[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]外文翻譯--私人控制權(quán)與盈余管理來(lái)自?xún)?nèi)部控制公司的證據(jù)（英文）

1、DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2011.00431.xJournal of Accounting ResearchVol. 50 No. 1 March 2012Printed in U.S.A.Private Control Benefits andEarnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled FirmsR A D H A K R I S H N A N

2、 G O P A L A N ? A N D S U D A R S H A NJ A Y A R A M A N ?Received 5 June 2009; accepted 19 September 2011ABSTRACTWe examine earnings management practices of insider controlled firms across 22 countries to shed light on

3、 the link between consumption of private benefits and earnings management. Insider controlled firms are associated with more earnings management than noninsider controlled firms in weak investor protection countries. Con

4、sistent with the private benefits motive, in- sider controlled firms with greater divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights are associated with more earnings management in these coun- tries. Growth opportuni

5、ties attenuate the association between insider control and earnings management even in weak investor protection countries. We also find some weak evidence that insider controlled firms are associated with less earnings m

6、anagement in strong investor protection countries. Overall, our results highlight a strong link between private benefits consumption and earnings management.?Olin Business School, Washington University, St. Louis. We tha

7、nk Phil Berger (the edi-tor), an anonymous referee, Utpal Bhattacharya (AFA discussant), Richard Frankel, Michelle Hanlon, and seminar participants at the 2011 Annual Finance Association (AFA) meeting and MIT (Sloan) for

8、 helpful comments. We are also grateful to Mara Faccio for sharing data on ownership structure of business groups in Europe and to Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H.P. Lang for sharing the data on ownership st

9、ructure of group firms in Asia through the Journal of Financial Economics Web site.117Copyright C ?, University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2011PRIVATE CONTROL BENEFITS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

10、 119capital) outweigh the costs of lost private benefits. We expect country-level investor protection to affect this trade-off. Regulations that inadequately protect outside shareholders will enhance insiders’ control ov

11、er firms and hence their consumption of private benefits (LaPorta et al. [1997, 1998], Dyck and Zingales [2004], Leuz, Lins, and Warnock [2009], Lins [2003]). Thus, we expect insider controlled firms to be associated wit

12、h more earn- ings management than noninsider controlled firms, especially in countries with poor investor protection. To the extent that the benefits from reducing information asymmetry (due to complex ownership structur

13、es) are higher in strong investor protection countries, we expect the positive association between insider control and earnings management to be attenuated in such countries. To test these predictions, we obtain ownershi

14、p data for a large cross- section of 4,517 unique firms across Europe and Asia from the sources in Claessens, Djankov, and Lang [2000] and Faccio, Lang, and Young [2001]. These data allow us to identify insider controlle

15、d firms. We classify firms as insider controlled if they belong to a family group as per Claessens, Djankov, and Lang [2000] or they belong to a business group as per Faccio, Lang, and Young [2001]. Following Leuz, Nanda

16、, and Wysocki [2003], we employ a composite measure of earnings management by combining two measures—the extent of income smoothing and the magnitude of total accruals—and use it as our proxy for the opacity of firms’ fi

17、nancial state- ments. We compute these earnings management proxies for our final sam- ple of 48,410 firm-year observations across 22 countries using financial data from Worldscope for the period from 1992 to 2006. We beg

18、in our empirical analysis by comparing the extent of earnings management of insider controlled and noninsider controlled firms in our full sample, and do not find any significant differences in their earn- ings managemen

19、t outcomes. Thus, the two forces that affect reporting practices of insider controlled firms seem to offset each other in the full sample. When we split the sample based on countries’ institutional environments, we find

20、important differences. We use two primary measures to capture a country’s institutional environment. The first is the “anti-self-dealing” in- dex constructed by Djankov et al. [2008], which captures the extent to which m

21、inority shareholders are protected against expropriation by cor- porate insiders. The second measure is whether the country has a common law or a code law legal origin. As legal origin is related to several institu- tion

22、al outcomes, we use it as a summary measure of a country’s institu- tional framework. Countries with common law legal origin are associated with greater protection for outside shareholders as compared to those with code

23、law legal origin (LaPorta et al. [1998]). We find that insider controlled firms are associated with more earnings management than noninsider con- trolled firms in low anti-self-dealing countries (i.e., in countries amena