[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]管理層收購(gòu)?fù)馕姆g--通過對(duì)家族企業(yè)的管理層收購(gòu)進(jìn)行價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的代理理論分析

1、8300 英文單詞， 英文單詞，4.5 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 1.5 萬(wàn)字 萬(wàn)字文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms[J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2012, 3(4):197-206.An agency t

2、heoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firmsJames J. Chrisman, Jess H. Chua, Lloyd P. Steier, Mike Wright, D’Lisa N. McKeeAbstractFamily firms without able and willing family successors

3、 are frequently sold to non-family managers through management buy-outs (MBOs). Whether MBOs create value is thought to be dependent upon the ability to reduce owner–manager agency costs. In this article we examine the a

4、gency costs of MBOs that acquire family firms. We contribute to theory by arguing that in such situations, value creation by reducing agency costs will depend upon pre-MBO agency costs, the ability to solve the double ag

5、ency problem, and the relationship between the cost of agency control mechanisms and the residual losses from opportunism before and after the MBO.Keywords: Agency theory; Family business; Management buy-outs1. Introduct

6、ionFamily firms account for the majority of firms around the world (La Porta, Lo´ pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Morck Chua, Chrisman, Lim, Lubatkin, Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Burrows, McConaughy, Matthews, Arthur

7、s, Hoskisson, Busenitz, Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, Child Wasserman, 2003). Researchers typically assume that transitions in family firms will involve the family. However, a variety of factors associated with the ab

8、ility and intentions of individual family members, family relationships, strategic context, finances, and transition processes can sometimes make intra-family succession impossible or undesirable (DeMassis, Chua, Tagiur

9、i Ward, 1997).MBOs are among the most important and desirable alternatives for selling a firm outside the family, partly because some MBO scenarios are more likely (though not guaranteed) to preserve some of the origina

10、l identity of the firm after the sale than other selling options such as IPOs (Scholes et al., 2007). In fact, after the MBO, some family members may continue to be employed in the firm (Howorth et al., 2004) and many fi

11、rms retain at least a little ‘familiness’ even after substantial ownership has been transferred to outsiders (Fiegener, 2010).However, from the vantage point of the acquirers, success or failure is measured not by contin

12、ued family involvement or even strictly in terms of profitability. Rather success is measured by the extent to which incremental value is created after the transfer of ownership. Acquirers typically have to pay a control

13、 premium (Finnerty & Emery, 2004) and therefore must be able to add to firm value over and above the premium paid to be successful. When the firm is owned by a family, the hurdle may be even higher because family own

14、ers tend to attach socioemotional value to the firm (Go´ mez-Mejia, Hynes, Nunez-Nickel, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), which can further increase the selling premium demanded (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, &

15、Chua, 2012).As mentioned above, value creation by the owners post-MBO will depend on economic conditions, strategy, governance, organizational structure, systems, culture, taxes, and agency costs, among others. If we abs

16、tract from the uncontrollable economic, tax, and national cultural conditions, then what remains to affect firm value are decisions regarding governance, strategies, structure, policies, tactics, systems, etc. which woul

17、d be determined by the family before the MBO and by the non-family owners afterward. If, indeed, value creation after the MBO is to be achieved through optimal changes in governance, strategy, etc., one may legitimately