關(guān)于價格戰(zhàn)外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯

1、<p><b>　　短學(xué)期課程報告</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　題 目 　　　價格戰(zhàn)的研究綜述　　　　　　　　</p><p>　　學(xué) 院 商學(xué)院 </p><p>

2、;　　專 業(yè) 市場營銷 </p><p>　　班 級 </p><p>　　學(xué) 號 </p><p>　　學(xué)生姓名

3、 </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師 </p><p><b>　　審核意見：</b></p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師（簽名） 年 月 日</p><p><

4、b>　　一、外文原文</b></p><p>　?。ㄒ唬?biāo)題：How to Fight a Price War</p><p>　　原文：In the battle to capture the customer, companies use a wide range of tactics to ward off competitors. Increasingly, p

5、rice is the weapon of choice – and frequently the skirmishing degenerates into a price war.</p><p>　　Creating low price appeal is often the goal, but the result of one retaliatory price slashing after anothe

6、r is often a precipitous decline in industry profits. Look at the airline price wars of 1992. When American Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and other U.S. carriers went toe-to-toe in matching and exceeding one another’s

7、reduced fares, the result was record volumes of air travel-and record losses. Some estimates suggest that the overall losses suffered by the industry that year exceed the co</p><p>　　Price wars can create e

8、conomically devastating and psychologically debilitating situations that take an extraordinary toll on an individual, a company, and industry profitability. No matter who wins, the combatants all seem to end up worse of

9、f than before they joined the battle. And yet, price wars are becoming increasingly common and uncommonly fierce. Consider the following two examples:</p><p>　　In July 1999, Sprint announced a nighttime lo

10、ng-distance rate of 5 cents per minute. In August 1999, MCI matched Sprint’s off-peak rate. Later that month, AT & T acknowledged that revenue from its consumer long-distance business was falling, and the company c

11、ut its long-distance rates to 7 cents per minute all day, everyday, for a monthly fee of $ 5.95. AT & T’s stock dropped 4.7% the day of the announcement. MCI’s stock price dropped 2.5%; Sprint’s fell 3.8%.</p>

12、;<p>　　E-Trade and other electronic brokers are changing the competitive terrain of financial services with their extraordinarily low-priced brokerage services. The prevailing price for discount trades has fallen

13、 from $30 to $ 15 to $ 8 in the past few years.</p><p>　　There is a little doubt, in the first example, that the major players in the long-distance phone business are in a price war. Price reductions per-se

14、cond billing, and free calls are the principal weapons the players bring to the competitive arena. There is little talk from any of the carriers about service, quality, brand equity, and other nonprice factors that migh

15、t add value to a product or service. Virtually every competitive move is based on price, and every countermeasure is a retaliator</p><p>　　Price wars are becoming more common because managers tend to view a

16、 price change as an easy, quick, and reversible action</p><p>　　In the second example, the competitive situation is subtly different – and yet still very much a price war. E-Trade’s success demonstrates how

17、 the emergence of the Internet has fundamentally changed the cost of doing business. Consequently, even businesses such as Charles Schwab, which used to compete primarily on low-price appeal, are chanting a “quality” ma

18、ntra. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch and American Express have recognized that the emergence of the Internet will affect pricing and are chang</p><p>　　Most managers will be involved in a price war at some point

19、in their careers. Every price cut is potentially the first salvo, and some discounts routinely lead to retaliatory price cuts that then escalate into a full-blown price war. That’s why it’s a good idea to consider othe

20、r options before starting a price war or responding to an aggressive price move with a retaliatory one. Often, companies can avoid a debilitating price war altogether by using a set of alternative tactics. Our goal is

21、</p><p>　　Take Inventory</p><p>　　Generally, price wars start because somebody somewhere thinks prices in a certain market are too high. Or someone is willing to buy market share at the expense

22、 of current margins. Price wars are becoming more common because managers tend to view a price change as an easy, quick, and reversible action. When business do not trust or know one another very well, the pricing batt

23、les can escalate very quickly. And whether they play out in the physical or the virtual world, price wars have a simila</p><p>　　The first step, then, is diagnosis. Consider a small commodities supplier th

24、at suddenly found that its largest competitor had slashed prices to a level well below the small company’s costs. One option the smaller company considered was to lower its price in a tit-for-tat move. But that price w

25、ould have been below the supplier’s marginal cost; it would have suffered debilitating losses. Fortunately, a few phone calls revealed that its adversary was attempting to drive the supplier out of the </p><p

26、>　　Intelligent analysis that leads to accurate diagnosis is more than half the cure. The process emphasizes understanding the opportunities for pricing actions based on current market trends and responding to competi

27、tors’ actions based on the players and their resources. Not only is it necessary to understand why a price war is occurring or may occur, it also is critical to recognize where to look for the resources to do battle.<

28、;/p><p>　　Good diagnoses involve analyzing four key areas in the theater of operations. They are customer issues such as price sensitivity and the customer segments that may emerge if prices change; company is

29、sues such as a business’s cost structures, capabilities, and strategic positioning; competitor issues, such as a rival’s cost structures, capabilities, and strategic positioning; and contributor issues, or the other pla

30、yers in the industry whose self-interest or profiles may affect the outcome of a</p><p>　　Companies that step back and examine those four areas carefully often find that they actually have quite a few differ

31、ent options-including defusing the conflict, fighting it out on several fronts, or retreating. We’ll look at some of those strategies and how companies have deployed them successfully.</p><p>　　Stop the War

32、 Before It Starts</p><p>　　There are several ways to stop a price war before it starts. One is to make sure your competitors understand the rationale behind your pricing policies. In other words, reveal yo

33、ur strategic intentions. Price matching policies, everyday low pricing, and other public statements may communicate to competitors that you intend to fight a price war using all possible resources. But frequently these

34、 declarations about low prices, or about not engaging in price promotions, aren’t low-price strategi</p><p>　　出處：Harvard Business Review,Sept 01,2000</p><p>　　標(biāo)題：Strategies to Fight Low-Cost Riv

35、als</p><p>　　原文：It’s easier to fight the enemy you know than one you don’t. With gale-force winds of competition lashing every industry, companies must invest a lot of money, people, and time to fight archri

36、vals. They find it tough, challenging, and yet strangely reassuring to take on familiar opponents, whose ambitions, strategies, weaknesses, and even strengths resemble their own. CEOs can easily compare their game plans

37、and prowess with their doppelgängers’ by tracking stock prices by the minute, if they </p><p>　　However, this obsession with traditional rivals has blinded companies to the threat from disruptive, low-c

38、ost competitors. All over the world, especially in Europe and North America, organizations that have business models and technologies different from those of market leaders are mushrooming. Such companies offer products

39、and services at prices dramatically lower than the prices established businesses charge, often by harnessing the forces of deregulation, globalization, and technological inno</p><p>　　What should leaders do?

40、 I’m not the first academic (nor, I daresay, will I be the last) to pose that question. Several strategy experts, led by Harvard Business School’s Michael Porter in his work on competitive strategy and Clayton Christense

41、n in his research on disruptive innovations, and Tuck School’s Richard D’Aveni in his writings on hypercompetition, have described the strategies companies can use to fight low-cost rivals. But that body of work doesn’t

42、make the phenomenon less interesting—</p><p>　　Over the past five years, I’ve studied around 50 incumbents and 25 low-cost businesses. My research shows that ignoring cut-price rivals is a mistake because it

43、 eventually forces companies to vacate entire market segments. When market leaders do respond, they often set off price wars, hurting themselves more than the challengers. Companies that wake up to that fact usually chan

44、ge course in one of two ways. Some become more defensive and try to differentiate their products—a strategy that works o</p><p>　　The Sustainability of Low-Cost Businesses</p><p>　　Be it in the

45、classroom or the boardroom, executives invariably ask me the same question: Are low-cost businesses a permanent, enduring threat? Most managers believe they aren’t; they’re convinced that a business that sells at prices

46、dramatically lower than those incumbents charge must go bankrupt. They cite the experience of U.S. airlines, which, after the industry’s deregulation in the 1980s, succeeded in beating off cut-price providers such as Peo

47、ple Express. What they forget is that low-cost </p><p>　　Successful price warriors stay ahead of bigger rivals by using several tactics: They focus on just one or a few consumer segments; they deliver the ba

48、sic product or provide one benefit better than rivals do; and they back everyday low prices with superefficient operations to keep costs down. That’s how Aldi, the Essen-headquartered retailer that owns Trader Joe’s in t

49、he U.S., has thrived in the brutally competitive German market. Aldi’s advantages start with the size of its product range. A typi</p><p>　　Aldi doesn’t pamper customers. Its stores display products on palle

50、ts rather than shelves in order to cut restocking time and save money. Customers bring their own shopping bags or buy them in the store. Aldi was one of the first retailers to require customers to pay refundable deposits

51、 for grocery carts. Shoppers return the carts to designated areas, sparing employees the time and energy needed to round them up. At the same time, Aldi gets the basics right. There are several checkout lines, so </p&

52、gt;<p>　　As Aldi’s story suggests, the financial calculations of low-cost players are different from those of established companies. They earn smaller gross margins than traditional players do, but their business

53、models turn those into higher operating margins. Those operating margins are magnified by the businesses’ higher-than-average asset turnover ratios, which result in impressive returns on assets. Because of those returns

54、and high growth rates, the market capitalizations of many upstarts are highe</p><p>　　Many price warriors don’t figure in listings of the biggest companies, but they have created wealth—and pots of it. Look

55、at Forbes’s list of the world’s richest people in 2006, for instance, and you will discover that 12 of the top 25 billionaires made their fortunes by creating (or inheriting) low-cost businesses. They include Sam Walton’

56、s five heirs, whose combined net worth was estimated at $80 billion, Aldi’s Theo and Karl Albrecht with $32 billion, IKEA’s Ingvar Kamprad with $28 billion, Mi</p><p>　　Interestingly, low-cost companies stay

57、 ahead of market leaders because consumer behavior works in their favor. My research suggests that if a business gets a customer to buy its products or services on the basis of price, it will lose the customer only if a

58、rival offers a lower price. Since the discounters win all their customers because of the prices they offer, they don’t have to worry about traditional rivals that always charge premiums. Only new entrants with even lower

59、 cost structures can c</p><p>　　The Futility of Price Wars</p><p>　　The moment a company spots a low-cost competitor, it would do well to ask itself this question: Is our new rival targeting a s

60、egment we don’t want to serve or will it eat into our sales? (The exhibit “A Framework for Responding to Low-Cost Rivals” shows companies’ options in various situations.) If the new entrant has set its sights on customer

61、s no other business serves, incumbents needn’t worry—for the moment. They can observe without engaging the competitor. That wait-and-watch strategy often </p><p>　　Sometimes, entrants at low price points can

62、 provide a fillip to incumbents’ business. Take the case of easyCruise, set up by the London-based serial entrepreneur Sir Stelios Haji-Ioannou, which has boosted Europeans’ interest in cruises. The line’s ships serve as

63、 floating hotels that dock in the afternoon and leave late at night, which allows passengers to entertain themselves at the ports of call. Since easyCruise doesn’t offer lavish meals and expensive shows, it is able to ch

64、arge low prices. </p><p>　　That may be an exception to the rule. Most low-cost players alter customer behavior permanently, getting people to accept fewer benefits at lower prices. EasyCruise’s passengers ma

65、y never switch to the higher-priced cruise lines. Moreover, low-price warriors are aided by the fact that consumers are becoming cynical about brands, better informed because of the Internet, and more open to value-for-m

66、oney offers.</p><p>　　When market leaders finally acknowledge the threat from low-cost rivals, they usually try to match or beat their prices. All the available evidence, however, shows that price wars don’t

67、 work in incumbents’ favor. Not only is pricing below cost illegal in many countries, including the United States, but also low-cost business models are designed to make money at low prices—a fact that executives tend to

68、 forget. In a race to the bottom, the challengers always come out ahead of the incumbents. For </p><p>　　Even when market leaders copy the critical elements of low-cost players’ business models, they are una

69、ble to match their prices. That’s because the individual elements of the model don’t matter as much as the interactions among them. Consider Internet bookings for airline tickets, which don’t deliver the kind of cost red

70、uctions to traditional airlines that they do to low-cost carriers. First, low-cost players generate 98% of their bookings through their Web sites, while only 20% of incumbents’ c</p><p>　　Slashing prices usu

71、ally lowers profits for all incumbents without driving the low-cost entrant out of business. I learned that firsthand while serving as a consultant to a European telecom-equipment provider that was competing against trad

72、itional rivals as well as a low-cost Asian competitor for a multimillion-dollar contract in Africa. All the bidders kept cutting prices in order to best the Asian rival’s offer, which proved to be the lowest after every

73、round of bidding. Eventually, the telecom</p><p>　　When Differentiation Works</p><p>　　When businesses finally realize they can’t win a price war with low-cost players, they try to differentiate

74、 their products in a last-ditch attempt at coexistence. This strategy, the consultant’s favorite antidote, takes many forms. Companies, we’re told, should adopt the following approaches:</p><p>　　Design cool

75、 products, as, say, Apple and Bang & Olufsen do.</p><p>　　Continually innovate in the tradition of Gillette and 3M.</p><p>　　Offer a unique product mix, like that of Sharper Image and Whole

76、Foods.</p><p>　　Brand a community à la Harley-Davidson and Red Bull.</p><p>　　Sell experiences, as Four Seasons, Nordstrom, and Starbucks do.</p><p>　　Since the tactics I’ve me

77、ntioned are well-known, I will not discuss them in detail. My research shows, however, that three conditions determine their efficacy. First, smart businesses don’t use these tactics in isolation. For instance, Bang &

78、; Olufsen is able to compete effectively against low-cost electronics manufacturers with its design capabilities. That approach works well because the Danish company also keeps introducing new products, cultivates an ups

79、cale brand image, and invests time and </p><p>　　Second, companies must be able to persuade consumers to pay for benefits. The ability to do so usually depends on the products they sell. For instance, Gillet

80、te, finding that it can push the “closer shave” envelope for men, has launched the Atra, Atra Plus, Sensor, Sensor Excel, Mach 3, Mach 3 Turbo, and Centro shaving systems at ever higher prices over the past 20 years. How

81、ever, when the company deployed a similar strategy for Duracell batteries by emphasizing longer life, many consumers balke</p><p>　　Many companies find it tough to persuade consumers to pay for additional be

82、nefits. A small premium for greater services or benefits is a powerful defense, as Target and Walgreens have shown. Target stocks inexpensive kitchenware and clothes developed by well-known designers such as Michael Grav

83、es and Isaac Mizrahi. It charges a bit more for products of better quality and design than those Wal-Mart sells. In like vein, Walgreens emphasizes convenience by setting up its stores close to shopping ce</p><

84、;p>　　The third condition necessary for a successful differentiation strategy is simple: Companies must bring costs and benefits in line before implementing it. That takes time. After years of restructuring, Hewlett-Pa

85、ckard may finally be catching up with Dell in the personal computer business. HP has shrunk Dell’s cost advantage from 20% to 10%, and since average PC prices have fallen, the absolute difference in prices is relatively

86、small. Consumers are shopping for HP computers once again because of</p><p>　　Unless sizable numbers of consumers demand additional benefits, however, companies may have to yield some markets to the price wa

87、rriors. Take the case of British Airways, which initially ignored low-cost rivals such as easyJet and Ryanair; then set up a low-cost carrier called Go, which it sold in 2002 to easyJet; and finally differentiated its se

88、rvices in several ways. BA now concentrates on long-haul flights, for which there are no low-cost carriers. In the short-haul market, the carrier has h</p><p>　　Strategies that help an established player coe

89、xist with low-cost rivals can work initially, but as consumers become more familiar with low-cost options, they tend to migrate to them. In the airline, PC, and retail industries, the segment choosing to pay less for few

90、er benefits has grown rapidly—and I’m not talking about Wal-Mart shoppers. Dell’s and Southwest Airlines’ shares of their industries, for instance, rose from around 3% in the early 1990s to 30% by 2006. That has left the

91、 traditional p</p><p>　　Dealing with Dual Strategies</p><p>　　When companies discover that the low-price customer segment is large, they often set up low-cost ventures themselves. Because of the

92、ir years of industry experience as well as their abundant resources, incumbents are often seduced into believing that they can easily replicate cut-price operations. Moreover, the business models of such rivals appear to

93、 be simpler than their own. In the 1990s, for instance, all the major airlines launched no-frills second carriers—Continental Lite, Delta Express, K</p><p>　　Although most executives don’t realize it, compan

94、ies should set up low-cost operations only if the traditional operation will become more competitive as a result and the new business will derive some advantages that it would not have gained as an independent entity. Fo

95、r example, in the financial services industry, HSBC, ING, Merrill Lynch, and Royal Bank of Scotland have set up low-cost operations in the form of First Direct, ING Direct, ML Direct, and Direct Line Insurance, respectiv

96、ely, becaus</p><p>　　A successful two-pronged approach requires the low-cost business to use a unique brand name such as HSBC’s First Direct or at least a sub-brand such as ING Direct. A distinct brand helps

97、 communicate that fewer services go along with lower prices. It also allows customers’ expectations to form around the low-cost business model rather than the traditional operation. First Direct customers, for example, a