[雙語翻譯]財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊外文翻譯--財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表舞弊的檢測(cè)以法國(guó)公司為例（英文）

1、 International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences Vol. 3, No.3, July 2013, pp. 40–51 ISSN: 2225-8329 © 2013 HRMARS www.hrmars.com Detection of Fraud in Financial Statement

2、s: French Companies as a Case Study Ines AMARA1 Anis BEN AMAR2 Anis JARBOUI3 1Department Of Accounting, Faculty Of Economics and Management Of Sfax (FSEGS), University of Sfax (Tunisia), E-mail: inesamara2010@yahoo.fr,

3、 Corresponding author 2Department Of Accounting, Business School Of Sfax (ESCS), University of Sfax (Tunisia), E-mail: anis_benamar@voila.fr 3Department Of Finance, Higher Institute of Business Administration (ISAAS),

4、 University of Sfax (Tunisia), E-mail: anisjarboui@yahoo.fr Abstract The objective of this research is to test the impact of the “Fraud Triangle“ elements on the detection of fraud in the financial statements. The dat

5、a used in our empirical research are related to a sample of 80 French companies in the SBF 250 over the period 2001 to 2009. Using the method of logistic regression, this study shows that the performance issue exerted

6、on the manager is a factor of pressure leading to commit fraud in the financial statements. However, factors related to financial difficulties (debt, liquidity) and the size of auditing firm are not associated with the

7、 detection of fraud. Key words Fraud, Fraud triangle, Pressure, Opportunity. DOI: 10.6007/IJARAFMS/v3-i3/34 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.6007/IJARAFMS/v3-i3/34 1. Introduction Nowadays, the global economy considers a se

8、ries of economic and financial crises caused a distrust of markets, investors and public opinion vis-à-vis the company accounts. Here, it suffices to highlight the fact that Enron corporation, a former United State

9、s energy commodity and service company, has caused a loss of 70 Trillion dollars for all its social partners. Thus, the aforementioned loon has brought about ensuing economic crisis which has spread to all globally eme

10、rging plans. As a case in point, scandals that were widely publicized were cases of Worldcom, Parmalat, Ahold etc. (Rezaee, 2005). Certainly, the financial scandals listed above are not the sole causes of the crisis of

11、confidence prevailing in the business world. The real scourge that affects the economy is undoubtedly “Fraud“. All manipulations are inherently common to some extent: it consists of deceit committed in violation of the

12、act and regulations causing damage to community. As Rouff (2003) cited “Fraud is an intentional act and its author is a real offender.“ In this research, we will focus our attention on the topic of “Fraud in Financial

13、Statements“, which, as indicated by a range of researchers, seems growing internationally. This phenomenon has attracted the attention of several researchers in accounting who are striving to detect the underlying logic

14、 and reasons (Goode and Lacey 2011; Sitorus et al. 2010; Wuerges and Borba 2010; Okoye et al. 2009). Perols and Lougee (2011); Dechow and Skinner (2000) highlight the difference between the concept of fraud and earning

15、s management. Some other authors seek the impact of audit quality on the detection of fraud in financial statements (Lennox and Pittman 2010; Dechow et al. 2011; Smaili et al. 2009; Choo and Tan 2007 etc.). To become f

16、amiliar with the phenomenon of “fraud in the financial statements“ and situate it in its context, a realization and understands of the reasons that can cause a person to violate the rules of International Journal of Acad

17、emic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences Vol. 3 (3), pp. 40–51, © 2013 HRMARS 42 The credibility of the approach of the fraud triangle was clearly manifested in that its assumptions were incorpo

18、rated into the American standard SAS 99 audit and the revised International Standard on Auditing ISA 240. It should be noted that several theories have been advanced to explain the fraud in the financial statements. 2.

19、1. Agency Theory Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship “as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which

20、 involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent“. This theory is based on the economic perspective that the relationship “principal/agent“ is characterized by a conflict of interest. This conflict is oft

21、en referred to as the “agency problem“ (Donaldson and Davis 1991). Thus, this relationship reflects a transfer of trust and obligation to the agent’s opportunism. The agency theory is based on two fundamental assumption

22、s which are as follows: - Leader’s opportunism; - Information asymmetry. Leader’s opportunism The manager, like any individual, is inherently clever, creative to the point that he seeking to maximize his personal intere

23、st in a selfish way. He seeks profit as an agent and thus adopts an opportunistic behavior (Strong and Waterson, 1987). Opportunism occurs through decisions and actions taken by leaders. These are, in most cases surpri

24、singly unobservable by shareholders and therefore, in cases where the financial situation is poor, the leader would be tempted to make accounting fraud to hide the truth of the situation. The opportunism of the leaders

25、hip is reinforced through a fraud in accounting by information asymmetry, which is postulate of agency relationship. Information asymmetry Information asymmetry determines the opportunistic behavior of the leader. In fa

26、ct, it uses all the information including earning managements using its discretion. By exploiting the flexibility of accounting principles, in order the leader would choose accounting methods that increase the result. T

27、hus, he will make an irregular “Fraud“ to cover poor performance and practice a policy of rooting translated into investment in activities where by officer has a comparative advantage in terms of personal or informatio

28、nal competence through accruals (Djama, 2008). The leader can thus be financially favorable without disclosing the management process behind. The problem of information asymmetry is the basis of any problem of conflict

29、 of interest and consequently increases the risk of fraud. This is the case for example of leaders who hide information that may be useful to shareholders in decision-making or evaluation of their securities. In this ca

30、se, there is an informational disadvantage, the principal cannot access company information and is in a situation where he does not know if the manager is able to apply the terms of the contract or not. Moreover if the

31、 company is facing financial difficulties or deficiency in internal control, then the agency relationships in this case affect both shareholders and creditors while the leader carries out the fraud. 2.2. Stewardship Theo

32、ry Stewardship theory considers that leaders are like “stewards“ in their companies they promote the interests of shareholders their own interests, regardless of their personal motivations or incentives (Donaldson and D

33、avis, 1991). So, the “stewardship“ isn’t a theory that rejects agency theory but rather goes hand with it in the sense that the head can choose to be either an agent or stewards. This choice depends on both principles

34、and leadership perceptions depending on the situation. The development of the theory of stewardship helps identify factors of opportunism (related to the person or the environment of the company) and understand the compl