內(nèi)部審計的蛻變外文翻譯

1、<p>　　1930單詞，3450漢字</p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　外文題目 Michael.Risk management：The reinvention of internal control and the changing role of internal audit

2、 </p><p>　　外文出處 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal </p><p>　　外文作者 Laura F. Spira / Michael Page

3、 </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　THE METAMORPHOSIS OF INTERNAL AUDIT</p><p>　　In this section we trace the development of internal audit and

4、 compare the rhetoric of the associations seeking to professionalise the activity with the changes which are occurring in the work of internal auditors as a result of external pressures and the opportunity to expand thei

5、r remit which the redefinition of internal control affords. </p><p>　　Historically, internal audit has been viewed as a monitoring function, the ‘organizational policeman and watchdog’ (Morgan, 1979, p.161),

6、 tolerated as a necessary component of organizational control but deemed subservient to the achievement of major corporate objectives. An examination of the pressures on internal audit in recent years reveals the structu

7、re to demonstrate that the function can add value. </p><p>　　Outsourcing of the internal audit function became popular during the 1980s as the costs of internal audit were being closely scrutinized in many c

8、ompanies, often as a result of the application of business process re-engineering techniques. The move to outsourcing was one of the driving forces for change in internal audit. The large accounting firms saw opportunit

9、ies for new business. Bruce (1996) suested that a risk management approach to strategy by top management and a desire to view it in a</p><p>　　..recent IIA pronouncements which emphasise how internal audit

10、should provide a “service to the organisation” and how internal auditors should become more accountable to Audit Committees of Boards of Directors and society, rather than exclusively to management…signal the definitio

11、n of a role and power base which returns to the philosophy of the original audit role…but which carries with it an expanded conception of the audit function which…seeks to combine control and advisory functions, by <

12、;/p><p>　　(Morgan 1979, pp. 169-70) </p><p>　　Twenty years after Morgan’s observations, the Institute of Internal Auditors promulgated a new definition of internal auditing which focuses on indepen

13、dence and objectivity, identifying an assurance and consulting role for internal audit and emphasizing adding value and improving effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes. Krogstad etal. (1999,

14、p.33) outlined the development of this new definition and noted that ‘internal auditing’s interface with governance raises the st</p><p>　　Although this new interest in the potential of internal audit to con

15、tribute positively to corporate objectives offers an opportunity for a stronger claim to professional status, difficulties remain. Pentland (2000), seeking to establish the boundaries of audit, observed that auditors are

16、 experts in process rather than content: in areas such as environmental audit, specialists from other disciplines offer strong competition to the expert status of the traditional internal auditor. Similar challen</p&g

17、t;<p>　　Fogarty and Kalbers (2000) explored a range of dimensions of professionalisation in internal audit, identifying independence, autonomy and self-regulation as key attributes, but cautioning that ‘..organisa

18、tions should also be aware that internal auditing inherently involves role conflict. Efforts to eliminate role conflict may deny internal auditors the very essence of their roles in the organisations.’(p.134). </p>

19、<p>　　Claims for professional status both support and are supported by the identification of areas in which professional expertise may be demonstrated. The financial scandals which provoked world-wide concern wit

20、h corporate governance in the 1990s highlighted apparent failures of accountability [9]. Inevitably audit and internal control, mechanisms designed to secure accountability, became a focus for the debate about reform. In

21、ternal auditors, traditionally specialists in internal control but not hi</p><p>　　Thus Turnbull’s broader approach to internal control has offered internal audit the opportunity to claim expertise in the c

22、rucial area of risk management. The power base of internal audit is firmly established: it is a key component of good corporate governance practice. But to what extent has the opportunity identified for extending this ad

23、vantage been exploited by internal auditors? </p><p>　　There is a consensus that important changes are occurring in the nature of internal auditing. </p><p>　　McNamee (1995) characterised the h

24、istory of internal auditing since the second world war as one of a transformation from validation of transactions to one of systems auditing. They also detected a change in which internal auditors became ‘a(chǎn) primary age

25、nt for transformational change’ in helping users of systems to ‘design test and monitor their own controls’. </p><p>　　Power (1999a and 1999b) suggested that there has been a fundamental change in the nature

26、 of corporate governance from ‘regulation from above’ to ‘regulation from the inside’ and that the key to what he calls this ‘proactive compliance based style of regulation’ is a ‘risk based future orientation’. Risk ma

27、nagement is integral to ‘the new self-governance of the organisation’. Despite Power’s world view of an ‘a(chǎn)udit society’ it is likely that there is growing divergence of compliance cultures. I</p><p>　　Howev

28、er, the extent to which such changes have permeated organisations is not yet known. Internal auditors are certainly exhorted in the professional literature to embrace the opportunity to contribute to the achievement of c

29、orporate objectives through risk management: for example, Deloitte and Touche Tohmatsu (2000) asserted: ‘The shift in the risk-control landscape creates both challenges and opportunities for internal auditors. Those that

30、 handle the challenge quickly and cost-effectively will</p><p>　　Other evidence demonstrates that internal auditors certainly aspire to this reframing of their role in terms of risk management: examples are

31、offered by the new definition of internal auditing issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors in June 1999, as well as commentary in recent articles (e.g. Bou-Raad, 2000; Chambers, 2000). Chambers observed the increasi

32、ng references to risk over the last five years in the strap lines of professional journals and newsletters relating to internal audit, as </p><p>　　It is less clear that this ambition is being achieved. Rese

33、arch into organisations known for their leading edge risk management practices (Selim and McNamee, 1999) shows an alignment of risk management and internal audit practice but the authors acknowledge that this is by no me

34、ans universal and identify changes in culture and competencies required of other internal audit functions if they are to go in the same direction. The Selim and McNamee model is one in which risk assessment is followed

35、b</p><p>　　Survey research by Griffiths (1999) is more broadly representative of current practice. In a questionnaire study of fellow FTSE 200 finance directors he found widespread ‘lukewarm’ or ‘negative’ a

36、ttitudes to internal audit and that the function was frequently seen as ‘too low key and basic (and therefore insufficiently business risk-oriented)’ and that the function was lacking in skills and appropriately trained

37、staff. </p><p>　　A survey of senior executives and senior internal auditors carried out by KPMG in the US (KPMG, 1999) indicated that a higher percentage of internal auditors than senior executives expected

38、internal audit to have a developing role in identifying and evaluating risk. Twice as many internal auditors as senior executives viewed risk management as the means by which internal audit added value (senior executives

39、 saw the internal audit role as principally to ensure internal control effectiveness, indi</p><p>　　‘…there are no major significant differences in perception [of the future role of internal audit] registere

40、d by all respondents, apart from internal auditors’ expectation of a larger role in assessing operational efficiency and organisational performance, than chief executives expect.’ (2000, p.10) </p><p>　　The

41、growth of concern for corporate governance has been of great benefit to the standing of internal auditors and has boosted their claims to professional status by emphasising the benefits of independence of judgement and o

42、bjectivity in their reports. An occupation which was once confined to checking mundane compliance with systems devised by others has become elevated to professional status and with a line of reporting to the higher leve

43、ls of the company. </p><p>　　The observation that, within corporate governance policy, risk management has become closely aligned with internal control suggests that the extent to which risks are managed ha

44、s now been annexed as a form of accountability, rather than its focus - a yardstick against which a dimension of performance is measured. This redefinition offers a new view of risk management as part of the accountabili

45、ty process, implying a shift which blurs the distinction between responses to risk, through risk manage</p><p>　　Source：Laura F. Spira，Michael Page.Risk management：The reinvention of internal control and the

46、 changing role of internal audit [J].Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal，2003，（4）：640-661.</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p><b>　　內(nèi)部審計的蛻變</b></p><p>　　

47、在這一部分中，我們將追溯內(nèi)部審計的發(fā)展過程，并比較各協(xié)會組織對由于外部壓力使內(nèi)部審計人員工作發(fā)生變化進(jìn)而尋求更專業(yè)的活動的這種行為導(dǎo)致內(nèi)部審計的定義發(fā)生變化和內(nèi)部審計成果被重新定義和擴(kuò)大的機(jī)會。</p><p>　　從歷史上看，內(nèi)部審計一直被認(rèn)為具有監(jiān)督的功能，是“經(jīng)濟(jì)警察和看門狗”（摩根，1979，P.161），是組織控制的一個必不可少的組成部分并且它被認(rèn)為對主要的企業(yè)目標(biāo)的完成非常有幫助。一項針對近年來內(nèi)部審

48、計壓力的調(diào)查也反映其具有增值功能。</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)80年代的時候，內(nèi)部審計業(yè)務(wù)外包非常流行。許多企業(yè)為了重整組織和改造流程把它當(dāng)成是進(jìn)行更加詳細(xì)審計的成本。外包的盛行是促使內(nèi)部審計變化的原因之一。一些大的會計師事務(wù)所看到了新的生財機(jī)會。布魯斯（1996）指出風(fēng)險管理類似于董事會提出的戰(zhàn)略，而他們希望用一種全面的方法來看待這一現(xiàn)象即組織實行風(fēng)險管理的需求是促使外部和內(nèi)部審計綜合的動因，但是外部審計更

49、加具有獨立性的事實提供了抵消壓力。內(nèi)部審計協(xié)會對此的反應(yīng)是強(qiáng)調(diào)內(nèi)部審計的專業(yè)性和其增值的潛力。凱爾巴斯和福加蒂（1995）注意到，關(guān)于如何使內(nèi)部審計更加具有專業(yè)性其實已經(jīng)被討論很多年了。1979年，摩根對扮演執(zhí)行內(nèi)部審計的專業(yè)程序角色的內(nèi)部審計師職責(zé)的定義從“控制者”到“控制和建議者”，他提出“這種轉(zhuǎn)變想要成功只能以放棄作為’控制者’角色的某些職能和權(quán)力機(jī)構(gòu)一直以來所賦予其的某些權(quán)利作為代價?！保Ω?，1979，P.168）但內(nèi)部審計人

50、員發(fā)現(xiàn)放棄某些權(quán)利是有問題的，他們引用曾遭遇到的困難來證明。當(dāng)內(nèi)部審計人員試圖想要與被審計者建立起一種合作關(guān)系時，那他們審計時就必須求助于機(jī)構(gòu)當(dāng)局才能取得想要的信息或者是處理暴露出的問題。摩根提出：</p><p>　　···最近國際內(nèi)部審計協(xié)會強(qiáng)調(diào)內(nèi)部審計應(yīng)“服務(wù)于組織”，相比僅對管理層負(fù)責(zé)，內(nèi)部審計人員更應(yīng)該對董事會下的審計委員會和社會公眾負(fù)責(zé)···

51、這暗示著對內(nèi)部審計人員的角色和權(quán)利的定義又回到最初···但是伴隨審計功能的是一個延伸的概念···它試圖把控制者和建議者兩個角色結(jié)合在一起，后者面向更高的組織層次。（摩根，1979，P.169-170）</p><p>　　在摩根提出這個觀點二十年后，內(nèi)部審計師協(xié)會發(fā)布了關(guān)于內(nèi)部審計的新定義。該定義突出獨立性和客觀性，表明其在內(nèi)部審計中應(yīng)扮演保證和咨詢的角

52、色，并且強(qiáng)調(diào)它的增值作用，提高風(fēng)險管理的效用，控制和管理流程的作用?？藙诟袼固垢爬诉@個新定義的發(fā)展并提到“內(nèi)部審計與管理的融合增加了同業(yè)的利益”</p><p>　　雖然內(nèi)部審計的新定義對內(nèi)部審計的專業(yè)地位有了更高的要求，這明顯有助于企業(yè)目標(biāo)的實現(xiàn)，但困難依然存在。潘特蘭德（2000）試圖建立審計的范圍，它觀察到相比起要審計的內(nèi)容比如環(huán)境審計等，審計人員在程序方面更加熟練。來自其他領(lǐng)域的專家比傳統(tǒng)的內(nèi)部審計人員

53、在提供專業(yè)服務(wù)方面有更強(qiáng)的競爭力。類似的競爭還出現(xiàn)在風(fēng)險管理領(lǐng)域，并且可能內(nèi)部審計具有獨立性優(yōu)勢的聲明更易被人所質(zhì)疑。（英格蘭及威爾士特許會計師協(xié)會2000，P.9）壓力還留在內(nèi)部審計咨詢角色和獨立性的要求之間。</p><p>　　福加蒂和凱爾巴斯（2000）在內(nèi)部審計時探索過一系列專業(yè)方法，把可識別的獨立性，自治和自我調(diào)節(jié)作為關(guān)鍵因素后提醒到“···組織也應(yīng)該意識到內(nèi)部審計內(nèi)部存

54、在其固有的角色沖突，努力消除角色沖突可能否定內(nèi)部審計人員在組織中的特有本質(zhì)?！保≒.134）</p><p>　　獨立性要求只有在專業(yè)知識可以被證明的識別領(lǐng)域受到支持。20世紀(jì)90年代，關(guān)于公司治理的財務(wù)丑聞在全世界范圍內(nèi)被曝光。企業(yè)責(zé)任明顯履行失敗。因為輿論的壓力，不可避免地，外部審計，內(nèi)部審計，組織機(jī)構(gòu)被賦予要對企業(yè)安全負(fù)責(zé)的責(zé)任。那些傳統(tǒng)上內(nèi)部審計的專家，原先在組織中常常不被重視的內(nèi)部審計師開始引起董事會的

55、注意，他們以此來滿足外部對保證公司治理的需求。</p><p>　　因此，特恩布爾的理論更接近于內(nèi)部控制在風(fēng)險管理的關(guān)鍵領(lǐng)域為內(nèi)部審計提供便利的觀點。內(nèi)部審計的權(quán)利基礎(chǔ)被穩(wěn)固的建立起來：它是一個良好的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的主要組成部分。但是內(nèi)部審計人員需要開發(fā)他們的這項被擴(kuò)充出來的優(yōu)勢到什么程度呢?</p><p>　　現(xiàn)在能夠統(tǒng)一的觀點是內(nèi)部審計的本質(zhì)正發(fā)生著重要的變化。麥克寧（1995）研究內(nèi)

56、部審計的歷史，他從二戰(zhàn)后便從作為研究驗實證交易轉(zhuǎn)變的一員變成研究系統(tǒng)審計的一員。他也發(fā)現(xiàn)內(nèi)部審計從幫助系統(tǒng)使用人的“變革主要代理人”變成“設(shè)計制度和監(jiān)管他們自己設(shè)計的制度的人”</p><p>　　鮑爾（1999a—1999b）提到公司治理有了一個根本的變化，即從“上級管理”轉(zhuǎn)變成“內(nèi)部管理”。他稱這“基于管理風(fēng)格的積極服從”是“基于未來方向的風(fēng)險”的關(guān)鍵。風(fēng)險管理是“組織新的自我管理”的一部分。鮑爾關(guān)于審計社會

57、的世界觀很可能是服從文化的發(fā)展中的分歧意見。在許多風(fēng)險導(dǎo)向方法中承受風(fēng)險是不受重視的。這里的風(fēng)險被認(rèn)為是最小的或者說對局部的管理者敏感，程序不具有證明文件，符合在這里不能被評定。同時，創(chuàng)新后的風(fēng)險管理應(yīng)對方法積極地尋找不需要程序上符合的方法。如前所述，不同的風(fēng)險來源于廣泛的管理制度。承受風(fēng)險只是其中的一種風(fēng)險反應(yīng)。</p><p>　　然而，風(fēng)險管理發(fā)展變化的程度到目前還不知道。在專業(yè)文獻(xiàn)上內(nèi)部審計人員必定被勸告

58、通過風(fēng)險管理來促進(jìn)企業(yè)目標(biāo)的實現(xiàn)。比如，德勤會計事務(wù)所（2000）宣稱：“這種在風(fēng)險控制上的變化對內(nèi)部審計人員來說既是挑戰(zhàn)也是機(jī)會。那些從成本效益出發(fā)并快速應(yīng)對挑戰(zhàn)的便能幫助組織達(dá)到其目標(biāo)，而那些不能應(yīng)對這種變化的，終將被留下。他們要么是問題的一員要么是解決問題的一員。要發(fā)展內(nèi)部審計到現(xiàn)在仍有許多工作要做，我們希望內(nèi)部審計人員在今天具有遠(yuǎn)見，這樣才能有一個有價值的明天?！保≒.6）</p><p>　　另外有證據(jù)

59、證明內(nèi)部審計人員必定渴望重新定義他們在風(fēng)險管理中的角色：1999年6月內(nèi)部審計協(xié)會發(fā)布內(nèi)部審計新定義就是一個很好的例子，最近的文獻(xiàn)中也常討論到。（例如布扎巴溫，2000；錢伯斯，2000）錢伯斯注意到在過去五年里在與審計有關(guān)的專業(yè)期刊里風(fēng)險被越來越多的提及到，越來越多的專業(yè)文章標(biāo)題聚焦風(fēng)險。（錢伯斯，2000）</p><p>　　針對組織最前沿的風(fēng)險管理實務(wù)研究表明風(fēng)險管理和內(nèi)部審計的結(jié)合，這樣的追求目前有沒有

60、被達(dá)成還不是很清楚，作者們也承認(rèn)即使他們主要研究觀點是一致的，這也絕不是放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的在理論上的變化。它需要內(nèi)部審計功能有這個能力。塞林和麥克寧模型是一種風(fēng)險評價模型，其次是風(fēng)險管理和風(fēng)險溝通模型。然而，他們描述的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)風(fēng)險模型是一種內(nèi)部審計來源于戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃過程,而不是一項程序的一大貢獻(xiàn)。</p><p>　　格里菲斯（1999）的調(diào)查研究更能廣泛性地代表目前的實際情況。在一個調(diào)查問卷中，富時指數(shù)公司的財務(wù)主管發(fā)現(xiàn)

61、人們對于內(nèi)部審計普遍存在著“溫和”或者“消極”的態(tài)度，內(nèi)部審計常常被認(rèn)為“太低調(diào)和基本（因此不能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)營風(fēng)險）”。目前要實施風(fēng)險管理缺乏有經(jīng)驗和合適的經(jīng)過專業(yè)培訓(xùn)的人員。</p><p>　　美國畢馬威會計師事務(wù)所（畢馬威國際會計公司，1999）的一項對高級管理人員和高級內(nèi)部審計人員的調(diào)查說明內(nèi)部審計人員能夠進(jìn)行內(nèi)部審計風(fēng)險識別和評估能力的比例比高級管理人員要高。內(nèi)部審計人員擁有把風(fēng)險管理看做是給內(nèi)部審計增加附

62、加值的方法的意識的人數(shù)是高管人員的兩倍（高管人員把內(nèi)部審計看做是主要的確保內(nèi)部控制效果的手段，不像英國特恩布爾的代表觀點）。相比起高管人員，內(nèi)部審計人員也對他們以現(xiàn)有的能力來協(xié)助風(fēng)險管理活動具有較強(qiáng)的感知。但高管人員強(qiáng)調(diào)他們強(qiáng)烈希望該領(lǐng)域能夠發(fā)展。新西蘭德勤會計師事務(wù)所在一項類似的調(diào)查中提到：“···所有被調(diào)查者（在內(nèi)部審計未來的角色認(rèn)知上）并沒有多大的顯著差異，除了內(nèi)部審計師比首席執(zhí)行官期望在評估經(jīng)營運作

63、效率和組織績效上扮演更加重要的角色?！保?000年，第50頁）</p><p>　　至關(guān)重要的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的發(fā)展有利于內(nèi)部審計行業(yè)的長久發(fā)展，并且通過內(nèi)審報告里強(qiáng)調(diào)獨立決策和客觀判斷的好處也推進(jìn)了內(nèi)審人員提高自身職業(yè)地位要求的達(dá)成。公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的發(fā)展把內(nèi)部審計從一份曾經(jīng)只局限于規(guī)矩地檢驗系統(tǒng)設(shè)計是否按要求執(zhí)行的職業(yè)提升為通過一系列報告形式向公司更高層報告并達(dá)到專業(yè)地位的職業(yè)。</p><p&g

64、t;　　觀察顯示，在公司治理政策中，風(fēng)險管理與內(nèi)部控制的緊密結(jié)合表明，在一定程度上風(fēng)險管理已經(jīng)定義為一種企業(yè)責(zé)任而非一個業(yè)績評價的準(zhǔn)繩和維度。這個新定義給風(fēng)險管理作為企業(yè)責(zé)任的一部分提供了一個新的視角。這也意味著通過風(fēng)險管理系統(tǒng)和風(fēng)險責(zé)任，責(zé)任轉(zhuǎn)移反應(yīng)模糊了風(fēng)險之間的區(qū)別。這支持了貝爾的觀點，即盡管調(diào)控程序擴(kuò)大了，但難以把特定責(zé)任歸因于個人或體系。風(fēng)險管理使人們從逃避責(zé)任到增強(qiáng)責(zé)任變成了可能。內(nèi)部審計人員基于自己熟悉這一方面的專業(yè)知識和