外文翻譯--家族企業(yè)收購，私募股權(quán)和戰(zhàn)略變革

1、<p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Family-Firm Buyouts, Private Equity, and Strategic Change</p><p>　　The European private equity and buyout market' has grown in prominence over rece

2、nt years. The Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR，2008) has shown that the annual number of management buyouts rose from l212 in 1998 to 1,436 by the end of 2007. Buyouts of family firms represent one of the mos

3、t important features of this market, with the number of deals increasing from 45 in 1998 to 559 in 2007 and the combined value from 11.2 billion to 18,3 billion over the same period. In 2007 family fi</p><p>

4、;　　Management buyouts (MBO) and buy-ins (MBI) thus represent an important succession option in family firms. They also provide an important deal source for private equity firms. Yet, while much attention in the private e

5、quity and buyout market has been on large public-to-private transactions, the family buyout part of the market is not well understood (Cumming, Siegel and Wright ，2007). The focus in large public-to-private transactions

6、and divisional buyouts has been on the resolution of incentive </p><p>　　The changes occurring on the buyout of a family firm may lead to changes in goals and strategies compared to the previous ownership re

7、gime, and these strategic changes may influence firm survival or failure. The change in strategy is motivated by one of the following two factors; first, the firm may have been underperforming and new strategies must b

8、e adopted to correct this (efficiency buyout). Second, the new owners will have the freedom to pursue their own interests in terms of business dir</p><p>　　In light of these issues, the purpose of this artic

9、le is twofold;</p><p>　　1. We provide an overview of developments in the family-firm buyout market. Specifically, we examine trends in the number and value of deals, deal sizes, share of the total buyout mar

10、ket, employment, and the role of private equity. We use CMBOR's unique database comprising the population of 30,000 European buyouts as the source for this analysis.</p><p>　　2. We undertake a detailed s

11、tudy of strategic changes in family firms as a result of a buyout. Specifically, we examine whether changes in the strategy of former private family firms are affected by the ownership and governance of the firm before t

12、he buyout. These issues are examined using a novel hand-collected representative questionnaire survey of 104 private family firms across Europe which had a buyout funded by private equity between1994 and 2003.</p>

13、<p>　　Family firms provide a constant and abundant source of potential targets for incumbent managers and private equity (PE) companies. Buyouts of family firms enable the resolution of succession problems and. By

14、catalyzing entrepreneurial activity, can improve the operating efficiency of the firm and enable growth. This section presents an overview of trends in this important part of the buyout market, focusing on number and val

15、ue of deals, deal sizes, share of the total buyout market, employment, a</p><p>　　In 2007, 559 family-firm buyouts and buy-ins were recorded by CMBOR across Europe, amounting to a total value of 18.3 billion

16、. There had been a dip in buyout activity between 2000 and 2003, in line with a somewhat weaker overall buyout market during that period. Since then buyout activity in family firms has recovered, and the 2007 figure was

17、a new record by number and value.</p><p>　　A comparison of trends by country reveals that the increase in deal numbers has been relatively uniform across most of Europe. Over the past 10 years, buyout activi

18、ty in terms of number of transactions has increased in most national markets. The total value of family-firm buyouts has fluctuated on an annual basis in many of the European markets, and no clear pattern has emerged. Ho

19、wever, due to the rise in number of this type of buyout, the total value reached a new record in 2007.</p><p>　　The average deal size of buyouts of family firms is much lower than the average deal size of al

20、l transactions. The trend in the average deal size of family buyouts over the past 10 years shows that these deals have remained at a relatively constant level of about26 m, while average deal size for all buyouts has in

21、creased significantly, from 36 m in 1998 to almost 120 million in 2007. This increasing gap reflects the major growth in large public-to-privates, divestments, and secondary buyouts acr</p><p>　　Family firms

22、 have been a constant and abundant source of buyouts. Between 1998 and 2007, about 29% of all buyouts in Europe were family-firm transactions. However, these deals represented only 11% of the total value of all buyouts o

23、ver this period, further underlining the fact that buyouts in family firms are generally much smaller than other types of buyouts.</p><p>　　Over the last 10 years, the proportion of the buyout market account

24、ed for by family-firm deals decreased until 2002 (23.2%) and started to rise again in 2004, reaching 38.3% of deal numbers by the end of 2007. The proportion of the total market accounted for by family-firm buyouts based

25、 on total value also saw a sharp decline from 1998 to 2000. Since then the value of family-firm buyouts has fluctuated between 10 %and 15% of total market value. </p><p>　　An international comparison of the

26、10-year averages of the share of the buyout market attributable to family-firm deals shows significant variation between countries. In France, Italy, Spain, and the UK, this proportion is a third or more of all transacti

27、ons in terms of deal numbers. A possible reason might be that these countries contain a considerable stock of family firms, thus fueling buyout transactions.</p><p>　　Germany shows a surprisingly low market

28、share given its huge number of family owned Mittelstand companies. This may be linked to the general poor understanding and possible mistrust of private equity and also the close links German companies have had historica

29、lly with their local banks.</p><p>　　An analysis of the 10-year average number of employees per company shows that the size of the former family firms varies considerably among European countries. While Germ

30、an family firms have been well above average, UK family firms are generally smaller and below the European average.</p><p>　　Buyouts can be financed by individuals using their own financial resources along w

31、ith bank debt or by private equity (PE) firms or a combination. The majority of buyouts of family firms are backed by a financial sponsor with the 10-year average showing that 62% of lit buyouts of family firms were PE-b

32、acked.</p><p>　　Non-PE-backed buyouts are significantly smaller than PE-backed transactions for family firms. Over the last 10 years, the average deal size of non-PE-backed family firm buyouts was about 7 m,

33、 compared with an average deal size of about 41 m for PE-backed deals from this source. Family-firm buyouts thus represent an important source of deals for private equity firms.</p><p>　　Family-firm characte

34、ristics before a private equity-backed buyout may influence the degree and focus of strategic changes after a buyout. We examine characteristics relating to ownership and founders' involvement pre-buyout, ownership s

35、take of non-family management pre-buyout, existence of non-family, nonexecutive directors pre-buyout, and management and private equity firm participation in succession planning. Our evidence is based on a representative

36、 survey of 104 private family firms across E</p><p>　　The respondents were in senior positions: CEOspresidents (83%), directors including deputy CEO (15%), and senior management (2%). The strategy of the fir

37、m is compared before and after the buyout where growth/ expansion. The sample was divided into various subgroups related to the company characteristics concerning ownership and management. University analysis was then us

38、ed to determine whether the observed changes in strategy of these subgroups was significant.</p><p>　　When the family firm had been founded by the previous owners, the changes in strategy post-buyout are gen

39、erally more numerous and more significant than when the firm had been purchased or inherited by the pre-buyout owners. This implies that the founder/owner has been dominant in terms of deciding company strategy and that

40、once she/he relinquishes ownership, the management is free to make the changes deemed necessary for the survival and growth of the firm.</p><p>　　Several changes in strategy were common to firms that were fo

41、unded or non-founded by the previous owners. While both types of firms showed strategic changes with regard to an increased emphasis on returns from operations and capital restructuring, founded firms also indicated a ch

42、ange in strategy with regard to sales growth, market share, short-term profitability, and long-term profitability. Thus, the two different strategies of growth expansion and efficiency improvements are fairly equally im&

43、lt;/p><p>　　Strategic changes after a buyout of a family firm were greater if the firm's founder was still present at the time of the buyout. There are three possible explanations for this finding: 1) found

44、ers may not provide adequate leadership as firms need to transition into more advanced growth phases; 2) founders may be unable to adjust their decision-making styles where changes in the market environment suggest a nee

45、d to change strategy; and 3) successful founders may become overly conservative in an </p><p>　　The changes in firm strategy were more numerous and more significant when there were no non-family managers wit

46、h ownership stakes. This finding indicates that management who had some ownership stake were potentially able to influence strategic direction before the buyout and that major changes after the buyout were not necessary.

47、 If the managers of the family firm were not family members and did not hold equity stakes before the buyout, their influence on strategic direction before the buyout mi</p><p>　　Several changes in strategy

48、were common to firms with and without non-family management with equity stakes. Those strategies specific to firms without nonfamily managers with equity stakes were net profit, cash flow, short-term profitability, sales

49、 growth, and market value increment and market share expansion. Thus, the two different strategies of growth/expansion and efficiency improvements are fairly equally important.</p><p>　　The governance of the

50、 family firm before the buyout could be in the hands of non-executive directors (NEDs) that did not belong to the family. The results indicate that more strategic changes are associated with the absence (of non-family NE

51、Ds before the buyout. If NEDs before the buyout were not family members, their advice should be more financially oriented (as opposed to family oriented). If good advice had been given before the buyout and some changes

52、had already been implemented, major str</p><p>　　In the absence of pre-buyout, non-family NEDs, the new owners were able to implement their ideas post-buyout primarily in terms of efficiency gains. This coul

53、d indicate that firms with NEDs were more effective and did not need to change their strategy so much post-buyout.</p><p>　　Governance can also be applied at the time of succession planning, although many fi

54、rms fail to plan for succession at all. In this study about 60% of the family firms questioned underwent succession planning in the period of up to two years before the event. </p><p>　　Nevertheless, if succ

55、ession was planned, management before the buyout as well as the financing private equity firm might participate in this planning and thus influence the strategic changes in the aftermath of the buyout. When management be

56、fore the buyout was involved in succession planning, strategic changes were stronger compared to succession planning without the management's involvement. Management's involvement in succession planning might hav

57、e enabled them to articulate possibilities for </p><p>　　When a private equity firm participated in succession planning, strategic changes were substantially greater than without participation of a private e

58、quity firm. As a precondition for investment of a private equity firm in the buyout, they needed to perceive chat there would be upside gains from investing in the deal.</p><p>　　Given the expertise of these

59、 firms and their access to information regarding opportunities, they showed strategic changes in improving efficiency and growth/ expansion, but the majority were associated with efficiency gains.</p><p>　　S

60、ource: Scholes 2009 family business acquisitions, “private equity and strategic chance” private equity Spring2009 No.2,pp.65-71</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　家族企業(yè)收購，私募股權(quán)和戰(zhàn)略變革</p&g

61、t;<p>　　近幾年歐洲的私人股權(quán)和管理層收購市場增長迅速。管理層收購研究中心表明（CMBOR,2008），管理層收購從1998年的1，212宗增至2007年年底的1,436宗。家族企業(yè)收購是這個市場的最重要特征之一：隨著交易數(shù)量從1998年的45宗到2007年的559宗，同期的交易價值從11.2億元增長到183億元； 2007年，家族企業(yè)的管理層收購數(shù)量和價值分別占整個歐洲管理層收購市場的38％和11％。</p&

62、gt;<p>　　管理層收購（MBO）和管理層買進(jìn)（MBI）成為家族企業(yè)繼承的重要選擇，且為私人股權(quán)投資公司提供了一個重要的交易來源。然而，私人股本和收購市場都非常重視廣大公眾的私人交易，部分家庭沒有很好地理解市場收購的含義（Cumming，Siegel和Wright,2007）。大型公共部門對私人部門的收購交易和重點(diǎn)一直是激勵和控制問題還有新決議的所有權(quán)和治理結(jié)構(gòu)，股權(quán)的管理，服務(wù)承諾和壓力等問題，并在許多案件的所有權(quán)和

63、積極參與私人股權(quán)投資公司中得以體現(xiàn)（Wright和Bruining,2008）。相比之下，典型的家族企業(yè)在傳統(tǒng)上一直被認(rèn)為是和家庭所在公司的目標(biāo)是緊密聯(lián)系在一起的，就是家庭成員集中的集團(tuán)管理目標(biāo)。家庭通常并不被認(rèn)為是追求利潤最大化的單純的經(jīng)濟(jì)單位的企業(yè)。相反，家庭還要爭取非經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)。結(jié)果是，一個公司家族控制的松緊度增加了一個重要層面的家族企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略分析方法。</p><p>　　這些變化在一個家族企業(yè)收購時可能導(dǎo)

64、致所有權(quán)制度的目標(biāo)和戰(zhàn)略變化，而這些戰(zhàn)略的變化可能會影響企業(yè)的生存或發(fā)展。在策略上的改變是由于以下兩種因素，第一，該公司可能已經(jīng)表現(xiàn)不佳，新的戰(zhàn)略必須采取方法糾正原戰(zhàn)略（效率買斷）。二，新業(yè)主將有追求在業(yè)務(wù)方向上多樣化發(fā)展自己利益的自由。創(chuàng)始人，非家族管理人員，可能對收購進(jìn)程和業(yè)務(wù)之前和之后的收購采取不同的策略。在戰(zhàn)略上也因所有權(quán)和企業(yè)治理前的收購，以及新的金融結(jié)構(gòu)和需要而產(chǎn)生相應(yīng)的變化進(jìn)而承擔(dān)由此產(chǎn)生的費(fèi)用。</p>&

65、lt;p>　　根據(jù)以上問題，本文寫作的目的是雙重的： </p><p>　　1、我們提供了家庭，企業(yè)并購市場的發(fā)展概況。具體來說，我們研究的數(shù)量和交易規(guī)模，占了收購總額的大部分。我們使用CMBOR獨(dú)特的數(shù)據(jù)庫，包括30 ,000個歐洲管理層收購的案例作為這一分析的來源。 </p><p>　　2、我們進(jìn)行詳細(xì)的研究表明，家族企業(yè)作為收購的主體會發(fā)上一個戰(zhàn)略性的轉(zhuǎn)變。具體來說，我們研究

66、了私人家族企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的變化會影響收購前的所有權(quán)和該公司的治理權(quán)。研究表明全歐洲的私人股本，在1994和2003年間資助了104個收購私人家族企業(yè)的例子。</p><p>　　家族企業(yè)現(xiàn)任經(jīng)理和私募股權(quán)（PE）公司的潛在目標(biāo)不變使收購家族企業(yè)繼承問題得以解決。通過催生創(chuàng)業(yè)活動，可以提高公司運(yùn)營效率和實(shí)現(xiàn)業(yè)務(wù)增長。本節(jié)介紹介紹的重點(diǎn)是這個收購市場的重要組成部分概覽，數(shù)量和交易價值，交易規(guī)模，總收購市場，就業(yè)份額，以及私

67、人股本的作用。文中所有數(shù)據(jù)指的是家族企業(yè)收購交易，另有說明除外。 </p><p>　　2007年，在歐洲有559家企業(yè)收購和有關(guān)CMBOR的買進(jìn)記錄，金額為18.3億元。在2000年至2003年間，收購活動中的一些整體收購市場在此期間達(dá)到一致。自那時以來，家族企業(yè)收購活動已經(jīng)恢復(fù)，而2007年的數(shù)字是按數(shù)量和價值統(tǒng)計(jì)的新紀(jì)錄。</p><p>　　國家發(fā)展趨勢的比較發(fā)現(xiàn)，交易數(shù)量的增加在

68、歐洲大部分地區(qū)已經(jīng)相對均勻。在過去的10年離，收購交易數(shù)量方面的活動在大多數(shù)國家的市場有所增加。在家庭企業(yè)收購總價值變動對每年歐洲市場的許多影響中，并沒有明顯的新模式出現(xiàn)。然而，由于在這種買斷的上升，總價值達(dá)到了2007年的新紀(jì)錄。</p><p>　　家族企業(yè)的平均收購交易規(guī)模比所有交易的平均交易量低。收購的家庭的平均交易量在過去10年的趨勢表明，1998年，這些交易數(shù)量都是維持在約26000000相對穩(wěn)定的水

69、平，而所有收購的平均交易量大幅增加到了36000000，而在2007年幾乎是1.2億。這種日益擴(kuò)大的差距，反映了廣大市民的主要增長是在資產(chǎn)剝離，收購方面。</p><p>　　家族企業(yè)一直是收購的熱門話題。 1998年至2007年，在歐洲約29％的收購活動是家族收購。然而，這些收購只占這段期間所有收購總價值的11％，進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，家族企業(yè)收購普遍比其他類型的收購規(guī)模較小。</p><p>

70、;　　在過去10年間，買斷市場在家族企業(yè)交易中所占比重下降所，在2002年占23.2％，并在2004年所占比重開始再次上升，在2007年底達(dá)到38.3％的交易數(shù)量。該市場在家庭，公司收購總價值中的比重在1998年到2000年期間急劇下滑。自那時以來，家族企業(yè)收購值在10％和15％的市場總價值之間波動。</p><p>　　過去10年的平均水平表明，買斷市場占家庭企業(yè)的交易份額量在各國之間存在明顯差異。在法國，意大

71、利，西班牙和英國，這一比例占所有交易的三分之一或更多。一個可能的原因是這些國家包含了相當(dāng)數(shù)量的大家族企業(yè)股票，從而助長了收購交易。德國展示了一個令人驚訝的低市場占有率，因?yàn)槠浼易鍝碛械牡聡行⌒推髽I(yè)數(shù)量龐大。這可能與私人股本的不信任性和德國企業(yè)和當(dāng)?shù)劂y行的歷史聯(lián)系有密切的關(guān)系。10年間平均每家公司的員工人數(shù)分析表明，前者的家族企業(yè)規(guī)模差別大部分在歐洲國家。而德國的家族企業(yè)都大大高于平均水平，英國的家族企業(yè)普遍較小，低于歐洲平均水平。收購

72、資金來源可以是通過向銀行貸款以及自己的個人資本。家族企業(yè)的收購歷史大部分有10年的平均水平，表明家族企業(yè)中62％是收購PE的金融贊助商。</p><p>　　非PE支持的收購都大大高于家族企業(yè)PE支持收購的交易規(guī)模。在過去10年間，非PE支持的家族企業(yè)收購的平均交易規(guī)模約為7百萬， PE支持的交易的平均交易規(guī)模是41000000。家族公司收購，是私人股本公司并購交易的重要來源。</p><p&

73、gt;　　前一私人股本支持的收購家族企業(yè)特征可能在一定程度上影響收購后的戰(zhàn)略變化。我們研究的特點(diǎn)是所有權(quán)和創(chuàng)始人的參與與買斷的關(guān)系，所有權(quán)的非家族化管理的股份與收購，存在于非家庭，非執(zhí)行董事前收購，管理和私人股本公司參與的繼任計(jì)劃的問題。我們的證據(jù)來源于對104家公司在歐洲的私人代表的調(diào)查，私人股權(quán)投資已在1994年和2003年買斷。作為擁有超過50個普通投票或由單一家庭血緣或姻親關(guān)系的股份控制定義的家族企業(yè)，該公司被認(rèn)為是一個家族企業(yè)

74、。</p><p>　　受訪者中的高級職位有：首席執(zhí)行官/行長（83％），董事包括副總裁（15％）和高級管理人員（2％）。該公司的策略是比較前后買斷的地方發(fā)展/擴(kuò)張。樣本分為與公司特征有關(guān)的所有權(quán)和管理的各個子群，然后用單因素分析，以確定是否在這些分組戰(zhàn)略中觀測到顯著的變化。</p><p>　　當(dāng)家族企業(yè)是以前的業(yè)主時，在戰(zhàn)略買斷后的變化一般都比較多，而且較當(dāng)時該公司已購買或預(yù)收購所有者

75、繼承更有意義。這意味著，創(chuàng)始人/所有人已站在決定公司的主導(dǎo)戰(zhàn)略上，而一旦他/她放棄所有權(quán)，管理者可以自由地進(jìn)行更改相關(guān)戰(zhàn)略，這是企業(yè)生存與增長的必要條件之一。</p><p>　　以前的業(yè)主公司在戰(zhàn)略上的若干變化，普遍存在成立或不成立的問題。這兩種類型的公司在戰(zhàn)略上越來越重視對業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)營和資本重組的回報，成立公司也表示在戰(zhàn)略方面應(yīng)重視銷售增長，市場份額，短期的盈利能力，長期盈利的變化。因此，這兩個增長/擴(kuò)張和效率的

76、策略改進(jìn)是不同的，但他們同樣重要。</p><p>　　當(dāng)一個家族企業(yè)收購戰(zhàn)略發(fā)生變化時，如果該公司的創(chuàng)始人在收購時仍然在場，有三種可能解釋這個發(fā)現(xiàn)：1）創(chuàng)始人可能沒有足夠的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，公司需要向更高級的發(fā)展階段過渡，2）創(chuàng)始人可能無法根據(jù)市場環(huán)境的變化來調(diào)整自己的決策風(fēng)格，3）成功的創(chuàng)始人可能無法努力維護(hù)他們所創(chuàng)造的財富，某些有增長機(jī)會的公司也可能過于保守。</p><p>　　在企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略

77、上的變化則更多了，更重要的是，那個時候的所有權(quán)股份沒有非家族的管理者。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，股權(quán)歸誰管理在收購前和收購后是有一些潛在的影響。如果家族企業(yè)的經(jīng)理中沒有家庭成員，那么收購股權(quán)，其戰(zhàn)略方向的確立，對收購之前的影響，是非常有限的，因?yàn)樽罱K的決定可能已經(jīng)與業(yè)主無關(guān)。沒有股權(quán)的這些非家族管理者們只能有一次買斷的影響，因?yàn)樗麄円殉蔀樾碌臉I(yè)主。</p><p>　　在戰(zhàn)略的上的若干變化和不常見的非家庭參與管理公司的股權(quán)中

78、。這些戰(zhàn)略并不與特定的非家族股權(quán)管理公司的凈盈利相關(guān)，而是和現(xiàn)金流量，短期盈利能力，銷售增長，市場價值增值和市場份額的擴(kuò)大有關(guān)。因此，這兩個增長/擴(kuò)張和效率的策略改進(jìn)是不同的，但他們同樣重要。</p><p>　　非執(zhí)行董事（非執(zhí)行董事）認(rèn)為該家族企業(yè)治理前的收購可以在不屬于家庭成員的手中進(jìn)行。結(jié)果表明，更多的戰(zhàn)略變化與非執(zhí)行董事缺席（ 非家庭之前買斷，買斷非執(zhí)行董事如果之前沒有家庭成員，他們的意見應(yīng)該更注重與非

79、執(zhí)行董事而不是面向家庭）相關(guān)聯(lián)。如果好的建議與已獲得的收購已經(jīng)實(shí)施，重大的戰(zhàn)略變化可能是沒有買斷必要。</p><p>　　在收購前期，沒有非執(zhí)行董事的情況下，新的業(yè)主在實(shí)現(xiàn)他們的想法后買斷主要是為了提高效率。這可能表明，對非執(zhí)行董事的公司更有效，沒有必要改變自己的策略，以便更多買斷。</p><p>　　也可應(yīng)用于在繼承規(guī)劃方面，雖然許多公司無法在所有的繼任計(jì)劃中實(shí)行。但在這項(xiàng)研究中大約

80、60％的家族企業(yè)在質(zhì)疑最多的前兩年活動期間繼任規(guī)劃。</p><p>　　不過，如果連續(xù)進(jìn)行規(guī)劃，管理收購前的融資以及私人股權(quán)投資公司可能參與這一計(jì)劃，從而影響在收購后的戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)變。在管理層收購之前，新的業(yè)主陸續(xù)參與策劃，戰(zhàn)略沒有變化，計(jì)劃得以繼任。管理層對繼任計(jì)劃的參與有可能使他們更加能夠闡明新的戰(zhàn)略，發(fā)展處于有利地位自己的影響力。通過買斷，并說服金融家，他們需要有一個明確的戰(zhàn)略，產(chǎn)生重大的成果。提高效率的變化是

81、比較堅(jiān)定的，如果管理層參加繼任計(jì)劃的話。</p><p>　　私人股權(quán)投資公司相繼參與規(guī)劃，戰(zhàn)略變化，作用大大高于無私人股本公司參與。在私人股權(quán)投資公司買斷的前提下，他們需要預(yù)測將來交易投資收益的上升。</p><p>　　由于存在獲得這些公司的專業(yè)知識和信息方面的機(jī)會，他們表現(xiàn)出提高效率和增長/擴(kuò)張戰(zhàn)略的熱情，但大部分是與效率的提高有關(guān)。</p><p>　　出處