[雙語翻譯]外文翻譯--私人控制權(quán)與盈余管理來自內(nèi)部控制公司的證據(jù)（節(jié)選）

1、3100 英文單詞， 英文單詞，1.8 萬英文字符，中文 萬英文字符，中文 5700 字文獻出處： 文獻出處：Gopalan R, Jayaraman S. Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled Firms[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2012, 50(1):117–

2、157.Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled FirmsRADHAKRISHNAN GOPALAN AND SUDARSHAN JAYARAMANABSTRACTWe examine earnings management practices of insider controlled firms across

3、 22 countries to shed light on the link between consumption of private benefits and earnings management. Insider controlled firms are associated with more earnings management than noninsider controlled firms in weak inve

4、stor protection countries. Consistent with the private benefits motive, insider controlled firms with greater divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights are associated with more earnings management in these c

5、ountries. Growth opportunities attenuate the association between insider control and earnings management even in weak investor protection countries. We also find some weak evidence that insider controlled firms are assoc

6、iated with less earnings management in strong investor protection countries. Overall, our results highlight a strong link between private benefits consumption and earnings management.1. IntroductionUnderstanding the dete

7、rminants of firm disclosure practices is of fundamental importance. In an influential study, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003] advance the link between insiders’ incentives to consume private control benefits and financial

8、 reporting practices. In support, they show that firms in countries with poor investor protection—where insiders have a greater ability to consume private control benefits—are associated with more earnings management (i.

9、e., less informative financial statements). Although an important first step, it is difficult to form definitive conclusions from a country-level design because a number of determinants of firm disclosures covary with th

10、e level of investor protection. In this study, we use detailed ownership data on over 4,500 firms from 22 countries to further examine the role of private benefits consumption in firms’ reporting practices. In particular

11、, we compare earnings management practices of insider controlled firms with those of noninsider controlled firms.It is common for firms outside the United States to be controlled by insiders—typically a family, financial

12、 institution, or the Government (LaPorta et al. [1998]). These insiders usually have concentrated ownership stakes and enjoy control rights far in excess of their cash-flow rights. Such disproportionate control, in conju

13、nction with lack of intervention from activists outside shareholders or a market for corporate control, affords insiders significant autonomy over firm decisions even when their ownership stakes are small. In many instan

14、ces, the firms are also managed by members or representatives of the controlling entity. This provides insiders added opportunities to expropriate outside shareholders through the firm’s operating and financing decisions

15、 (Lins [2003], Leuz, Lins, and Warnock [2009]). Prior research provides evidence of private benefits consumption among insider controlled firms. For example, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang [2000] and Lins [2003] show that

16、such firms have lower valuation; Leuz, Lins, and Warnock [2009] show that these firms have lower foreign portfolio holdings; Faccio, Lang, and noninsider controlled firms in low anti-self-dealing countries (i.e., in coun

17、tries amenable to self-dealing) and in code law countries. Insider control is associated with 156% higher earnings management in countries that rank low on the anti-self-dealing index. These results are consistent wi

18、th an important role for private benefits in shaping firms’ earnings management practices.In high-anti-self-dealing countries and in those with common law legal origin, we find some weak evidence that insider controlle

19、d firms are associated with lower earnings management than their noninsider controlled counterparts. This result suggests that, in countries where benefits consumption is lower, insiders may provide more informative disc

20、losures to alleviate information asymmetry arising from complex ownership structures. We explore this result further in our last set of tests. This result may also help explain why foreign investors are willing to invest

21、 in insider controlled firms in strong investor protection countries (Leuz, Lins, and Warnock [2009]).Prior research shows that, even among insider controlled firms, those with ownership structures that enhance the insid

22、er’s control rights are associated with greater benefits consumption (Claessens et al. [2001]). To further sharpen the link between private benefits and earnings management, we differentiate firms based on the extent of

23、divergence between the insider’s cash-flow rights and control rights and find that insider controlled firms in poor investor protection regimes with greater divergence are associated with more earnings management. In con

24、trast, we do not find evidence of divergence influencing earnings management of insider controlled firms in strong investor protection countries.Even in countries with poor investor protection, insider controlled firms m

25、ay at times voluntarily improve transparency if doing so allows them to access external capital at a lower cost. Such behavior is analogous to firms from poor investor protection countries cross-listing in the United Sta

26、tes and subjecting themselves to U.S. securities laws. The cross-listing literature identifies lower private benefits (Doidge et al. [2009], Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2004], Reese and Weisbach [2002], Stulz [1999]) and

27、 a lower cost of capital (Hail and Leuz [2009]) as the main cost and benefit, respectively, of cross-listing. In an analogous fashion, while more informative financial statements may limit insiders’ ability to consume pr

28、ivate benefits, they are also likely to reduce the cost of external capital and enable firms to exploit investment opportunities.To test this prediction, we identify investment opportunities at the industry level and fin

29、d that insider controlled firms in high self-dealing and code law countries that operate in industries with greater investment opportunities are associated with lower earnings management. These results reinforce the impo

30、rtant trade-off between private benefits consumption and access to external capital in influencing disclosure practices. Since investment opportunities are time varying, these tests allow us to employ firm fixed effects

31、that control for all time invariant firm characteristics that may affect disclosures. As these tests rely on deviation in disclosure practices for an individual firm from its sample mean, they also mitigate concerns abou

32、t endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure, which is time invariant in our sample. Further, to the extent that firm growth and accruals are positively associated, our finding of less earnings management by insider con

33、trolled firms in industries with more growth opportunities provides additional assurance that our results are not driven by differences in innate characteristics across insider controlled and noninsider controlled firms.