2009年-中國(guó)的利率市場(chǎng)化外文翻譯

1、<p>　　中文7545字,5182單詞，英文字符2.8萬(wàn)</p><p>　　出處：2009 International Monetary Fund</p><p><b>　　中國(guó)的利率市場(chǎng)化 </b></p><p>　　Interest Rate Liberalization in China</p><p

2、>　?。ㄓ⑽馁Y料及中文翻譯）</p><p>　　專(zhuān) 業(yè)： 計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)與技術(shù) </p><p>　　班級(jí)學(xué)號(hào)： </p><p>　　學(xué)生姓名： </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師： </p><p>　

3、　二〇一一 年 六 月</p><p><b>　　英文資料</b></p><p>　　Interest Rate Liberalization in China</p><p>　　Tarhan Feyzio?lu, Nathan Porter, and El?d Takáts</p><p>　　Abst

4、ract：What might interest rate liberalization do to intermediation and the cost of capital in China? China’s most binding interest rate control is a ceiling on the deposit rate, although lending rates are also regulated.

5、Through case studies and model-based simulations, we find that liberalization will likely result in higher interest rates, discourage marginal investment, improve the effectiveness of intermediation and monetary transmis

6、sion, and enhance the financial access of underserved se</p><p>　　Key Words: financial deregulation; financial supervision; interest rate; China</p><p>　　I. INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　Fi

7、nancial liberalization can provide many benefits. By allowing for the better pricing of capital and risk, liberalization improves the allocation and efficiency of investment (Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda, 2004). A larger share

8、 of intermediation would be undertaken by more efficient banks and those better at assessing risk. More credit would also flow to sectors previously underserved. The range of financial products should also expand, allowi

9、ng firms and households to better manage risk, and providi</p><p>　　China has already made substantial progress in liberalizing its financial markets, and its interest rates in particular. After years of ref

10、orm, however, there still remains a floor on bank lending rates and a ceiling on deposit rates. The deposit rate ceiling, in particular, appears to bind, as deposit rates have remained clustered at their benchmark, and r

11、eal deposit rates have on average been zero.</p><p>　　Interest rate controls perpetuate important distortions in the Chinese economy. First, households are not appropriately compensated for their savings, an

12、d their financial income as share of total income remains one of the lowest in the world. Second, the large administratively determined interest margin provides little incentive for banks to become more efficient and imp

13、rove intermediation and risk pricing. Third, credit constraints put in place to limit credit growth create an environment where</p><p>　　We investigate the likely impact of reform using two different approac

14、hes. First, we develop and calibrate an oligopoly model of the banking system. Using this model, we study the likely impact of interest rate deregulation. Similar model based approaches have been applied to the study of

15、deregulation in other markets (see Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia, 2004; and Kopsangas-Savolainen, 2003, for electricity reform examples).The model simulations show that liberalization results in a higher cost o</p>

16、<p>　　Our second approach—the discussion of a series of case studies—asks what the experience of interest rate liberalization in other countries may imply for China (Section IV). The experience of other reformers

17、highlight a number of preconditions for successful reform, including macroeconomic stability, sound bank governance and supervision, and appropriate monetary policy in the face of any excessive demand after reform. Liber

18、alization is likely easiest when the controls are relatively less binding</p><p>　?、? HOW MAY INTEREST RATE LIBERALIZATION CHANGE CHINESE BANKING?</p><p>　　With the calibrated model capturing th

19、e main patterns of intermediation and efficiency in Chinese banking, we can now apply the model to investigate the impact of deposit rate liberalization. Given that the impact of interest rate liberalization may depend o

20、n central bank operations, we consider three different assumptions: (i) the central bank operates monetary policy by targeting the interbank (IB) rate (holding it constant); (ii) the central bank targets a spread over th

21、e now endogenously det</p><p>　　In the rest of the section, we describe the impact of liberalization given these different assumptions for central bank behavior. Specifically, we ask four questions: (1) What

22、 is the impact of liberalization on intermediation? (2) Does the central banks’ operating target significantly affect the impact of reform? (3) What implications does liberalization have for the effectiveness of monetary

23、 policy? (4) How does the impact of liberalization depend on the extent of competition?</p><p>　　A. The Impact of Liberalization</p><p>　　Intermediation and Banking System Soundness</p>&

24、lt;p>　　Liberalizing the deposit rate allows banks an additional channel to compete for deposits, and therefore fund their lending operations. The model-based results, as shown in the empirical distributions once the d

25、eposit rate cap is eliminated (Figure 2), shows that banks would likely take full advantage of this additional channel, with smaller banks offering higher deposit rates to increase their size. The larger banks shrink the

26、ir deposit bases to reduce costs as the deposit rate increases, althou</p><p>　　These trends are consistent across central bank operating procedures (Table 1). The resulting interest rates are very similar i

27、f the central bank rigidly targets the interbank rate, or is relatively more passive allowing the rate to be endogenously determined given by liquidity demand (including its own). A larger increase in the interest rate o

28、ccurs if the central bank targets a constant spread of the interbank over the deposit rate, because the bidding up of the deposit rate, directly increase</p><p>　　Why don’t interest rates rise more after lib

29、eralization? The cost of interbank funds places an effective cap on the possible rise in deposit rates after liberalization. As banks also face some cost in managing deposits, the deposit rate should typically be below t

30、he interbank rate. Consequently, as the simulated scenario assumes little change in desired monetary conditions (as captured by the interbank rate), there can only be a limited rise in the deposit rate (up to 37 basis po

31、ints), and there</p><p>　　Table 1.The Impact of Liberalization on Market Outcomes</p><p>　　Monetary Policy</p><p>　　Interest rate liberalization enhances the effectiveness of indire

32、ct monetary policy and interest rates as price signals. The effectiveness of monetary policy after reform is a major question, with China’s quantity-based monetary policy already effective under regulation. Can policy be

33、 as effective after reform? Table 2 compares the impact of monetary policy actions through interbank rate targets and changes in reserve requirement (relative to our baseline case described above) when deposit rates</

34、p><p>　　Monetary policy, especially through indirect monetary policy instruments, would likely be highly effective after interest rate liberalization. A given change in an IB rate target results in a larger fee

35、d-through to the lending and deposit rates when the deposit rate is liberalized. For example, the simulations suggest that tighter policy—through a 50 basis point increase in the targeted interbank rate—results in a larg

36、er increase in borrowing and lending rates when interest rates are liberalized</p><p>　　Table 2. Monetary Policy Impact</p><p>　　(In percentage point deviation from baseline)</p><p>

37、;　　Market Behavior</p><p>　　The nature of underlying market behavior may substantially change the impact of reform. To investigate this, we consider two polar extremes: one where after liberalization banks c

38、ompete aggressively, and one where they collude. In the first case, margins will be squeezed and intermediation expands, while in the second, margins rise as intermediation is curtailed. The simulated impact on interest

39、rates and other banking system indicators appear in Tables 3 and 4, with the distributional impact on</p><p>　　As expected, greater competition leads to a large expansion in lending and deposit taking. As a

40、consequence, deposit rate is bid substantially higher and, as the cost of funds increases, so does the lending rate. While interest rates are higher, banks margins are lower, profitability falls, and the share of deposit

41、s in loss making banks rises slightly. Nonetheless, by far the majority of the banking industry remains profitable. Defining bank failure by cases where costs are too high at prevailin</p><p>　　If banks were

42、 to collude, they find it profitable to scale back their operations to increase margins. As they limit their lending activity, they also reduce their demand for deposits. As deposit supply is highly inelastic, they can f

43、orce the deposit rate down significantly with a relatively small loss of deposits. If banks collude, “l(fā)iberalization” leads to lower deposit rates, reflecting the extent of their aggregate market power. This result sugge

44、sts that current market behavior must be far fr</p><p>　　Table 3. The Impact of Liberalization Under Alternate Market Behavior</p><p>　　(In percentage point deviation from baseline)</p>&

45、lt;p>　　B. Robustness</p><p>　　Underlying these simulations were assumptions on the interest rate elasticity of loan demand and deposit supply. The above simulations assumed that the elasticity of deposit

46、supply was small (0.2) based on estimates in Ho (2008) and the limited investment options individuals have, while the elasticity of loan demand is assumed somewhat larger (-1). The broad picture painted above does not re

47、ally change even for sizable changes in these elasticity’s:</p><p>　　? Deposit Supply—If the elasticity of deposit supply more than doubles (rises either to 0.5 or 1) then deposit rates increase by less than

48、 under deregulation. The larger elasticity means banks have to offer a smaller increase in interest rates to achieve a given change in deposits volumes. The deposit and lending markets end up being less concentrated also

49、, as smaller banks expand their presence by more than in the baseline presented.</p><p>　　? Loan Demand—The results are largely unchanged if loan demand becomes more elastic, but do not change if demand is s

50、ufficiently less elastic. Banks become significantly more profitable after reform if loan demand becomes less elastic (falling to -0.5), reflecting the greater market power banks would hold. Given this power and their le

51、nding decisions, banks would even be able to reduce the deposit rate (meaning that at this elasticity, the deposit cap was not binding). If loan demand becomes mor</p><p>　　How does the impact of reform chan

52、ge in the lending rate is initially binding? In this case, the dual liberalization of both markets results in much tighter margins, as reform results in the deposit rate rising and lending rate falling. On balance, both

53、deposit and lending volumes rise above their regulated levels. Simulations of our model (not reported) suggests lower market concentration in both markets, but despite lower profits, banks generally remain sound (and non

54、e fail).</p><p>　　Ⅲ. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EXPERIENCE WITH LIBERALIZATION ELSEWHERE?</p><p>　　In this section, we review some country experiences with interest rate liberalization relevant for the c

55、hallenges that China faces. One key issue that comes up repeatedly in country experiences is the sequencing of interest rate liberalization. However, in China, most of the necessary steps toward liberalization have been

56、already taken (Box 1). Nevertheless, the final step—lifting the ceiling on deposit rates and floor on lending rates—still remains. Another key issue that is of concern during a</p><p>　　In most cases, intere

57、st rate liberalization led to higher real interest rates, shifted surplus from borrowers to savers, and allowed those who were previously crowded out to have access to credit. In India, for example, medium-sized enterpri

58、ses gained access to credit as interest rates and credit allocation were liberalized and regulation and supervision was improved significantly (Hanson, 2001). At the same time, the volatility of interest rates increased

59、after liberalization, and so did the li</p><p>　　In this paper, we focus on cases where transition to a liberalized financial system was not smooth with a view to learning from the mistakes made during these

60、 transitions. We start with the case of financial liberalization in Nordic countries, which culminated in a major banking crisis. Next we look at the savings and loan industry in the United States, which, soon after inte

61、rest rate liberalization, suffered a major collapse. Third, we look at the case of Turkey, which experienced excessive com</p><p>　　A. Nordic Countries3</p><p>　　Before deregulation in 1980s, fi

62、nancial sectors of Finland, Norway, and Sweden had a number of important similarities to the current system in China: controls kept interest rates low and stable; credit was rationed, creating an informal market for loan

63、s; banks gravitated towards relatively safer credit risks; and competition was limited. Lending rate restrictions led to the growth of a grey market and disintermediation, but often banks supported these informal sector

64、loans with their off-balance</p><p>　　During 1978–91, these Nordic countries took a number of steps to liberalize their financial markets. They liberalized most of the interest rates during late 1970s–early

65、1980s. Initially, quantitative controls (including reserve requirements and at times credit quotas) were used to limit credit growth, but soon these restrictions were eased, and most external capital account restrictions

66、 were abolished.</p><p>　　Soon after deregulation, lending surged in all three countries (Figure 4). The ratio of loans to GDP increased from 40 percent of GDP to close to 60 percent of GDP within four years

67、 in Sweden, and similar changes were observed in Finland and Norway. This reflected the profound change in competition among banks, as well as strong economic growth. Price competition among banks increased, and a number

68、 of large banks lost their market dominance. In Norway, within a decade the large state-owned banks</p><p>　　Changes in interest margins, on the other hand, were much less dramatic. While real interest rates

69、 increased in all countries, net interest margins remained stable in Sweden, but declined 60–80 basis points in Norway and Finland between 1980 and 1990. Part of the reason for lower margins was the more expensive borrow

70、ing banks were forced to raise funds abroad and in money markets. </p><p>　　It did not take long for a full-blown banking crisis to emerge. By late 1980s, signs of economy-wide stress became evident and by e

71、arly 1990s Sweden and Finland entered one of their deepest and most prolonged recessions. Bank lending shrunk rapidly to levels before the deregulation. Private consumption did not pick up for several years, and investme

72、nt collapsed.</p><p>　　However, it would be wrong to conclude that financial deregulation led to the banking crisis. Instead, the banking crisis reflected a failure in both macroeconomic and prudential polic

73、ies. There was excess demand in the economy, which was financed to an increasing extent by borrowing from abroad as capital account restrictions were relaxed. This excess demand boosted GDP growth, as well as demand for

74、housing and housing prices rose. With constraints removed, banks became an integral part of the </p><p>　　Policies failed in three key areas (Davis, 1995; Berg, 1994; Koskenkyla, 1993; Drees and Pazarbasiogl

75、u, 1998; and Chen, Jonung, and Unteroberdoerster, 2009):</p><p>　　?prudential regulations were not strengthened to prevent banks from supporting the housing bubble;</p><p>　　?borrowing was activ

76、ely encouraged by allowing tax deductibility of interest expenses;</p><p><b>　　and ?</b></p><p>　　Monetary policy was not tightened to rain in excess demand, especially when loan gro

77、wth had increased sharply and household indebtedness surged to unsustainable levels.</p><p>　　This highlights the critical role that active supervision and regulation must play in the immediate aftermath of

78、interest rate liberalization. Bank efforts to rapidly expand their balance sheets should be scrutinized carefully. In addition, strict attention needs to be paid to how banks are financing themselves, particularly if der

79、egulation leads to some banks heavily relying on short-term wholesale funding markets.</p><p><b>　　D. Korea</b></p><p>　　Korea made two attempts to liberalize its interest rates. The

80、 first episode was during 1980s, when most lending rates and long-term deposit rate were liberalized, as part of a broader agenda to deregulate the financial sector. However, despite formal deregulation of interest rates

81、, in effect most rates remained controlled through more informal window guidance (Kim, 1996). Competition among banks increased, but this was the direct result of deliberate measures taken by the government, including l&

82、lt;/p><p>　　The second episode of interest rate liberalization begun in 1991 as part of a four-step deregulation program. During the first stage, short-term lending rates were liberalized, and during the second

83、 stage, most of the remaining lending rates. During the third stage, long term deposit rates were freed up, and in the final stage (by 1997), most of the remaining deposit rates were liberalized. </p><p>　　J

84、ust as the final stage of the interest rate liberalization was implemented, Korea’s economy begun to deteriorate sharply as the Asian crisis took hold in several economies in the region. The reasons for the crisis have b

85、een widely discussed (IMF, 1998), but none of the reasons included interest rate liberalization. Instead, inadequate supervision of financial systems and poor enforcement of prudential rules, in addition to inappropriate

86、 monetary and exchange rate policies were highlighted as so</p><p>　　E. Lessons</p><p>　　Pace of reform. China started the liberalization process in earnest in 1996, and took gradual steps since

87、 then, but over the past five years, progress towards financial regulation has stalled with the deposit rate floors and lending rate ceilings still remaining. It is true that too rapid liberalization could lead to instab

88、ility and reversal of the reforms, as was seen in Turkey and Korea. However, in those cases it is not the reform itself but rather a failure of regulation and supervision that</p><p>　　Timing. Macroeconomic

89、and structural imbalances present important challenges. Removing a constraint can expose other problems in the economy, as was the case in Nordic countries, where demand was growing too rapidly and policies allowed for e

90、xcessive borrowing, facilitated by a rapid liberalization of capital account restrictions. Inadequate regulatory and supervisory frameworks and poor governance in banks also have exacerbated problems in virtually in all

91、the cases covered above. The ideal tim</p><p>　　Supporting measures.</p><p>　　? Bank regulation and supervision. Proper regulation and supervision is the most important factor in the success or

92、failure of interest rate liberalization. All banking crises after interest rate liberalization could be traced back to inadequate supervision or regulations not keeping up with the changing financial landscape. Removing

93、interest rate constraints has led to more competition in almost all cases; but this competition became destructive rather than constructive when banks were allowed </p><p>　　Monetary policy. Monetary policy

94、also needs to be vigilant against excess demand when interest rate constraints are removed from the banking system. Often the loosening of restrictions has led to an expansion of credit (which, ultimately, was not consis

95、tent with the macroeconomic stability goals of the government). In most of the cases discussed above, monetary conditions were not tightened enough to stem the demand boom and limit inflationary pressures from an expansi

96、on of credit. In China’s ca</p><p>　　? Policy Tools. As direct controls over interest rates and credit quantity are replaced by indirect controls, countries have benefited from strengthening their indirect p

97、olicy tools. China has also made major advances in deepening its money markets, and removing the interest rate restrictions will catalyze further development of these markets. Nonetheless, there is a need to strengthen i