in our sample of emerging market firms than there is in the US control sample. This is consist

51、ent with our prior theorizing that bank centric financial systems place less weight on the dividend as either a signaling or pre-commitment device. Contrary to our financial systems taxonomy, this conclusion is as valid

52、for Korea and Malaysia, which</p><p>　　This paper examined the dividend behavior of companies in eight emerging markets between 1980 and 1990, and compared the results to those for 100 US companies. We reach

53、ed the following conclusions:</p><p>　　1) Generally it is more difficult to predict dividend changes for these emerging market firms. The quality of firms cutting dividends were much more similar to those in

54、creasing dividends, than for the US control sample.</p><p>　　2) Regression results suggested that current dividends are much less sensitive to past dividends than for the US control sample of firms.</p>

55、;<p>　　3) The Lintner model does not work very well for this sample of emerging market firms, with adjusted R squares of the Lintner regression model well below what we expect for US firms.</p><p>　　T

56、hese results provide support for the substitute theory of dividends over the complement theory in our sample of emerging market firms. In other words, the results support the premise that the institutional structures of

57、these developing countries make corporate dividend policy a less viable mechanism for signaling future earnings, and for reducing agency costs than for US firms operating in capital markets with arm’s length transactions

58、.</p><p>　　Source：Aivazian , Laurence Booth ,Sean Cleary . “Dividend policy and the organization of capital markets “.J. of Multi. Fin. Manag. 13 (2003) .pp.101-121.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b&

59、gt;</p><p>　　股利政策和組織的資本市場</p><p>　　多年來，公司如何制定他們的股利政策對于財務(wù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家是個難題。米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961)(MM理論),表明在一定假設(shè)條件下的現(xiàn)金股利不會影響公司的股票價格。MM理論假設(shè),公司的投資是固定的,因為所有有利的凈現(xiàn)值的項目將會提供資金而不管公司的股利政策如何。因此,該公司的未來凈現(xiàn)金流是獨立的公司的財政政策，這樣的股息是公

60、司的剩余自由現(xiàn)金流。事實上這樣的結(jié)果與事實經(jīng)驗是相悖的，更不用說實證研究了，這被費希爾·布萊克(1976)稱為股利之謎。</p><p>　　一些股利理論研究已發(fā)展到實際股利政策,以擺脫MM理論的假設(shè)。例如布倫南(1970)，擺脫了相同稅率的假設(shè)。然而,在布倫南模型中股利越高稅務(wù)越高。因此,一個稅收因素的推動稅前投資者要求選擇股利回報率高的公司。盡管廣泛的實際調(diào)查似乎至今無法證實這一假說.而且, 波特伯

61、(1987)記錄了美國在稅收政策改革時卓越而穩(wěn)定的股利政策。</p><p>　　在稅收不確定影響下，信息不對稱的問題越來越受到人們的重視。米勒和莫迪里阿尼明確表明股利的變化產(chǎn)生信息的影響。美國瓦茨(1973)和其他人后續(xù)研究證明了增加股利使股價上升和削減股利通常會導(dǎo)致股票價格下降。信息不對稱也會產(chǎn)生代理成本的增加。加強(qiáng)所有權(quán)和分離的控制,經(jīng)理人面對非常小的監(jiān)督。在這種情形下,保證高股利政策下減弱管理投機(jī)機(jī)會和加

62、強(qiáng)資本市場的相互影響。</p><p>　　信息不對稱的模型的一個中心信息是股利支付問題，它對約束代理成本和為管理層傳遞股票未來盈利的預(yù)期信號都具有重要性。兩種模式被用來證實林特納(1956)的觀察,實際股利政策傾向于遵循緩慢自我適應(yīng)的過程。然而,這兩種機(jī)制的可行性取決于其他方面的制度和制約的環(huán)境。例如,如果公司緊緊地抓住這一點，可能是比支付股利更加容易和成本更低的交流信息的方式。同樣,管理控制中可能遇到?jīng)]那么嚴(yán)

63、峻的問題在具有持續(xù)監(jiān)控的中央銀行按貸款公司活動的人員。</p><p>　　有不同的方法可以描述制度差異,但是邁耶(1990)提出一個關(guān)鍵的區(qū)別:“盎格魯-撒克遜”資本市場模型與“歐洲-德國-日本”銀行業(yè)模式相比。拉詹(1992)指出最關(guān)鍵的差異,資本市場觀點依賴于“無知”投資人的締結(jié)短期市場契約，然而銀行債務(wù)是與一個經(jīng)常得知機(jī)密信息的消息靈通的投資者之間訂立的合同，而沒有利用資本市場。我們將認(rèn)為這些組織的金融體

64、系的差別顯著影響公司金融股利政策,特別是將股利作為一個信號傳遞和約束。</p><p>　　在本文中,我們利用了近年來最新發(fā)展的國際數(shù)據(jù)庫,這是被世界銀行允許跨國比較股利政策的數(shù)據(jù)庫。財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)是從8個新興市場國家中最大的公司提取出來的:韓國、印度、巴基斯坦、泰國、馬來西亞、土耳其和津巴布韋在之間1980年至1990年的。分析了企業(yè)的股利政策，也分析了每個國家關(guān)鍵制度特色,并與美國公司控制抽樣調(diào)查進(jìn)行對比。<

65、/p><p>　　股利信號模型提供有價值股利政策觀點。它的特殊性在于解釋了為什么股息是穩(wěn)定性優(yōu)于收入和為什么公司不愿意削減股息。在以往的情況下,只要潛在的永久性的收益穩(wěn)定性優(yōu)于實際收益,股息也將更加穩(wěn)定。因為從管理者的角度看股利是潛在收入的信號。在之后的情形里,紅利削減表明,相應(yīng)的收益永久下降,而不是暫時的和周期性的。</p><p>　　信息不對稱和締約成本都可以產(chǎn)生代理成本?？紤]一下,例如

66、在一個公司,100%的股權(quán)融資與業(yè)內(nèi)人士作為實驗對照組,和遍布世界各地的外部股東相比。杰森和梅克林 (1976)表明,外部控制少,管理者和業(yè)內(nèi)人士將沉迷于過度消費或者通過直接做公共資源的消費或通過低效的管理和不正確的投資政策。在這樣一個框架，外部人員可能更喜歡高股利政策:比今天從資本收益高度不確定的未來投資獲得股息更好。在缺乏強(qiáng)力的合同和法律框架的學(xué)科業(yè)內(nèi)人士認(rèn)為,例如通過外部董事選舉,發(fā)放股利是企業(yè)內(nèi)部人員籌集資金的唯一方法。在極端的

67、例子,100%派息迫使公司出價召回在市場上失去的權(quán)益資本。因此,一個高派息率有助于減少代理成本。</p><p>　　這兩個觀點的暗示著，股利發(fā)放更高的地方就有分散外部投資者,只要公司連續(xù)需要股權(quán)資本,從而迫使對資本市場產(chǎn)生作用。制度結(jié)構(gòu)所扮演的角色是通過它來增加資本，因此是重要的股利政策。</p><p>　　拉詹(1992)指出在債券和銀行貸款之間的差異，在于信息的獲取過程和繼續(xù)協(xié)商合

68、同的可能性。這關(guān)鍵在于銀行之間的債務(wù)合同是一個通知人提供一個通知債券資本獲取當(dāng)前公司信息,而且大部分都保密。銀行關(guān)系通常需要申請季度財務(wù)信息以標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的格式,以及定期拜訪工地貸款官員,使貸款官員熟悉公司。此外,許多銀行債務(wù),要么是短期或包括“重大不利條件”條款有效，因為給銀行幾乎持續(xù)看漲期權(quán)其貸款。因此,存在顯著下降的道德風(fēng)險程度問題,以及代理成本。這種風(fēng)險減少主要通過參加每月恢復(fù)抵押貸款主要類型付款。在本質(zhì)上，這個行為與股息支付有相同的約

69、束作用。因此也就不足為奇的是,詹姆斯(1987)發(fā)現(xiàn)1.7%為期兩天的異常股權(quán)回報導(dǎo)致信用透支。與銀行發(fā)生關(guān)系的許多方法是相當(dāng)于開始發(fā)放股利:兩者都標(biāo)志著高質(zhì)量的公司和約束現(xiàn)金支出。</p><p>　　與銀行債務(wù)相反，戴蒙德(1991)描述國債或債券涉及較少的監(jiān)督。由于有較少強(qiáng)調(diào)(費用)信息收集和與暨南拉詹的過程討論。主要特點則反而被記錄的存在并公開的聲譽。與銀行債務(wù)形成鮮明對比,債券投資者往往依賴公共信息債券

70、評級評定，股利發(fā)放的歷史,一些簡單的財務(wù)比率。在這樣一個背景下,預(yù)先承諾股利比公司只依靠銀行債務(wù)更重要，特別是當(dāng)銀行債務(wù)被限制為許多機(jī)構(gòu)投資公共債務(wù)支付的股息紅利政策,因此, 公司可能更有效的保證和金融系統(tǒng)中的信號傳導(dǎo)機(jī)制,更過分依賴于公平交易。</p><p>　　我們假設(shè)把這種股利發(fā)放角色叫做替補(bǔ),在這種意義上的分紅代替與外部投資者直接通信,包括債務(wù)和股權(quán)。這個替代假設(shè)意味著應(yīng)該有顯著差異與不同的各國間的股利

71、政策制度結(jié)構(gòu)。特別是,股利政策在公平交易資本市場中對于公司經(jīng)營更重要，而不是在“內(nèi)部的”銀行中心市場。戴溫特和維特 (1998)提出類似的觀點，他們爭辯說穩(wěn)定的股利發(fā)放對日本公司來說不重要。它是企業(yè)集團(tuán)“業(yè)內(nèi)“網(wǎng)絡(luò),由于管理層和投資者之間的密切聯(lián)系。</p><p>　　相反對于替代假設(shè)，有人也許會認(rèn)為,股息增強(qiáng)而不是代替其他機(jī)制在控制代理和信息問題上。我們在這里補(bǔ)充假說。洛杉磯門戶網(wǎng)孫俐(1998)認(rèn)為缺乏透明

72、度不充分的法律基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和疲軟的投資新興市場保護(hù)提高分紅的角色聲譽機(jī)制。在這種情況下,雖然盡管與銀行有密切聯(lián)系和緊緊地握性質(zhì)的公司,但支付股息以吸引資本是必要的,</p><p>　　替代的假設(shè),我們希望能更可能的在交易資本市場上預(yù)測股利為外部投資者提供保證,傳達(dá)公司的經(jīng)營是正確的。相反,在中心市場銀行,我們希望能這溝通能直接和分紅體現(xiàn)公司的不可預(yù)知的內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流。特別是,我們測試：</p><p

73、>　　1)公司在這些新興市場股利發(fā)放比美國公司更不可預(yù)測么？</p><p>　　2)是新興市場的公司的股息紅利對過去較不敏感？</p><p>　　和美國公司相比對當(dāng)前的收入更加敏感么？</p><p>　　我們知道林特勒的股息平滑理論描述許多美國公司,這是因為從資本市場的角度看問題。利用假設(shè)替代模式我們不期待利用林特勒模型對新興市場公司持有相同的觀點。&l

74、t;/p><p>　　這些假設(shè)存在內(nèi)在聯(lián)系,但如果我們發(fā)現(xiàn)答案是一致的，我們認(rèn)為這是支持“替代”理論對股利政策。另一方面,如果我們發(fā)現(xiàn)股利政策在這些新興市場是可以預(yù)測的,可以利用林特勒模型做出準(zhǔn)確解釋,我們認(rèn)為這是支持股利政策的“補(bǔ)充”理論。</p><p>　　摘要統(tǒng)計表4提供比較八個新興國家和美國公司的股利政策和幾個主要財務(wù)比率。因為所有的價值觀是比率,他們有時被比較小的數(shù)值除時會被曲解。

75、由于這個原因, 隨著標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差，中值和平均都會被記錄下來。同時,所有的觀察基于三種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的情況意味著已經(jīng)被移除。分析股利政策的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)比率是股息收益，此種情況下，每年股利除以每年的平均水平高、低的股票價格、派息，是所支付的股息每股盈利。凈資產(chǎn)收益率作為衡量利潤,負(fù)債比率和利息保障倍數(shù)的信用狀況的手段和流動比率衡量資產(chǎn)流動性的手段。</p><p>　　八個新興市場的比率的平均支出與美國公司,相似,而只有土耳其公司明顯較高,

76、和巴基斯坦公司較低。相比之下,這些新興市場國家公司的平均股息收益率比美國公司的更高。這表明新興市場公司股利支付大體相同,但他們的美國同行更深處的美國股票的市場價值這些股息高得多。這又是對這些國家的相對發(fā)展落后的證券交易市場的行為指標(biāo)。有趣的是,馬來西亞是最接近又美國平均股息率,而韓國和中值股息收益率有2%差異，主要是時間的作用：在前期垂死掙扎的韓國市場導(dǎo)致高股息收益率, 直到當(dāng)時才消除。</p><p>　　通過

77、判別計較分析法和統(tǒng)計抽樣得出主要結(jié)論是，股息存在較大不穩(wěn)定性，從某種意義上說是不可預(yù)測的，在我們?nèi)〉眯屡d市場公司樣本而不是與美國對照實驗。這與之前的理論相符合-中央金融體系對于傳遞信號與預(yù)先承諾相比處于較輕的地位，與我們財務(wù)系統(tǒng)分類相反，這一結(jié)論為韓國、馬來西亞提供證據(jù)，我們視為“最像美國"因為這是對于喬丹,我們認(rèn)為是最發(fā)達(dá)的銀行導(dǎo)向系統(tǒng)?？磥碓谒羞@些新興市場，其它的控制機(jī)制扮演的角色是反映股利與代理的縮減，這也是它在美國公

78、平交易的資本市場體系中所起的作用。</p><p>　　本文調(diào)查了在八個新興市場的公司在1980至1990年的股利行為，并與100個美國的公司相比較。我們達(dá)成以下結(jié)論:</p><p>　　1)往往更難預(yù)測新興市場公司的股息變化。與美國控制樣品相比，大多數(shù)公司切割股息更類似于那些分紅、派息。</p><p>　　2)回歸結(jié)果表明, 比我們控制樣本的美國公司相比，當(dāng)前

79、的股息對過去的股息不太敏感,。</p><p>　　3)林特勒模型對新興市場公司的效果并不十分明顯，具有變R方格林特勒回歸模型大大低于我們期待的像美國公司一樣。</p><p>　　這些結(jié)果表明，在我們抽樣的新興市場公司當(dāng)中，股利的替代理論優(yōu)于互補(bǔ)理論。換句話說，這些結(jié)果支持了這一假設(shè)：這些發(fā)展中國家的體制結(jié)構(gòu)不能使企業(yè)股利政策成為有效反映未來盈利的信號機(jī)制，也不能有效減少代理成本，相比之