2012年--外文翻譯--hudson 訴 michigan案與非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則的削減

1、<p>　　中文2045字,1250單詞，6500英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Jones D M. Hudson v. Michigan and the decline of the exclusionary rule[J]. Police Practice and Research, 2012, 13(3): 282-293.</p><p>　　Hudson v. M

2、ichigan and the decline of the exclusionary rule</p><p>　　David M. Jones*</p><p>　　Department of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, Oshkosh, WI, USA</p><p>　　Although

3、the exclusionary rule has been an important part of American jurisprudence for over a century, it has long been under attack. This paper traces the evolution of the doctrine and demonstrates that, for many years, its imp

4、act has been narrowed in its application. The paper concludes with a concern for its continued viability in the American justice system.</p><p>　　Keywords: Fourth Amendment; knock and announce; exclusionary

5、rule; US Supreme Court</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution provides:</p><p>　　The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, p

6、apers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be sea

7、rched, and the persons or things to be seized.</p><p>　　The words, of course, are stirring, and imply empathy for citizen rights against the state. They also imply that one’s home and one’s privacy are impor

8、tant. On the other hand, they are, like words in other amendments, subject to different interpretations. Put another way, ‘The Fourth Amendment, like many provisions of the U.S. Constitution, is concise and exceedingly a

9、mbiguous’ (Holly, 1997, p. 541).</p><p>　　It has also been noted that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches, just unreasonable ones. This raises the question of what constitutes the difference

10、between the two. In this regard, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist pointed out:</p><p>　　The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by ass

11、essing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. (United States v. Knight,

12、534 U.S. 112 [2001], 119)</p><p>　　As one authority has put it:</p><p>　　According to the Court, the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’. The Court wants us to believe th

13、at the provision merely commands that law enforcement officers act rationally and pursue reasonable goals when they intrude upon individuals and their possessions. Whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable is

14、generally determined by balancing the competing interest at stake – the government’s interest in effec- tive law enforcement versus the individual’s interest i</p><p>　　Another important issue is that of enf

15、orcing those rights, however interpreted. ‘Some- what surprisingly, the U. S. Constitution contains no provisions for enforcing the protec- tions enunciated in the Bill of Rights’ (Worrall, 2007, p. 54). One that has bee

16、n developed is the ‘exclusionary rule’, which:</p><p>　　Commands that where evidence has been obtained in violation of the search and seizure pro- tections guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution, the illegally

17、 obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the defendant. Under this rule evidence which is obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure is excluded from admissibility under the Fourth Amendment, and this rule h

18、as been held to be applicable to the States. (Nolan & Nolan-Haley, 1991, p. 291)</p><p>　　Early cases</p><p>　　This rule was first fully enunciated nearly a century ago in Weeks v. United St

19、ates, 232 U.S. 343 (1914). In this case, US Marshalls had entered Weeks’ home without a warrant (in violation of the Fourth Amendment) and seized evidence that the government wanted to use against him in a criminal proce

20、edings. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opin- ion, held that the government could not do this:</p><p>　　If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen a

21、ccused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken fr

22、om the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, can not be used by the sacrifice of these great pri</p><p>　　In effect, the Cou

23、rt seemed to be suggesting that the exclusionary rule was an essen- tial element of the Fourth Amendment, which, at the time only applied to the actions of federal officials. The issue of search and seizure violations ar

24、ose again in Wolf v. Colo- rado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), where Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court’s majority, argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the original Bill of R

25、ights. What the Due Process Clause did was</p><p>　　However, though the Due Process Clause did forbid state actors from violating such rights, the Court also held, that did not necessarily mean that the reme

26、dy applied to fed- eral actors by Weeks should apply to state actors. Indeed, the majority opinion explicitly stated that, ‘in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the

27、 admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and sei- zure’ (at 33). There were, the Court averred, effective al</p><p>　　This changed in 1961 when, in a split decision written by Justice Clark,

28、 the Court held (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [1961]):</p><p>　　. . . that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is by that same authority, inadmissible in a state cou

29、rt.</p><p>　　Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the State through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanctio

30、n of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be ‘a(chǎn) form of words’, valueless and

31、undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, </p><p>　　In short, since the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to state

32、action, so, too, should the remedy – the exclusionary rule, since it was implied in the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s reasons for the use of the exclu- sionary rule were multiple. One was the notion of ‘judicial integrit

33、y’, that by admitting illegally obtained evidence the judiciary would undermine public regard for the legal sys- tem, especially the judges. Another was that the rule wa</p><p>　　Hudson 訴 Michigan案與非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則的

34、削減</p><p><b>　　簡(jiǎn)介</b></p><p>　　美國(guó)憲法的第四修正案規(guī)定：</p><p>　　人們保護(hù)而不受到人、房屋、文件、還有對(duì)不合理的搜查和扣押的權(quán)利不應(yīng) 受到侵犯且不應(yīng)授權(quán)，但是在可能的案例中，有宣誓和批準(zhǔn)支持以及有特殊描述的場(chǎng)場(chǎng)地可以進(jìn)行搜索，人員或物件可以進(jìn)行扣押。</p><p>　　

35、當(dāng)然，這些話是矛盾的，并表現(xiàn)了與聲明違背而對(duì)公民權(quán)利的憐憫。他們也表示了個(gè)人住所和個(gè)人隱私是非常重要的。另一方面，他們像其他修正案中所描述的相似，特殊情況特殊處理。換而言之，“第四修正案，就如其它美國(guó)規(guī)定的憲法相似，描述得非常明確但同時(shí)也很模糊不清。”（Holly，1997）</p><p>　　這同時(shí)也強(qiáng)調(diào)了第四修正案并非禁止一切搜查，而針對(duì)的只是那些不合理的搜查。而此時(shí)便會(huì)引出一個(gè)問(wèn)題，到底是什么構(gòu)成上述兩種

36、情況的區(qū)別。在這方面，Chief Justice William Rehnquist指出了：</p><p>　　第四修正案的試金石是其合理性，而搜索的合理性由評(píng)估決定，在一方面，侵犯?jìng)€(gè)人隱私的程度，另一方面，需要合理的政府利益推廣的程度。（United State 訴 Knight, 534 U.S.)</p><p><b>　　作為權(quán)威所述：</b></p

37、><p>　　根據(jù)法院，第四修正案的中心思想是“合理性”。法院希望我們能相信，當(dāng)侵入個(gè)人以及其個(gè)人持有物時(shí)，甚少需要法律強(qiáng)制執(zhí)法人員行為理性以及追求合理目標(biāo)。一個(gè)特定的搜查或者扣押是否合理，通常由權(quán)衡相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的利弊決定的——政府有效執(zhí)法的利益與個(gè)人隱私與個(gè)人安全的利益。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)重要事項(xiàng)是解釋強(qiáng)制規(guī)定的那些權(quán)利。“有些意外的是，美國(guó)憲法并未包含批準(zhǔn)強(qiáng)制保護(hù)在人權(quán)法案中闡述（W

38、orral，2007）。其中一個(gè)被建立起來(lái)的是“非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則”，描述如下：</p><p>　　已被違法搜查和扣押獲得的證據(jù)的保護(hù)受美國(guó)憲法擔(dān)保，非法取得的證據(jù)并不能在被告人的審判中使用。在這個(gè)規(guī)則限制下，通過(guò)不合理搜查和扣押的證據(jù)會(huì)在第四修正案允許的情況下被排除，而這個(gè)規(guī)則在美國(guó)被認(rèn)為是適用的。（Nolan & Nolan－Haley， 1991）</p><p><b

39、>　　早期案例</b></p><p>　　這規(guī)則第一次完全明確描述幾乎是在一百年以前的美國(guó)Week訴訟案（1914）。在這個(gè)案例中，美國(guó)的Marshalls沒(méi)有任何批準(zhǔn)就侵入了Week的房子中（在第四修正案中屬于違法）并扣押了政府想要用于對(duì)付他犯罪過(guò)程的證據(jù)。最高法院，全體一致主張政府不能有此行為：</p><p>　　如果信件和私人檔案能因此被扣押、持有和使用于作為證

40、據(jù)用于對(duì)付被起訴的市民違法行為，第四修正案的保護(hù)部分重申了其沒(méi)有價(jià)值的證據(jù)受保護(hù)而不受這種搜查和扣押的權(quán)利，所以這可以考慮成也是于憲法相違背的。法院和其人員努力懲罰有罪的，值得稱(chēng)贊的是他們不能使用犧牲多年前成立的偉大原則，這些努力和經(jīng)歷結(jié)果讓他們體現(xiàn)了這片土地的基本法則。</p><p>　　起效的是，法院似乎要建議非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則需成為第四修正案中重要的組成部分，這在當(dāng)時(shí)僅僅采用在限制聯(lián)邦官員的行動(dòng)中。關(guān)于搜查

41、和扣押的違法問(wèn)題重新在Wolf訴Colonrado案例中，338美國(guó)23（1949）的案例中重新提出，當(dāng)時(shí)Justice Frankruter為法院大多數(shù)人發(fā)言，并提倡第十四修正案的正當(dāng)程序條款并沒(méi)有包含原始的人權(quán)法案。而正當(dāng)程序條款做的事“從聲明中提取，為了最低級(jí)的和最被排斥的所有含蓄表達(dá)自由與秩序概念的（在27）”。他進(jìn)一步辯護(hù)說(shuō)，由于保護(hù)個(gè)人隱私安全以不被政府人員任意侵入（第四修正案的核心）是基于自由社會(huì)的，這與此概念相符。&l

42、t;/p><p>　　然而，雖然正當(dāng)程序條款的確是禁止國(guó)家執(zhí)法者侵犯這些權(quán)利，同時(shí)法院也堅(jiān)持這并不意味著要糾正像Week應(yīng)用于國(guó)家執(zhí)法員那樣的方法應(yīng)用于聯(lián)邦執(zhí)法人員。確實(shí)，大多數(shù)人的一件明確聲明了，“在一個(gè)國(guó)家法院的訴訟國(guó)家政府犯罪的案例中，第十四修正案并沒(méi)有禁止接受不合理搜查和扣押而取得的證據(jù)（在33）。有法院聲稱(chēng)存在有效替代的補(bǔ)救措施。隨后，在這個(gè)關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)上，一個(gè)‘中斷’在權(quán)利相關(guān)的第四修正案和非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則應(yīng)用

43、成立了。</p><p>　　這個(gè)在1961年發(fā)生了彼岸花，當(dāng)時(shí)一個(gè)由Justice Clark編寫(xiě)的分裂的決定中，法院主張（Mapp訴Ohio案，367美國(guó)643［1961］）：</p><p>　　…所有由非法搜查和扣押以獲得的證據(jù)于憲法中由一樣的權(quán)利授權(quán)，在州中不予受理。</p><p>　　由于第四修正案中隱私的權(quán)利公告了強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行對(duì)抗國(guó)家通過(guò)第十四修正案中正

44、當(dāng)程序條款的行為，這是可以強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行對(duì)抗他們使用與違背聯(lián)邦政府的非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則同樣的制裁方式。否則，這就僅僅是沒(méi)有Weeks規(guī)則保證不受聯(lián)邦不合理的搜查和扣押，會(huì)變成“一個(gè)形式性的說(shuō)辭”，沒(méi)有價(jià)值且不應(yīng)得的提及一個(gè)不可估量的人類(lèi)自由恒久的憲章，所以同樣，沒(méi)有國(guó)家侵入隱私的自由規(guī)則會(huì)從概念關(guān)系中變得如此短暫、如此整齊，擁有所有從野蠻手段中脅迫獲得證據(jù)這樣的自由，猶如不值得這個(gè)法院高度重視的“有序的自由概念的隱性”。</p>

45、<p>　　簡(jiǎn)而言之，第四修正案中抵抗不合理搜查和扣押的禁制令應(yīng)用于國(guó)家執(zhí)法行為，因此同樣應(yīng)該糾正非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則，由于這被第四修正案中暗示了。而法院采用非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則的原因則是多樣的。其中一個(gè)原因是“司法公正”，承認(rèn)了違法獲取的證據(jù)這種裁決會(huì)破壞公眾認(rèn)為對(duì)法律系統(tǒng)的印象和看法，特別是對(duì)裁決的看法。另一個(gè)原因則是這個(gè)法則是經(jīng)憲法規(guī)定的。這同時(shí)也有威懾理論的看法——通過(guò)消除政府人員違背第四修正案的任何動(dòng)機(jī)，這個(gè)非法證據(jù)排除規(guī)則