會(huì)計(jì)專業(yè)畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯--變化中的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性——與當(dāng)前環(huán)境與時(shí)俱進(jìn)

1、<p><b>　　畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）</b></p><p>　　外 文 文 獻(xiàn) 翻 譯</p><p>　　系　 別 經(jīng)濟(jì)管理系 </p><p>　　專 業(yè) 班 </p><p>　　姓　

2、名　 </p><p>　　評(píng) 分 </p><p>　　導(dǎo) 師（簽名） </p><p>　　變化中的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性——與當(dāng)前環(huán)境與時(shí)俱進(jìn)，理查德·貝克</p>&l

3、t;p>　　2005年8月——具《注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師?？返闹骶幜_伯特科爾森在他2004年3月的專欄里的研究表明，“會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性”的概念，在過(guò)去的150多年中，是不斷變化的。從一般意義上說(shuō)，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性與當(dāng)前的商業(yè)環(huán)境是存在著密切的關(guān)聯(lián)的。但是，不同的“會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性”的概念之間，并沒(méi)有明顯的過(guò)渡。通常情況下，許多審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的不同概念的提出，都是圍繞著專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)師、審計(jì)師、監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和一般公眾之間的獨(dú)立性，所展開(kāi)討論的。&

4、lt;/p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的最初概念，出現(xiàn)在19世紀(jì)。它的出現(xiàn)，是基于這樣一個(gè)前提的，即主要是英國(guó)本土的專業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)師和審計(jì)師，對(duì)整個(gè)大英帝國(guó)以前的和現(xiàn)有的殖民資本承擔(dān)監(jiān)督的責(zé)任。在此期間，數(shù)量上相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)較少的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所，卻要對(duì)相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)大數(shù)量的群體執(zhí)行審計(jì)的任務(wù)。這些專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)師和審計(jì)師就有可能同時(shí)對(duì)不同的實(shí)體出具財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告、為不同的投資群體工作。</p><p>　　在這個(gè)時(shí)代，

5、會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的概念，并沒(méi)有把審計(jì)設(shè)想為一個(gè)獨(dú)立存在的審計(jì)實(shí)體;英國(guó)投資者明確禁止審計(jì)者在其審計(jì)的企業(yè)工作或參與投資。與此同時(shí)，只要會(huì)計(jì)師保持對(duì)主要投資者的審計(jì)服務(wù)，他們的專業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)服務(wù)的范圍，是可以合理地?cái)U(kuò)大的。例如，審計(jì)師被允許可以幫他們所審計(jì)的企業(yè)編制財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性這一初步的概念在19世紀(jì)末到20世紀(jì)初發(fā)生了改變。在這段時(shí)期，經(jīng)濟(jì)上有了一個(gè)大的變化，那就是資本的主要來(lái)源由

6、國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)向到外國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)。這一變化的出現(xiàn)是與美國(guó)的大型工業(yè)公司，如采礦，鐵路，能源，電力和電信，的出現(xiàn)相關(guān)聯(lián)的。伴隨著這些美國(guó)大公司的出現(xiàn)的，也包括著對(duì)公司商業(yè)性的理解的改變。在上世紀(jì)30年代，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家阿道夫貝爾和伽爾迪納指出，推進(jìn)對(duì)這一變化的理解的，是大型企業(yè)所有權(quán)的分離，以及會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)對(duì)于公司的財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)益的重要性。在這一新思路下，審計(jì)的主要職責(zé)，就是為集體的所有權(quán)益的需要而服務(wù)，而不是某個(gè)具體的無(wú)所有權(quán)的利益。這種集體的所有權(quán)益，基

7、本上是由國(guó)內(nèi)的股東組成，通常往往是大銀行或非常富有的投資者。 </p><p>　　聯(lián)邦證券法在新政時(shí)代的通過(guò)，以及美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的成立，使會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的概念，有了再一次的轉(zhuǎn)變。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的成立，對(duì)建立出具財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告和審計(jì)法規(guī)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，有著最重要的影響。通過(guò)這種努力，公共的會(huì)計(jì)師和審計(jì)師不再認(rèn)為他們的主要職責(zé)，是為那些特定的物主，或某些集體的所有權(quán)益；而是按照一套既定的專業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，來(lái)編制財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，和進(jìn)

8、行財(cái)務(wù)決算的審計(jì)工作。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的概念，轉(zhuǎn)向?yàn)樵谪?cái)務(wù)狀況和經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的報(bào)告中保持客觀性和中立性，而不是忠于某一政黨。這一觀點(diǎn)，由西澳佩頓教授，在理論上和書面上被闡述出來(lái)，他著重強(qiáng)調(diào)了公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的重要性。 </p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的客觀和中立的概念，一直趨于上風(fēng)，成為主流。直到20世紀(jì)70年代，當(dāng)財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)成立，成為獨(dú)立的、權(quán)威的會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定者。大約從那個(gè)時(shí)候開(kāi)始，公共的會(huì)計(jì)公司開(kāi)始改

9、變其客觀和中立的原則，并開(kāi)始對(duì)他們的審計(jì)客戶宣傳和提供關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)的事項(xiàng)。同時(shí)，在全球范圍內(nèi)，企業(yè)的快速增長(zhǎng)，為公共的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所提供了大量的機(jī)會(huì)去獲得收入，而這些收入，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)了傳統(tǒng)的審計(jì)服務(wù)所能取得的收入。雖然，美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)的審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)（ASB），發(fā)布的審計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，一直繼續(xù)強(qiáng)調(diào)著與客戶保持獨(dú)立性，但是日益激烈的審計(jì)服務(wù)市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，以及錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的國(guó)際商業(yè)慣例，導(dǎo)致一些審計(jì)者不得不違反會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的客觀性和中立性的，因?yàn)檫@更有利于

10、贏得客戶的信賴。</p><p>　　繼2000年初的會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)丑聞之后，以及2002年沙賓法案的通過(guò)，審計(jì)者被認(rèn)為是值得信賴的顧問(wèn)的這種想法，似乎已經(jīng)越來(lái)越難以讓人信服。一個(gè)潛在的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的新概念，仍然未能演變出來(lái)，但上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督委員會(huì)（ PCAOB ）對(duì)這種獨(dú)立性的概念上，似乎更強(qiáng)調(diào)要在更大程度上區(qū)分注冊(cè)審計(jì)師和客戶管理的獨(dú)立性。 </p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的

11、早期爭(zhēng)議</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)的下半葉，學(xué)術(shù)界和出現(xiàn)了關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的各種爭(zhēng)論和專業(yè)文獻(xiàn)。有一些關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的觀點(diǎn)，是從包括英國(guó)和美國(guó)兩者的會(huì)計(jì)職業(yè)相關(guān)的歷史性觀點(diǎn)中理想化、發(fā)展和演變出來(lái)的。例如，托馬斯李，在《公司審計(jì)》第3版（范諾斯得萊因霍爾德，1986年，頁(yè)89）中提到的：一個(gè)誠(chéng)實(shí)的審計(jì)者應(yīng)該是完全獨(dú)立的，用獨(dú)立的意志和態(tài)度思考，絕不允許的其觀點(diǎn)和結(jié)論，受到利益沖突所帶來(lái)的壓力所影響

12、或?qū)ζ溆兴蕾嚒?lt;/p><p>　　不幸的是，雖然這種對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的表達(dá)，是令人欽佩和向往的，但是這種對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的表達(dá)，在一定程度上，是有不確定性的，因此，判斷一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)是否是獨(dú)立的，根據(jù)托馬斯李的定義要得出結(jié)論，是不可能的。 </p><p>　　皮莫扎爾，在“獨(dú)立性”（在《當(dāng)前審計(jì)的問(wèn)題》，由木雪納爾和斯特利編輯，保羅查普曼公司出版，1991年）中，主張會(huì)計(jì)師

13、審計(jì)獨(dú)立的經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯的辯論，是這樣歸納的：人們期望會(huì)計(jì)師進(jìn)行了審計(jì)后，可以把不能訴訟成功的概率和審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)降低到一個(gè)可以接受的水平。用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的語(yǔ)言來(lái)說(shuō)，審計(jì)員執(zhí)行審計(jì)工作的費(fèi)用，應(yīng)該是和工作量平等的，換句話說(shuō)，是會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)行審計(jì)任務(wù)時(shí)所產(chǎn)生的費(fèi)用，和其所能減少的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，是成正比的。然而，所有的審計(jì)者都是單獨(dú)的個(gè)體，他們都對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和回報(bào)，持有著各自不同的態(tài)度，因此會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)工作的最低標(biāo)準(zhǔn)并不一定必須是相同的。</p><p>

14、;　　用這種經(jīng)濟(jì)上的理論來(lái)解釋會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，似乎是合乎邏輯的。但是，如果某些審計(jì)者采納了關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的一般概念，是為了可以獲得好處，從中謀利，以便獲得更多的市場(chǎng)占有率和市場(chǎng)份額，那么這種觀點(diǎn)就不能成立了。換言之，雖然這種立足于經(jīng)濟(jì)上論證是有效的，但是會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，還是需要一個(gè)可以去完全遵守的原則。 </p><p>　　正與此相反，相對(duì)于這種經(jīng)過(guò)專業(yè)的和經(jīng)濟(jì)論證的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的概念，巴特

15、利特在“審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的挑戰(zhàn)”（會(huì)計(jì)地平線，第二卷，第五刊，第一期，1991年）中所提出的則大相徑庭。巴特利特認(rèn)為，關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，有四種不同的比喻。</p><p>　　1、“冒煙的槍口”，這個(gè)論點(diǎn)是說(shuō)只有少數(shù)幾個(gè)事例表明會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性被認(rèn)為是和審計(jì)失敗有所牽連的。大多數(shù)訴訟和被起訴的審計(jì)者，都是基于對(duì)其不稱職或不盡職調(diào)查的說(shuō)法上的，而不是缺乏獨(dú)立性。然而，因?yàn)闊o(wú)法獲得有關(guān)的審計(jì)失敗的詳細(xì)的記錄和其他的

16、訴訟證據(jù)，使這種觀點(diǎn)很難被證明。</p><p>　　2、“我們這樣做很好?！边@一論點(diǎn)中，根據(jù)民意調(diào)查，公眾會(huì)計(jì)界普遍已經(jīng)得到了高度的關(guān)注。民意調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，民眾所關(guān)心的，往往是會(huì)計(jì)師對(duì)于職業(yè)本身的尊重、對(duì)問(wèn)題的客觀性的處理、可靠性和誠(chéng)實(shí)，而不是獨(dú)立性本身。雖然，客觀性、可靠性和誠(chéng)實(shí)，在一定程度上可能和獨(dú)立性有所重疊，什么是所謂的“獨(dú)立性”，實(shí)際上一般公眾并沒(méi)有一個(gè)清楚的概念。通常情況下，并沒(méi)有人告訴公眾，會(huì)計(jì)師

17、的審計(jì)到底是在做些什么。</p><p>　　3、“公共利益?！边@個(gè)是要表明，如果在公共會(huì)計(jì)的專業(yè)服務(wù)的范圍內(nèi)有了太多的限制，會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所將無(wú)法正確的為客戶提供服務(wù)，而白白的耗費(fèi)了大數(shù)額的費(fèi)用。一些公共的會(huì)計(jì)公司認(rèn)為，提供審計(jì)以外的服務(wù)，讓他們能更好地履行審計(jì)義務(wù)，因?yàn)樗鼈兛梢愿玫厝チ私馑麄兊目蛻簟?lt;/p><p>　　4、“信任我們?！豹?dú)立性往往是說(shuō)一個(gè)專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)師所擁有的精神狀態(tài)，因

18、此這是不能被實(shí)證、以實(shí)驗(yàn)來(lái)觀察，或被量化的。這種說(shuō)法是基于審計(jì)者自身的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益出發(fā)的，即審計(jì)者被假定為可以、會(huì)保持他的獨(dú)立性和客觀性，以便不損害其自身的長(zhǎng)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。雖然這種假設(shè)可能是備受爭(zhēng)議的，因?yàn)檫@樣做是為了產(chǎn)生最大的、長(zhǎng)期的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。某個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)師在執(zhí)行審計(jì)時(shí)可能會(huì)因?yàn)閭€(gè)人的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而去權(quán)衡，從而保留某一個(gè)重要客戶，而不是去保持客觀性和獨(dú)立性，這實(shí)際上也破壞了“信任我們”的這一論調(diào)。</p><p>　　市場(chǎng)

19、變化對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的影響</p><p>　　喬納森?威爾，在“企業(yè)不為人知的欺騙：如何變更審計(jì)工作”（華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)，2004年3月25日）指出，在20世紀(jì)的70年代和80年代的審計(jì)服務(wù)市場(chǎng)，會(huì)計(jì)師進(jìn)行審計(jì)的方式是有所改變的，在一定程度上對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性是有所減弱的。這種變化的開(kāi)始的第一個(gè)組成部分，是價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。在20世紀(jì)70年代以前，美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)的行為守則中是禁止會(huì)計(jì)師、審計(jì)者公開(kāi)的為他們的審計(jì)服務(wù)

20、做廣告的，或者為了贏得公司的客戶而相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的，甚至是去參加為審計(jì)舉行的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的投標(biāo)、競(jìng)標(biāo)。在受到聯(lián)邦政府的反壟斷訴訟的威脅下，美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)不得不被迫取消了這些對(duì)反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的做法的禁令。其結(jié)果是，審計(jì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性招標(biāo)變得司空見(jiàn)慣。審計(jì)變成了商品。</p><p>　　審計(jì)實(shí)施上的第二個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)變，是越來(lái)越強(qiáng)調(diào)“審計(jì)基礎(chǔ)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”。審計(jì)的基礎(chǔ)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的增大與審計(jì)任務(wù)的數(shù)量的增大成正比，這是合理的，這種假設(shè)是合乎邏輯的。但是，審計(jì)專家

21、是可以確定一家公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)中，最危險(xiǎn)的那個(gè)部分的。不幸的是，安然公司和其他企業(yè)的倒閉，已經(jīng)表明，一些審計(jì)者沒(méi)有辦法充分的確定，公司業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)營(yíng)運(yùn)作中，哪個(gè)部分會(huì)遭受著最大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。此外，審計(jì)者采用基本風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的方法，有可能無(wú)法發(fā)現(xiàn)欺詐活動(dòng)。雖然這一會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的新概念，對(duì)于某種環(huán)境下的某個(gè)審計(jì)者，可能是適合的，但往往審計(jì)者會(huì)努力去用欺騙性的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字，幫助隱瞞經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況，從而隱瞞真實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)。在20世紀(jì)90年代，似乎有些審計(jì)者會(huì)忽視他們的最

22、直接的責(zé)任，而按照第三方投資者的利益去行動(dòng)。</p><p>　　加強(qiáng)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性 </p><p>　　法律上禁止擔(dān)任審計(jì)工作的會(huì)計(jì)師與委托人在財(cái)務(wù)上有經(jīng)濟(jì)利益關(guān)系，是美國(guó)從20世紀(jì)30年代直至20世紀(jì)90年代期間，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性原則存在的基礎(chǔ)。但這并不代表這在英國(guó)或其他一些國(guó)家也是同樣正確，即使禁止金融利益上的連帶關(guān)系，通常是實(shí)際中按照最基本的會(huì)計(jì)制度中留心觀察，就可以得出的結(jié)

23、論性做法。 </p><p>　　實(shí)際上，目前，禁止擔(dān)任審計(jì)工作的會(huì)計(jì)師擁有客戶的財(cái)務(wù)利益幾乎是一個(gè)普遍性的原則。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)和公共會(huì)計(jì)行業(yè)都不約而同的把的他們大部分的注意力，重點(diǎn)地放在，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性概念的界定，和對(duì)財(cái)政利益的禁令的執(zhí)行上。詳細(xì)的規(guī)則和報(bào)告結(jié)構(gòu)已制定的出來(lái)了，目的是為了要揭露，任何一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的職業(yè)雇員，所可能擁有的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，也包括這些職業(yè)雇員的配偶，父母，或他們的孩子。上市公司會(huì)

24、計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)采用了這些規(guī)則中的一大部分，這在一定程度上緩和了那些制度上有不合理地方的地區(qū)的問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　除此之外，還有輪換任用的審計(jì)方法。在某些國(guó)家，如意大利，審計(jì)者可以對(duì)委托人執(zhí)行某一個(gè)特定年限的審計(jì)工作。這種類型的管理方法，在美國(guó)和英國(guó)，從來(lái)沒(méi)有被認(rèn)真的考慮過(guò)。雖然法案要求，個(gè)別審計(jì)者要定期地輪換委托人客戶。而在法國(guó)，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的輪換概念是顛倒的：即審計(jì)者的任期為一段固定的時(shí)間，在這段時(shí)間里，他

25、們不能被取代。這種規(guī)則的制定，目的是增加會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，因?yàn)橛纱藢徲?jì)者對(duì)于被客戶解雇的擔(dān)憂就減少了。 </p><p>　　關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)通過(guò)了臨時(shí)準(zhǔn)則3600T作為其規(guī)章制度。第3600T準(zhǔn)則如下： </p><p>　　任何有關(guān)審計(jì)報(bào)告的籌備或發(fā)布的，已經(jīng)登記的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所及其所有相關(guān)人員，都應(yīng)遵從獨(dú)立性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)： </p><

26、;p>　　（一）依照美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)的專業(yè)行為守則第101條所描述的，依照裁決的特殊解釋除外，在2003年4月16日[美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)專業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，東部部分101條和191條（美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)2002）]的范圍內(nèi)，是不能取代或修正的； </p><p>　?。ǘ?biāo)準(zhǔn)第1號(hào)、第2號(hào)、第3號(hào)，及解釋中的99-1，00-1和00-2，在獨(dú)立準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)的范圍內(nèi)，不能取代或修正。 </p><

27、p>　　從本質(zhì)上來(lái)說(shuō)，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到以前制定的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，被美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)和美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)，通過(guò)獨(dú)立標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會(huì)，又進(jìn)一步的發(fā)展了。</p><p>　　對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的重新思考</p><p>　　我們現(xiàn)在需要的，是一個(gè)完整的對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審獨(dú)立性概念的重新思考。這種復(fù)議可能帶來(lái)一種會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的新概念，它是基于重申專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的客觀性和中立

28、性極其道德規(guī)范上的，而不是主張站在委托人、客戶的立場(chǎng)上?？紤]到一些最近和正在發(fā)生的會(huì)計(jì)和審計(jì)丑聞，顯然，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性不應(yīng)該站在客戶的立場(chǎng)上。 </p><p>　　這種觀點(diǎn)要求，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的新概念要結(jié)合具體的主張來(lái)實(shí)施：</p><p>　　（1）審計(jì)者不應(yīng)該提倡擁護(hù)他們的客戶；</p><p>　　（2）管理者不能影響查賬公費(fèi)，即審計(jì)費(fèi)用和會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)

29、的范圍。如果沒(méi)有過(guò)渡到這一概念，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，將極有可能只是做做門面功夫，根本不足以保證審計(jì)者在實(shí)際中獨(dú)立于委托人管理者而存在。</p><p>　　The Varying Concept of Auditor Independence</p><p>　　Shifting with the Prevailing Environment，C. Richard Baker<

30、/p><p>　　AUGUST 2005 - As CPA Journal Editor-in-Chief Robert Colson observed in his March 2004 column, “Auditor Independence Redux,” the concept of auditor independence has varied over the last 150 years. In a

31、general sense, auditor independence has borne a relationship to the prevailing commercial environment in different time periods. There has not, however, been a clear transition from one concept of auditor independence to

32、 another. Frequently, more than one idea of auditor independence has been prese</p><p>　　The initial concept of auditor independence, which arose during the 19th century, was based on the premise, primarily

33、British in origin, that a principal duty of professional accountants and auditors was the oversight of absente investments in the existing and former colonies of the British Empire. During this period, a relatively small

34、 number of accounting firms could perform audits for a relatively large number of entities. Professional accountants and auditors could render reports on the fina</p><p>　　The concept of auditor independence

35、 during this era did not conceive of auditors as advocates for audited entities; British investors explicitly forbade auditors from investing or working in the businesses that they audited. At the same time, as long as a

36、uditors maintained their primary loyalty to the investors back home, the scope of professional accounting services could be reasonably broad. For example, auditors were permitted to keep the books and prepare the financi

37、al statements for the ent</p><p>　　This initial concept of auditor independence changed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During this time, there was an economic shift from capital coming primar

38、ily from foreign sources to capital deriving primarily from domestic sources. This change was associated with the emergence of large American corporations in industries such as mining, railroads, energy, and telegraph an

39、d telephone. The emergence of large American corporations was accompanied by a change in the understanding o</p><p>　　The passage of the federal securities acts during the New Deal era, and the creation of t

40、he SEC, led to another transition in the concept of auditor independence. The SEC’s most important effect on auditor independence derived from its efforts to establish standards for financial reporting and auditing. Beca

41、use of these efforts, public accountants and auditors no longer accepted that their primary responsibility was to a specific absentee owner, or to a collective proprietary interest, but rathe</p><p>　　The ob

42、jective and neutral concept of auditor independence prevailed until the 1970s, when FASB was established as the authoritative independent accounting standards setter. From approximately that time, public accounting firms

43、 began to modify their objective and neutral focus and started advocating for their audit clients with regard to accounting and auditing matters. Simultaneously, the rapid growth of business enterprises on a worldwide ba

44、sis provided large public accounting firms with an opp</p><p>　　Subsequent to the accounting and auditing scandals of the early 2000s, and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), the idea of aud

45、itors as trusted advisors appears to have become increasingly unsustainable. The parameters of a potentially new concept of auditor independence are still unfolding, but the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (P

46、CAOB) seems to be stressing a concept of auditor independence that emphasizes a greater degree of separation between registered auditors </p><p>　　Prior Debates About Auditor Independence</p><p>

47、;　　The second half of the 20th century saw various debates in both the academic and the professional literatures about auditor independence. One argument pertaining to auditor independence developed from idealized views

48、of professionalism that emerged historically in both the British and the American accounting professions. For example, Thomas A. Lee, in Company Auditing, 3rd ed. (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1986, page 89), suggested the fol

49、lowing: </p><p>　　An honest auditor will behave like someone who is independent, using independence to mean an attitude of mind which does not allow the viewpoints and conclusions of its possessor to become

50、reliant on or subordinate to the influence and pressures of conflicting interests.</p><p>　　Unfortunately, this admirable expression about auditor independence does not acknowledge that an auditor’s state of

51、 mind is not determinable, and, therefore, to conclude whether an auditor is independent pursuant to Lee’s definition is impossible.</p><p>　　P. Moizier, in “Independence” (in Current Issues in Auditing, edi

52、ted by M. Sherer and S. Turley, Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd., 1991), argued for an economic rationale for auditor independence, which was summarized as follows:</p><p>　　There is an expectation that the audi

53、tor will have performed an audit that will have reduced the chances of a successful negligence lawsuit to a level acceptable to the auditor. In the language of economics, the auditor will perform audit work until the cos

54、t of undertaking more work is equal to the benefit the auditor derives in terms of the reduction in the risk of a successful lawsuit being possible. This then represents the minimum amount of work that the reader can exp

55、ect the auditor to perf</p><p>　　This economic argument, while logical, would be unsustainable if certain auditors took advantage of the general presumption regarding auditor independence in order to obtain

56、increased market share. In other words, for the economic argument to be effective, complete compliance with the principle of auditor independence would be required.</p><p>　　In contrast to the professional a

57、nd economic arguments for auditor independence, R.W. Bartlett, in “A Heretical Challenge to the Incantations of Audit Independence” (Accounting Horizons, vol. 5, No. 1, 1991), suggested that auditing is a sort of ceremon

58、y involving incantations about independence. Bartlett argued that there have been four kinds of “incantations” regarding auditor independence:</p><p>　　The “smoking gun.” This is the argument that only in a

59、few documented instances has auditor independence been found to be implicated in audit failures, at least if one accepts the evidence provided by lawsuits and prosecutions of auditors for securities fraud. Most lawsuits

60、and prosecutions of auditors have been based on assertions of incompetence or lack of due diligence in the application of auditing standards, rather than lack of independence. An inability to obtain access to detailed re

61、cords</p><p>　　“We are doing pretty good.” Based on public opinion surveys, the public accounting profession has generally been held in high regard. Public opinion polls assessing the esteem of the professio

62、n often address issues like objectivity, reliability, and honesty, rather than independence perse. While objectivity, reliability, honesty, and independence may overlap, what “independence” actually means to the general

63、public is unclear. Often, the public is not well informed about what auditors do. </p><p>　　The “public good.” This incantation suggests that if too many constraints are placed on the public accounting profe

64、ssion’s scope of services, accounting firms will be unable to serve clients properly, thereby imposing significant costs on the public. Some public accounting firms have argued that providing nonauditing services allows

65、them to perform better audits because they can obtain a better understanding of the client’s systems. </p><p>　　“Trust us.” Independence is often said to be a mental state possessed by professional accountan

66、ts and therefore not subject to empirical observation or quantification. This incantation is based on the idea of auditor economic self-interest; that is, auditors are assumed to maintain independence and objectivity so

67、as not to harm their longer-term economic interests. This assumes that auditors continually evaluate the costs and benefits associated with ethical behavior and always resolve conflicts</p><p>　　Changes in t

68、he Market That Affected Auditor Independence</p><p>　　Jonathan Weil, in “Behind Ways of Corporate Fraud: A Change in How Auditors Work” (The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004), suggests that during the 197

69、0s and 1980s the market for audit services and the way in which audits were conducted changed, contributing to a decline in auditor independence. The first component of change was price competition. Prior to the 1970s, t

70、he AICPA Code of Conduct prohibited auditors from publicly advertising their services, from making uninvited solicitations to r</p><p>　　The second change in how audits were conducted was an increased emphas

71、is on “risk-based auditing.” Risk-based auditing is reasonable in that the largest amount of audit effort is placed on the greatest areas of audit risk. This logical idea assumes, however, that auditors are experts in de

72、termining the riskiest areas of a company’s operations. Unfortunately, as Enron and other business failures have demonstrated, some auditors are not sufficiently able to determine which areas of a company’s ope</p>

73、<p>　　Pre–Sarbanes-Oxley Proposals to Enhance Auditor Independence</p><p>　　A legal prohibition against an auditor possessing a financial interest in a client has been the cornerstone of auditor indep

74、endence rules in the United States since the 1930s. Until the 1990s, this was not necessarily true in the United Kingdom and some other countries, even though prohibitions against holding financial interests were general

75、ly observed in practice because of the standards of the accounting institutes and common law. </p><p>　　Currently, a prohibition against auditors possessing financial interests in clients is virtually a univ

76、ersal principle. Both the SEC and the public accounting profession have focused most of their attention regarding auditor independence on defining and enforcing prohibitions against financial interests. Elaborate rules a

77、nd reporting structures have been formulated for the purpose of revealing any type of financial interest on the part of professional employees of accounting firms, their spouses</p><p>　　Rotation of audit ap

78、pointments. In several countries (e.g., Italy) auditors are permitted to audit a client for only a specified number of years. This type of regulation has never been seriously considered in the U.S. or the U.K., although

79、Sarbanes-Oxley requires that individual auditors rotate off a client on a periodic basis. In France, the concept of auditor rotation is reversed: Auditors are appointed for a fixed period of time, during which time they

80、cannot be replaced. This rule was intend</p><p>　　With regard to independence standards, the PCAOB has adopted interim rule 3600T as part of its bylaws and rules. Rule 3600T reads as follows:</p><

81、p>　　In connection with the preparation or issuance of any audit report, a registered public accounting firm, and its associated persons, shall comply with independence standards:</p><p>　　(a) as described

82、 in the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct Rule 101, and interpretations and rulings thereunder, as in existence on April 16, 2003 [AICPA Professional Standards, ET sections 101 and 191 (AICPA 2002)], to the extent not

83、 superseded or amended by the Board;</p><p>　　(b) Standards Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and Interpretations 99-1, 00-1, and 00-2, of the Independence Standards Board, to the extent not superseded or amended by the Boa

84、rd.</p><p>　　Essentially, the PCAOB has recognized the independence standards previously developed by the AICPA and the SEC through the Independence Standards Board. </p><p>　　Reconsidering Audi

85、tor Independence</p><p>　　What is needed now is a complete reconsideration of the concept of auditor independence. Such reconsideration might lead to a new concept in which auditor independence would be base

86、d on reasserting the accounting profession’s former ethic of being an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards, rather than an advocate for client positions. Given the recent and ongoing accounting and a

87、uditing scandals, it seems obvious that independent auditors should not be advocates for client pos</p><p>　　A new concept of auditor independence is required that specifically incorporates the propositions

88、that: 1) auditors should not be advocates for their clients, and 2) management should not be able to influence the audit fee and the scope of the audit. Without a transition to this concept, auditor independence standard