2017年共享經(jīng)濟外文翻譯—透視共享經(jīng)濟（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　字數(shù)：英文3345單詞，18027字符；中文5823漢字</p><p>　　出處：Koen Frenken, Juliet Schor. Putting the sharing economy into perspective[J] Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions.2017,23:3-10</p><p

2、><b>　　外文文獻：　</b></p><p>　　Putting the sharing economy into perspective</p><p>　　Abstract We develop a conceptual framework that allows us to define the sharing economy and its cl

3、ose cousins and we understand its sudden rise from an economic-historic perspective. We then assess the sharing economy platforms in terms of the economic, social and environmental impacts. We end with reflections on cur

4、rent regulations and future alternatives, and suggest a number of future research questions.</p><p>　　Keywords: Sharing; Platform; Sustainability; Reverse technology assessment; Regulation</p><p&g

5、t;　　1.Introduction</p><p>　　In the Spring of 2014, the sharing economy held an unusual gathering in San Francisco, a sort of “coming out” party. Entitled “SHARE,” the conference included not only founders, f

6、unders and fans of the sharing economy, but also harsh critics. Politically progressive insiders and outsiders raised questions about access, exclusion and the distribution of value in the sector. They discussed their vi

7、sion of a fairer, lower-carbon, more transparent, participatory and socially-connected economy, and w</p><p>　　It is clear that the sharing economy is creating enormous amounts of wealth, and that it has bee

8、n using a sociallyprogressive feel-good rhetoric to do so. But will the platforms share that wealth with users—on both the provider and user sides of the market? Will the platforms ensure widespread access—by expanding t

9、heir user base beyond the mostly white, highly educated, able-bodied urbanites who have comprised the bulk of users in the first stage? Will they make good on their promises to provide</p><p>　　Our aim with

10、this paper is to put the sharing economy into perspective by providing a conceptual framework that allows us to define the sharing economy and its close cousins and to understand its sudden rise from an economic-historic

11、 perspective (Section 2), to assess sharing economy platforms in terms of the economic, social and environmental impacts (Section 3), and to reflect on current regulations and possible alternative platform architectures

12、(Section 4). We end with some research question</p><p>　　2.Definitional issues</p><p>　　The notion of sharing of idle capacity is central to the definition of sharing economy, because it disting

13、uishes the practice of sharing of goods from the practice of on-demand personal services. There is a fundamental difference between ordering a taxi through Uber, Lyft or Didi and sharing a ride through BlaBlaCar or anoth

14、er hitchhiking or carpooling platform (Meelen and Frenken, 2015). In the case of a taxi service, the consumer creates new capacity by ordering a taxi on demand to drive the p</p><p>　　The notion of under-uti

15、lization is also key to the current discussion about home sharing platforms such as Airbnb. When a house owner is away for holidays or a business trip, or has a spare bedroom, the asset is not utilized. That is, the unoc

16、cupied house can be considered as temporary idle capacity. If, however, a person were to buy a second home and rent it out to tourists permanently, that constitutes running a commercial lodging site, such as a B&B or

17、 hotel.</p><p>　　Based on this definition, the sharing economy can be distinguished from three other types of platforms that are sharing economy examples pre-dating the Internet. In Fig. 1, the sharing econo

18、my is placed in the centre as it adheres to the three defining characteristics: consumer-to-consumer interaction (c2c), temporary access and physical goods.</p><p>　　Fig. 1. Sharing economy and related forms

19、 of platform economy </p><p>　　Consumers selling goods to each other is called the second-hand economy. This does not fall under the sharing economy as consumers grant each other permanent access, rather tha

20、n temporary access to their goods. Large platforms intermediating such transactions are Ebay and Taobao. There are also platforms where people give away goods to each other, without payment (including Facebook groups). T

21、his would also fall under the category of consumers who grant another permanent access. Renting goods fr</p><p>　　The definition that we use for sharing economy platforms, and the three other types of platfo

22、rms that can be distinguished from it, accommodates the notion of sharing as a historical practice. Before the arrival of Internet platforms, people were already lending or renting out goods to others. They shared with f

23、amily and friends because were known and trusted social contacts. What is new is that users now also lend goods to strangers, because the Internet has enormously decreased transaction cos</p><p>　　3.Assessin

24、g the sharing economy</p><p>　　The direct economic effects of the sharing economy are indisputably positive. People who voluntarily enter into a transaction in the sharing economy only do so if it is benefic

25、ial to both parties. Even in the case of goods lending there is a benefit: there are few costs for the lender because the person did not need the product during the lending period, whereas the borrower gains access to th

26、e product without charge. The rise in income or consumer welfare can be understood as a direct consequen</p><p>　　Yet, the full economic effects are far more complex. First, the rise of p2p sharing markets w

27、ill have indirect effects on other markets. For example, legacy businesses and their workers in related markets are likely to experience lower earnings. One study found that hotel earnings in Texas declined significantly

28、 in places where Airbnb grew (Zervas et al., 2016). Further analysis also showed that the impacts were uneven across the industry, with lower-end hotels and hotels not catering to busines</p><p>　　Second, th

29、ere are externalities as third parties may experience losses as the two parties transact. This is especially a problem with house sharing with neighbours experiencing nuisance and feelings of danger from strangers. Incre

30、asingly, neighbourhoods have attempted to stop the further growth of home sharing in tourist cities like Amsterdam, Barcelona, Berlin, New York and Paris. In response, municipalities are tightening their regulations towa

31、rds home sharing platforms (Woolf, 2016).</p><p>　　The environmental effects associated with the sharing sector are also complex. Many platforms advertise themselves as green, and particularly as carbon-foot

32、print reducing. It is also a common belief among participants that sharing is less resource intensive (Schor and Wengronowitz, 2017). Sharing is thought to be eco-friendly because it is assumed to reduce the demand for n

33、ew goods or the construction of new facilities (in the case of hotels or shared spaces). Despite these widespread beliefs, t</p><p>　　Regarding the social benefits, there is a widespread “common good” claim

34、by a number of platforms, as well as participants on both sides of the market which is the benefit of meeting people, making friends and getting to know others (Fitzmaurice et al., 2016). Schor (2015a) finds that the sit

35、e that has been most successful at creating new social ties is Airbnb. Findings from one small interview study are that for half the Airbnb hosts social interaction was central to their motivation and practi</p>&

36、lt;p>　　It is also possible that sharing platforms may be harmful to social cohesion as reflected in existing social ties. Platforms economize private things in the sense that at any time these stand idle, an opportuni

37、ty cost arises. This in itself does not affect social relations. However, while idle capacity was generally available to family and friends for free in the past, researchers and commentators have expressed concern about

38、the viability of non-monetized sharing within networks as people prefe</p><p>　　In all, the economic, social and environmental effects of sharing economy platforms are largely unknown. While the direct econo

39、mic benefits are obvious from the large volume of monetary transactions taking place, the distributional effects may be quite skewed. Since the bulk of revenue in the sharing economy accrues via home sharing, already wel

40、l-off home owners will profit most. Environmental benefits mostly lie in car and ridesharing, and the overall effects of sharing economy platforms may be</p><p>　　4.Alternatives</p><p>　　Despite

41、 the call for scientific assessments of the sustainability impacts of sharing economy platforms, we should acknowledge that the precise impacts are likely to remain unclear for a long time to come. The reason for the las

42、ting gap in our knowledge is not only theoretical, but also empirical. For a proper assessment of the impacts, access to the user data currently held by platforms is key. However, the platforms have been restrictive and

43、selective in granting researchers access to their use</p><p>　　In this context, it has been noted that the social process of assessing the desirability of sharing platforms follows a reverse logic. Frenken (

44、2016) speaks of “reverse technology assessment” in this context. In many countries, established sectors like food, drugs, transportation, construction, and children’s toys are subject to detailed scientific analysis and

45、normative deliberation before new products are allowed to enter the market. Sharing economy platforms, by contrast, are introduced onto </p><p>　　Restricted access to user data also hampers the enforcement o

46、f regulations and, consequently, policy evaluation. Though the advent of sharing-economy platforms is recent, the volume of activity on some of these platforms is already sizeable and still growing exponentially. Underst

47、andably, calls for regulations are getting louder given the negative externalities caused by home sharing and unfair competition between platform and traditional operators in sectors like tourism, restaurants, short-sta&

48、lt;/p><p>　　The typical response of regulators has been to create institutional boundaries between the sharing economy and the regular economy by putting a cap on a sharing activity. For example, an increasing

49、number of cities allow home sharing for a fixed number of days (e.g., 30, 60 or 90 days). This “cap” logic can be applied to operators of home restaurants and owners of boats, campers, and parking spaces. The principle o

50、f a cap is consistent with our definition of sharing economy as consumers who gran</p><p>　　Against this background, it is not surprising that to see various alternative platforms being founded. Serious expe

51、riments are emerging ranging from cooperative-based and crowdfunded platforms to platforms that make use of alternative currencies or more novel block-chain technology (Scholz, 2014; Scholz and Schneider, 2016). At the s

52、ame time, some of the existing commercial platforms are now changing the ways in which they engage with users and governments, and are looking for workarounds to hel</p><p>　　5.A research agenda</p>&

53、lt;p>　　From our discussion of the delineation of the sharing economy from other platform economies, and our assessment of its impacts and alternatives, we distill a number of research questions. These questions focus

54、on the varieties of platforms in terms of their governance, scalability and impacts.</p><p>　　(1)What types of sharing economies have historically existed across cultures and epochs, and what can we learn fr

55、om the economics, governance and impacts of such initiatives and practices in the light of current day sharing economy platforms?</p><p>　　(2)What is the relative importance of trust-generating mechanisms on

56、 sharing economy platforms, including past ratings, personal identification, online communication and extra-platform reputational capital?</p><p>　　(3)How can we analytically conceptualize and empirically as

57、sess the various impacts of the current sharing economy platforms in terms of people, planet and prosperity? To what extent can we carry out such assessment without access to user data?</p><p>　　(4)How can w

58、e explain and evaluate the variety of regulatory responses of governments at local, national and supra-national levels as well as the modes of self-governance employed by platforms?</p><p>　　(5)What alternat

59、ive governance schemes for operating a platform are currently being employed? How can we explain their emergence, growth and relative success across sectors, territories and social groups?</p><p>　　Finding a

60、nswers to these questions will be a challenging endeavour. It will require a range of disciplinary perspectives and methodological approaches and a close eye for historical contexts and geographical specificities. Despit

61、e the strong rhetoric of proponents and criticasters alike, the future of the sharing economy is fundamentally open and contingent. In this, clearly, academics have their role to play.</p><p><b>　　中文譯文

62、：</b></p><p><b>　　透視共享經(jīng)濟</b></p><p>　　摘要 我們建立了一個概念框架，使我們能夠定義共享經(jīng)濟及其近親，并從經(jīng)濟歷史的角度理解它的突然崛起。然后，我們從經(jīng)濟、社會和環(huán)境影響方面評估了共享經(jīng)濟平臺。最后，我們對當(dāng)前的法規(guī)和未來的替代品進行了反思，并提出了一些未來的研究問題。</p><p>　

63、　關(guān)鍵詞：共享；平臺；可持續(xù)發(fā)展；逆向技術(shù)評估；法規(guī)</p><p><b>　　1.引言</b></p><p>　　在2014年春季，共享經(jīng)濟在舊金山召開了一次不尋常的聚會，這是一場“走出去”的聚會。題為“共享”的會議不僅包括共享經(jīng)濟的創(chuàng)始人、資助者和支持者，也包括了嚴厲的批評者。政治先進的內(nèi)部人士和外部人士對該經(jīng)濟的準(zhǔn)入、排斥和價值分配提出了質(zhì)疑。他們討論了他們

64、對更公平、更低碳、更透明、更具參與性和與社交聯(lián)系的經(jīng)濟體的愿景，以及這些目標(biāo)是符合大的有錢的玩家們的行為——成功的平臺和風(fēng)險投資家正以巨額資金支持這些大的有錢的玩家。最近，一個來自法國共享經(jīng)濟智庫OuiShare協(xié)會的關(guān)鍵人物甚至在巴黎年會上表示，“共享經(jīng)濟已經(jīng)結(jié)束”，因為它沒有履行其最初的承諾（DeGrave，2016）。</p><p>　　很顯然，共享經(jīng)濟正在創(chuàng)造巨額財富，而且它一直在用社會進步、感覺良好這

65、樣的修辭來描述。但是，這些共享經(jīng)濟平臺是否會與用戶分享這些財富呢？——無論是市場的提供者還是使用者。這些平臺是否能夠通過擴展他們的用戶群，確保廣泛的進入呢？——平臺的第一階段的大量用戶是由大多數(shù)白人、受過高等教育的、身體健全的城市居民組成的。這些平臺是否會履行承諾，為提供者提供體面的生活，為所謂的“微型企業(yè)家”提供機會，并繼續(xù)為客戶提供真正的價值呢？或者說，這些花言巧語只是一層薄薄的掩飾，掩蓋了其掠奪性的商業(yè)模式，一旦市場發(fā)展，用戶被鎖

66、定在平臺上，這種商業(yè)模式最終將對投資者和創(chuàng)始人產(chǎn)生價值。這些平臺是否會像一些看起來準(zhǔn)備成為壟斷的企業(yè)那樣行事呢？雖然現(xiàn)在回答這些問題還為時過早，但我們相信，我們以更具分析性、經(jīng)驗性和批判性的方式來質(zhì)問共享經(jīng)濟，這是至關(guān)重要的。</p><p>　　本文的目的是通過提供一個概念框架，使我們能夠定義共享經(jīng)濟及其近親，并從經(jīng)濟歷史的角度理解它的突然崛起（第2節(jié)），從經(jīng)濟、社會和環(huán)境影響方面評估共享經(jīng)濟平臺（第3節(jié)），并

67、反思現(xiàn)行法規(guī)和可能的替代平臺架構(gòu)（第4節(jié)）。最后，我們提出了一些未來的研究問題（第5節(jié)）。</p><p><b>　　2.定義問題</b></p><p>　　共享閑置產(chǎn)能的概念是共享經(jīng)濟定義的核心，因為它將商品共享的做法與按需個人服務(wù)的做法區(qū)分開來。通過Uber、Lyft或滴滴預(yù)約出租車，與通過BlaBlaCar或另一個搭車、拼車平臺共享車座，有著根本性的區(qū)別（M

68、eelen和Frenken，2015）。以出租車服務(wù)為例，按需預(yù)約出租車，將乘客從A地送到B地，消費者創(chuàng)造了新的產(chǎn)能。如果沒有預(yù)約，旅行一開始就不會發(fā)生。在這種情況下，現(xiàn)在普遍使用的術(shù)語是按需經(jīng)濟。相比之下，在搭便車/拼車的情況下，消費者占據(jù)了一個本來不會使用的座位，因為駕駛員本來就計劃從A地到B地去。搭便車和拼車是共享乘車的事例，是共享經(jīng)濟的一部分（Benkler，2004）。事實上，在交通方面，隨著時間的推移，按需經(jīng)濟和共享經(jīng)濟之間

69、的這種區(qū)分變得越來越明顯，因為大多數(shù)評論者現(xiàn)在都稱Uber、Lyft和滴滴為網(wǎng)約車公司，而不是拼車。</p><p>　　低利用率的概念也是目前關(guān)于Airbnb等共享房屋平臺的討論的關(guān)鍵。當(dāng)房主出去度假或出差，或有一間空閑臥室時，該資產(chǎn)沒有被利用。也就是說，空置的房屋可以被認為是暫時閑置產(chǎn)能。但是，如果一個人要購買第二套房屋并永久出租給游客，這就構(gòu)成了一個商業(yè)住宿場所，例如民宿或旅館。</p>&l

70、t;p>　　基于這一定義, 共享經(jīng)濟可以區(qū)別于其他三種類型的平臺，它們是在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)前共享經(jīng)濟的示例。在圖1中，共享經(jīng)濟被放置在中心，因為它遵循三個定義特征：消費者對消費者的互動（C2C），暫時獲取和實物商品。</p><p>　　圖1.共享經(jīng)濟及平臺經(jīng)濟的相關(guān)形式</p><p>　　消費者之間相互銷售產(chǎn)品被稱為二手經(jīng)濟。這不屬于共享經(jīng)濟，因為消費者互相授予永久使用權(quán)，而不是暫時獲取他

71、們的產(chǎn)品。介入此類交易的大型平臺包括易趣和淘寶。還有一些平臺，人們互相贈送貨物，無需付款（包括Facebook群組）。這也屬于授予另一方永久獲取權(quán)限的消費者類別。從一家公司租用產(chǎn)品而不是從另一個消費者手里租用產(chǎn)品，我們稱之為產(chǎn)品服務(wù)經(jīng)濟。公司提供的服務(wù)包括讓消費者獲得產(chǎn)品，而公司保留其所有權(quán)。一旦產(chǎn)品被使用完并返還之后，它就會再次供其他承租人使用。例如Hertz等汽車租賃服務(wù)。最后，如果我們正在處理P2P服務(wù)交付，而不是P2P產(chǎn)品共享，

72、則應(yīng)該使用的術(shù)語是按需經(jīng)濟。最近，評論者在這方面也傾向于談?wù)摗傲愎そ?jīng)濟”。按需或零工經(jīng)濟經(jīng)濟包括購買個人服務(wù)，如搭車、雜工或熟食。</p><p>　　我們用于共享經(jīng)濟平臺的定義，以及可以與之區(qū)分的其他三種平臺的定義，將共享作為一種歷史實踐的概念。在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺到來之前，人們已經(jīng)在向他人放貸或出租貨物。他們與家人和朋友共享，因為他們都是已知的、可信的社交聯(lián)系人?，F(xiàn)在，用戶還把貨物借給陌生人，因為互聯(lián)網(wǎng)大大降低了未知

73、的交易成本。所謂的交易成本，經(jīng)濟學(xué)家指的是在進行經(jīng)濟交易時所產(chǎn)生的所有成本和麻煩（Williamson，1981）。這尤其是指與尋找和安排合同有關(guān)的成本。對于陌生人，這些成本在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)出現(xiàn)之前是很高的，因為關(guān)于供應(yīng)、可靠性和合同形式的信息很少（Benkler，2004）。這就是為什么共享通常僅限于朋友和家人的圈子。由于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺的緣故，尋找和合同的成本已經(jīng)降低了很多。消費者現(xiàn)在發(fā)現(xiàn)，找到他們想要的商品和服務(wù)要容易得多，而且交易通過標(biāo)準(zhǔn)合同

74、和在線支付系統(tǒng)進行正規(guī)化。另外，在大多數(shù)共享經(jīng)濟平臺上，關(guān)于過去行為的信息以及用戶的可信度被視為交易的常規(guī)特征。這進一步降低了交易成本及風(fēng)險。</p><p><b>　　3.評估共享經(jīng)濟</b></p><p>　　共享經(jīng)濟的直接經(jīng)濟影響無疑是積極的。在共享經(jīng)濟中自愿參與交易的人只有在對雙方都有利的情況下才會這樣做。即使是商品貸款，也有好處：因為貸款人在貸款期間不需

75、要產(chǎn)品，所以貸款成本很低，而借款人可以免費獲得產(chǎn)品。收入或消費者福利的增加可以理解為交易成本降低的直接成果?，F(xiàn)在的成千上萬次交易在過去是不可能發(fā)生的，因為與陌生人共享的交易成本太高（Benkler，2004）。</p><p>　　然而，全面的經(jīng)濟影響要復(fù)雜得多。首先，P2P共享市場的崛起將對其他市場產(chǎn)生間接影響。例如，傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)及其相關(guān)市場的員工可能會獲得較低的收入。一項研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，德克薩斯州的酒店收入在Airbn

76、b增長的地區(qū)顯著下降（Zervas等，2016）。進一步的分析還表明，整個行業(yè)的影響參差不齊，低端酒店和不適合商務(wù)旅客的酒店受到的影響最大。這表明，Airbnb是酒店住宿的部分替代品，尤其是在市場中較便宜的那部分酒店。隨著P2P共享汽車平臺的興起，競爭日益激烈的汽車租賃市場也可能會面臨著同樣的結(jié)果。如果共享房屋變得更加普遍，那么對房屋的供應(yīng)和價格也有潛在的影響。這意味著居民們看到他們的租金在共享房屋受歡迎的社區(qū)中上漲了。</p&g

77、t;<p>　　其次，由于第三方在交易過程中可能會遭受損失，因此存在外部性。對于遇到陌生人滋擾和感受到危險的鄰居而言，這尤其是一個問題。在阿姆斯特丹、巴塞羅那、柏林、紐約和巴黎等旅游城市，越來越多的社區(qū)試圖阻止共享房屋的進一步發(fā)展。對此，市政當(dāng)局正在收緊他們對共享房屋平臺的監(jiān)管（Woolf，2016）。</p><p>　　與共享產(chǎn)業(yè)相關(guān)的環(huán)境影響也很復(fù)雜。許多平臺都標(biāo)榜自己是綠色的，特別是減少碳足

78、跡。參與者也普遍認為共享的資源密集度較低（Schor和Wengronowitz，2017）。人們以為，共享減少了對新產(chǎn)品的需求或新設(shè)施的建造（就酒店或共享空間而言），所以共享是環(huán)保的。雖然這種看法較為普遍，但除了能夠大幅減少二氧化碳排放的汽車共享之外，還沒有實證性的證據(jù)（Chen和Kockelman，2015；Nijland和VanMeerkerk，2015）。關(guān)于生態(tài)影響的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)論證涉及不同技術(shù)的商品或服務(wù)類型之間的替代。這種類型的推理

79、是經(jīng)濟學(xué)家口中的局部均衡分析法，它只考慮了首輪效應(yīng)。為了確定全面的碳和生態(tài)影響，還有必要分析由于新的共享實踐而導(dǎo)致系統(tǒng)中發(fā)生的所有變化（Schor，2014；Frenken，2017）。例如，如果出售家用物品創(chuàng)造收入，然后用來購買新的商品（“回彈效應(yīng)”），那么最初的出售可能不會減少碳排放或其他環(huán)境影響。如果共享實踐將收入轉(zhuǎn)移到不同的階層，可能會產(chǎn)生另一個第二輪影響，因為每一美元支出的生態(tài)影響因收入階層而異。</p><

80、;p>　　關(guān)于社會效益，一些平臺以及市場雙方的參與者都普遍存在“共同利益”的主張，即與人見面、交朋友和認識其他人的好處（Fitzmaurice等，2016）。Schor（2015a）發(fā)現(xiàn)，創(chuàng)建新社交關(guān)系最成功的網(wǎng)站是Airbnb。一項小型訪談研究的結(jié)果表明，對于一半的Airbnb房主來說，社交互動是他們在網(wǎng)站上的動機和實踐的核心。這些房主與他們的客人交往，與他們一起吃飯，帶他們出去游玩，并在某些情況下與他們成為朋友。一部分人聲稱，

81、即使他們有足夠的錢，他們也會共享房屋，并且有少數(shù)人在Airbnb和Couchsurfing上提供住房，但他們沒有收到任何款項。這一研究結(jié)果是由Böcker和Meelen（2016）發(fā)現(xiàn)的，他們認為，那些表示愿意共享房屋的人往往在經(jīng)濟上有社交動機。Ladegaard（2016）使用波士頓地區(qū)的樣本，進一步驗證了這些結(jié)果，以社交為導(dǎo)向的房主渴望與那些“充滿異國情調(diào)”的外國客人進行交流，這些外國客人各有不同，但非常有趣，讓人愜意。&

82、lt;/p><p>　　共享平臺也有可能對現(xiàn)有社會關(guān)系所反映出的社會凝聚力造成損害。平臺可以節(jié)省私人的物品，因為在任何時候這些閑置物品都會產(chǎn)生機會成本。這本身并不影響社會關(guān)系。然而，雖然過去閑置產(chǎn)能通?？晒┘胰撕团笥衙赓M使用，但研究人員和評論者對網(wǎng)絡(luò)中非貨幣化共享的可行性表示擔(dān)憂，因為人們更喜歡賺錢（Belk，2014；Schor，2015b）。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的經(jīng)濟分析表明，盡管不能預(yù)測影響會有多大，但這種情況將會發(fā)生。目前在

83、這個問題上只有軼事證據(jù)。例如，一位Airbnb房主表示，他現(xiàn)在要求他的朋友和親戚通過平臺與他進行交易，以確保他的公寓和財物不受到損害（Ravenelle，2016）。另一位房主說，由于她無法掙錢，所以她對讓她的公婆呆上一段時間感到不滿（Schor，2015b）。然而，在這些研究中，迄今為止，利他主義的共享的普遍存在似乎很低。</p><p>　　總而言之，共享經(jīng)濟平臺的經(jīng)濟、社會和環(huán)境影響在很大程度上是未知的。盡

84、管從大量的貨幣交易中可以明顯看出直接經(jīng)濟效益，但分配效應(yīng)可能相當(dāng)不平衡。由于共享經(jīng)濟中的大部分收入是通過房屋共享所產(chǎn)生的，所以已經(jīng)富裕的房主將獲利最多。環(huán)境效益主要集中在汽車和共享乘車上，由于回彈效應(yīng)，共享經(jīng)濟平臺的整體效應(yīng)可能較小。最后，社會影響是復(fù)雜的，不一定是包容性的。</p><p><b>　　4.替代品</b></p><p>　　盡管呼吁對共享經(jīng)濟平臺的

85、可持續(xù)性影響進行科學(xué)評估，但我們必須承認，今后很長一段時間內(nèi)，確切的影響可能仍不清楚。造成我們知識差距的原因既有理論上的，也有經(jīng)驗上的。為了正確評估影響，對當(dāng)前平臺所擁有的用戶數(shù)據(jù)的訪問是關(guān)鍵。然而，由于隱私和競爭問題，這些平臺在授予研究人員訪問用戶數(shù)據(jù)方面具有限制性和選擇性。相反，平臺發(fā)布他們自己的研究成果（例如Airbnb，2014），往往會強調(diào)直接好處，而沒有考慮剛才討論的更復(fù)雜和間接的影響。</p><p&g

86、t;　　在此背景下，人們注意到，評估共享平臺可取性的社會過程遵循逆向邏輯。Frenken（2016）在這方面談到了“逆向技術(shù)評估”。在許多國家，食品、藥品、運輸、建筑和兒童玩具等既定部門在新產(chǎn)品獲準(zhǔn)進入市場之前，必須進行詳細的科學(xué)分析和規(guī)范性審議。相比之下，共享經(jīng)濟平臺未經(jīng)協(xié)商就被引入市場，而且由于其快速的增長，它們在沒有太多實證的基礎(chǔ)上敦促政府采取臨時行動。這種逆向過程具有優(yōu)勢，因為用戶“用腳投票”并為個人平臺提供實際的合法性。但是，

87、這些用戶可能很少受到外部性和第二、三輪效應(yīng)的影響。鑒于近期各種社會群體對特定平臺的抵制和反對，需要更有系統(tǒng)的證據(jù)來解決當(dāng)前的爭論，獨立行為者（例如學(xué)者、記者、消費者組織等）應(yīng)有更多的空間來發(fā)表細致入微的意見。</p><p>　　對用戶數(shù)據(jù)的限制訪問也阻礙了法規(guī)的執(zhí)行，從而影響了政策評估。盡管共享平臺是最近才出現(xiàn)的，但其中一些平臺的活動量已經(jīng)相當(dāng)可觀，而且仍呈指數(shù)增長?？梢岳斫獾氖?，鑒于房屋共享和平臺與傳統(tǒng)運營商

88、之間在諸如旅游、餐館、短途、交通和家電等領(lǐng)域的不公平競爭導(dǎo)致的負面外部性，對法規(guī)的呼聲越來越高。更重要的是，我們有理由認為許多人在避免納稅，甚至不知道應(yīng)該為哪些活動（特別是共享房屋）支付稅款。</p><p>　　監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的典型反應(yīng)是通過限制共享活動，在共享經(jīng)濟和正規(guī)經(jīng)濟之間建立制度邊界。例如，越來越多的城市允許房屋共享固定天數(shù)（例如30、60或90天）。這種“上限”邏輯可以應(yīng)用于家庭餐館的經(jīng)營者以及船只、露營車

89、和停車位的所有者。上限的原則與我們對共享經(jīng)濟的定義是一致的，因為消費者相互允許暫時獲得未充分利用的商品，從而避免了人們?yōu)榱擞谰贸鲎舛徺I貨物或房屋的情況。有了上限，政府可以同時解決兩個問題，它們通過在專業(yè)提供商和附帶提供者之間建立明確的界限來滿足現(xiàn)有業(yè)務(wù)，而且附帶的提供者所獲得的金額非常小，可以被忽略，或者屬于現(xiàn)行的免稅級別（除非是共享房屋，收入相當(dāng)不平衡，而且稅收收入相當(dāng)可觀），從而以務(wù)實的方式解決了避稅問題。只要能夠有效監(jiān)控上限，這

90、種控制邏輯就是可持續(xù)的。不過，目前政府正在努力執(zhí)行這些規(guī)則，而這些平臺并沒有讓他們訪問用戶數(shù)據(jù)，因為它們受當(dāng)前隱私法律的保護，替代的監(jiān)控方式不會超過所涉及的成本。因此，政府遵循的上限邏輯，在實踐中可能難以實施?？傊?dāng)前的政府機構(gòu)還沒有對現(xiàn)有的企業(yè)利益和工會擔(dān)憂做出充分和可信的回應(yīng)。</p><p>　　在這種背景下，看到各種替代平臺的建立并不奇怪。從合作型和眾籌平臺，到利用替代貨幣或更新穎的區(qū)塊鏈技術(shù)的平臺，一

91、系列嘗試不斷涌現(xiàn)（Scholz，2014；Scholz和Schneider，2016）。與此同時，一些現(xiàn)有的商業(yè)平臺正在改變他們與用戶和政府打交道的方式，并尋找變通方法來幫助執(zhí)行法規(guī)。</p><p><b>　　5.研究議程</b></p><p>　　從討論共享經(jīng)濟與其他平臺經(jīng)濟的區(qū)別，以及評估共享經(jīng)濟的影響和替代品，我們提煉出一些研究問題。這些問題側(cè)重于各種平臺

92、的管理、可伸縮性和影響。</p><p>　?。?）在不同的文化和時代中，哪些類型的共享經(jīng)濟曾經(jīng)存在過，對于當(dāng)前的共享經(jīng)濟平臺，我們可以從這些倡議和實踐的經(jīng)濟、治理、影響中學(xué)到什么？</p><p>　　（2）信任生成機制，包括過去的評分、個人識別、在線交流和超平臺聲譽資本，對共享經(jīng)濟平臺的相對重要性如何？</p><p>　?。?）我們?nèi)绾胃拍罨治龊徒?jīng)驗性評估當(dāng)

93、前共享經(jīng)濟平臺對用戶、地球和財產(chǎn)的各種影響？我們可以在多大程度上無需訪問用戶數(shù)據(jù)就能進行這類評估？</p><p>　?。?）我們?nèi)绾谓忉尯驮u估政府在地方、國家和超國家層面的各種監(jiān)管反應(yīng)，以及平臺所采用的自治模式？</p><p>　?。?）目前正在使用哪些替代管理方案來管理平臺？我們?nèi)绾尾拍芙忉屗麄冊诟鱾€行業(yè)、地區(qū)和社會群體中的涌現(xiàn)、成長和相對成功？</p><p&g