2014年--外文翻譯--北歐上市公司的股利政策（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3340字，,2000單詞，10900英文字符</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)出處：Brunzell T, Liljeblom E, Löflund A, et al. Dividend policy in Nordic listed firms ☆[J]. Global Finance Journal, 2014, 25(2):124-135.</p><p&g

2、t;<b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Dividend policy in Nordic listed firms</p><p>　　T Brunzell，E Liljeblom，A Löflund，M Vaihekoski</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p>

3、<p>　　In this paper we analyze the results from a survey among all publicly listed Nordic firms on their dividend payout policy. The results show that 72% of the Nordic companies have a specified dividend policy. L

4、arger and more profitable companies are more likely to have a defined dividend policy in place. The dividend policy is mostly influenced by capital structure considerations and the outlook of future earnings. We also fin

5、d that the likelihood for a firm having an explicit dividend policy is p</p><p>　　Keywords: Corporate finance; Dividend policy; Payout; NASDAQ OMX</p><p>　　Introduction</p>

6、<p>　　Ever since studies such as Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968), a large number of papers have studied corporate dividend policies (payout ratios) and factors that contribute to the payout

7、 decision. Recently, focus has been on the choice between dividends and share repurchases (see for example Guay and Harford, 2000 and Jagannathan et al., 2000; and Skinner, 2008), the question of disa

8、ppearing dividends (see for example DeAngelo et al., 2004 and Fama and French, 2001), and the relationship </p><p>　　We contribute to the literature on studies of the relationship between cont

9、rolling shareholders and dividend decisions by studying the determinants of whether a firm follows a more explicit dividend policy. While implicit dividend policies (most commonly the relationship between dividends and e

10、arnings, and the speed of adjustment to an assumed optimal level) have been subject of many studies, only a few papers have studied whether a company has an explicit defined dividend policy in place, and w</p><

11、;p>　　There are many reasons for why the question of whether the firm follows a clearly defined dividend policy may be of interest. Firstly, it can be seen as an alternative approach to study whether signaling can be o

12、ne of the motives for dividend distributions. Without expectations for future dividends, formulated by some systematic publicly announced dividend policy, deviations from such expectations cannot be identified and reacte

13、d upon. Thus, one could view a “dividend policy” as a necessary but </p><p>　　We contribute by providing empirical results on the existence of a dividend policy in listed ?rms and investigating factors affec

14、ting the choice of such a policy. Most notably, we study how the existence of a major shareholder impacts the decision. The data used in this study are from the Nordic markets, since there is more cross-sectional variety

15、 in ownership concentration levels and different ownership types than in the USA. This gives us an especially fruitful setting for a study of the link </p><p>　　We ?nd that 72% of the Nordic companies have a

16、n explicit dividend policy. Larger and more pro?table companies are more likely to have a de?ned dividend policy in place. The dividend policy is mostly in?uenced by the considerations of the company's capital struct

17、ure and future earnings. In estimations studying the determinants for whether a ?rm has an explicit dividend policy or not, we get support for agency or monitoring motives (the need of a stable cash ?ow) rather than the

18、signaling motive a</p><p>　　The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The testable hypotheses are developed in the second section. The sample and survey methods are discussed in Section 3. In Section

19、4 we present the results together with discussion of their implications. A summary is given in the ?nal section.</p><p>　　Literature review and hypothesis development</p><p>　　There exists a vas

20、t literature on corporate dividend policy. The main determinants of a corporate dividend policy include tax optimizing, firm profitability and earnings stability, signaling (of firm investment policy) and managerial or m

21、ajority owner related agency costs. There are a number of papers that study which factors are considered by companies when setting their dividend policy. Early results indicate that taxes play a role if taxation on capit

22、al gains and dividends differ, but if they</p><p>　　A dividend policy can be formulated in several ways. In the Lintner (1956) study, the most common specification was based on the long-run target

23、payout ratio. Current earnings are the main determinant of the current dividend while deviations from the target represent the signaling component. Dividend per share is another potential dividend policy target and is on

24、ly weakly linked to current earnings performance through the corporate history. Dividends may also be related to other currently observ</p><p>　　A dividend policy can also be used as a monitoring tool to red

25、uce free cash ?ows in order to reduce managerial agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control in companies. La Porta et al. (2000) offer opposite predictions for dividend policy. According to the

26、“outcome model” (Faccio et al., 2001 and La Porta et al., 2000), dividends are paid because minority shareholders force corporations to distribute cash, thereby reducing agency problems associated with free cash ?ow. W&l

27、t;/p><p><b>　　Data</b></p><p>　　The survey data</p><p>　　This paper is based on the results of a questionnaire directed to all chairpersons of the Board of firms in th

28、e Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). this paper lists the questions used in the survey.</p><p>　　The survey was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the questionnaire w

29、as sent to the chairmen in the Nordic firms listed on the exchanges operated by the OMX (now NASDAQ OMX) including the national stock markets of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. This took place in early December 20

30、07. In the second stage, in May 2008, the questionnaire was sent to the chairmen in the firms listed at the Oslo Børs in Norway. The questionnaire was sent as a letter directed to a named respondent. T</p>&l

31、t;p>　　Background data</p><p>　　The responses were matched with background information on firm financials and ownership concentration. The financial data are collected from three sources. Our primary sourc

32、e is the Amadeus database. Additional items have been collected from Datastream, when not available in Amadeus. Finally, annual reports downloaded from internet sources have provided an additional data source in cases wh

33、ere information has not been available in other databases. The financials are from the last reporting year </p><p><b>　　Results</b></p><p>　　We asked the chairpersons to indicate whe

34、ther their company had a defined dividend policy. Two alternatives (‘yes’ and ‘no’) were given. Panel A shows the results. Out of the 158 responses we got from the chairpersons, 152 provided an answer to this questi

35、on. 110 companies (72.4%) had a defined dividend policy, 42 (27.6%) did not.</p><p>　　Conclusions</p><p>　　The results of our extensive survey among Nordic listed firms on their commitment to di

36、vidend policy show that 72% of the Nordic companies have a specified dividend policy. Furthermore, the results indicate that the dividend policies are mostly influenced by the considerations of the company's capital

37、structure and future earnings. </p><p>　　In estimations studying the determinants for whether a firm has an explicit dividend policy or not, we find that firms with older chairmen appear to prefer a looser c

38、ommitment to payout policy as their firms are significantly less likely to have an explicit dividend policy in place. We also documented that larger and more profitable companies are more likely to commit to a defined di

39、vidend policy.</p><p>　　Finally, the likelihood for a firm having an explicit dividend policy is significantly positively related to ownership concentration as well as to large long-term private or industria

40、l owners. This gives indirect support for agency/monitoring motives rather than the signaling motive which is expected to be more prevalent in firms with dispersed ownership. Overall, our results suggest that the relativ

41、ely concentrated ownership structures in Nordic firms play a role in shaping dividend policy over</p><p>　　References</p><p>　　Amihud, Y., & Murgia, M. (1997). Dividends, taxes, and signalin

42、g: Evidence from Germany. Journal of Finance, 52(1), 397–408.</p><p>　　Baker, H. K., Mukherjee, T. K., & Paskelian, O. G. (2006). How Norwegian managers view dividend policy. Global Finance Journal, 17,

43、155–176.</p><p>　　Baker, H. K., Saadi, S., Dutta, S., & Gandhi, D. (2007). The perception of dividends by Canadian managers: New survey evidence. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 3(1), 70–91.

44、</p><p>　　Barclay, M., Smith, C., & Watts, R. (1995). The determinants of corporate leverage and dividend policies. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7(4), 4–19.</p><p>　　Bena, J., &

45、 Hanousek, J. (2005). Rent extraction by large shareholders: Evidence using dividend policy in the Czech Republic. Working paper series 291. Charles University, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education.</p&

46、gt;<p>　　Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. (2005). Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(3), 483–527.</p><p>　　Brunzell, T., Liljeblom, E., &am

47、p; Vaihekoski, M. (2013). Determinants of capital budgeting methods and hurdle rates in Nordic firms. Accounting & Finance, 53(1), 85–110.</p><p>　　DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (2004)

48、. Are dividends disappearing? Dividend concentration and the consolidation of earnings. Journal of Financial Economics, 72, 425–456.</p><p>　　DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (2008). Corporat

49、e payout policy. Foundations and trends in finance. Nos. 2-3. (pp. 95–287).</p><p>　　Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two-agency explanations of dividends. American Economic Review, 74(4), 650–659.</p><

50、p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　北歐上市公司的股利政策</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　本文分析了所有在北歐公開(kāi)上市的公司的股利分配政策。研究結(jié)果表明，72%的北歐公司都有其獨(dú)特的股利政策。那些規(guī)模更大的以及盈利更多的公司更有可能有一個(gè)特定的股利政策。股利政策主要受到資

51、本結(jié)構(gòu)因素和未來(lái)收益前景的影響。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司有一個(gè)明確的股利政策可能與所有權(quán)集中度以及企業(yè)家之間存在著積極的關(guān)系。我們的研究結(jié)果認(rèn)為，可以使用特定的股利分配政策。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞:企業(yè)融資；股利政策；支出; 納斯達(dá)克交易所</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　自從林特納于1956年，法瑪和巴比克于196

52、8年所做的研究以來(lái)，目前有大量的文獻(xiàn)都研究了企業(yè)的股利政策(股息支付率)和影響企業(yè)股利分配的決定因素。最近，人們的研究一直都在關(guān)注股息分配或股票回購(gòu)方面(例如：蓋伊和哈福德，2000；賈甘納坦等，2000;斯金納，2008)，股利消失的問(wèn)題(例如：迪安杰羅等，2004；法瑪和弗蘭奇，2001)；以及少數(shù)股權(quán)保護(hù)與股息分配之間的關(guān)系(例如：法喬等，2001和博爾特等，2000)。通常來(lái)說(shuō)，股息分配政策是企業(yè)中一系列因素導(dǎo)致的結(jié)果，如：公司

53、的盈利能力、穩(wěn)定的收入增長(zhǎng)速度、自由現(xiàn)金流以及公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)等。</p><p>　　在他們對(duì)股利政策的調(diào)查中，迪安杰羅和斯金納(2008)得出結(jié)論，有一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的信息不對(duì)稱框架，可以很好地解釋觀察到的派息政策。這個(gè)框架強(qiáng)調(diào)了需要分散自由現(xiàn)金流的代理成本和安全評(píng)估問(wèn)題。他們還得出結(jié)論，其他動(dòng)機(jī)和因素，比如：稅收優(yōu)惠、客戶的需求等。另外，行為偏差管理水平(如過(guò)度自信)和控股股東的特殊偏好似乎對(duì)公司的股利政策也會(huì)有一定

54、的影響。</p><p>　　我們的研究對(duì)控股股東和股息分配政策的決定因素之間的關(guān)系，以及一個(gè)公司是否遵循一個(gè)更明確的股利政策等方面的研究都是有所助益的。而隱含的紅利政策(最常見(jiàn)的股利和盈利之間的關(guān)系)已經(jīng)被許多專家學(xué)者們所研究，只有少數(shù)文獻(xiàn)研究了公司是否有一個(gè)明確的分紅政策，以及分紅政策的選擇與哪些因素相關(guān) （貝克，薩阿迪和甘地2007；布拉夫，格雷厄姆，哈維和米夏埃爾，2005)。</p>&l

55、t;p>　　關(guān)于為什么很多研究都對(duì)公司是否遵循一個(gè)特定的股息政策感興趣，這有許多的原因。首先，它可以被看作是用來(lái)研究企業(yè)是否有特定的股息分配政策的另一種方法。因?yàn)殡y以預(yù)期到未來(lái)的股息，一些企業(yè)制定和公開(kāi)宣布的分紅政策，都有可能有所偏離。因此，人們可以查看“股息政策”作為股息分配方法的必要條件但不是充分條件，因?yàn)檫@一政策難以傳達(dá)關(guān)于未來(lái)收益的信息。其次，那些對(duì)企業(yè)持有控股權(quán)的企業(yè)所有者也需要一個(gè)特定的股利分配政策。這一政策可能解決少

56、數(shù)股股東的代理和大老板在公司集中所有權(quán)之間的問(wèn)題(博爾特等，2000)，優(yōu)化稅收問(wèn)題，以及滿足企業(yè)主的股利分配偏好問(wèn)題。 </p><p>　　我們通過(guò)提供關(guān)于上市公司股利政策存在的實(shí)證結(jié)果和影響這種政策選擇的調(diào)查因素的實(shí)證結(jié)果。最值得注意的是，我們研究了主要股東的存在如何影響決策。本研究中使用的數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)自北歐市場(chǎng)，因?yàn)樗袡?quán)集中度水平和不同所有制類型比美國(guó)有更多的變化。這為我們研究所有權(quán)和定義股利政策存在之間

57、的聯(lián)系提供了一個(gè)非常有重要的環(huán)境。我們的結(jié)果是基于北歐證券交易所上市公司的董事會(huì)主席進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查。調(diào)查結(jié)果與文件的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)結(jié)合，關(guān)于文件的實(shí)際特征和性能，以及每個(gè)公司最大的所有者的數(shù)據(jù)，包括其類型分類。</p><p>　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)72％的北歐公司都有明確的分紅政策。更大和更有利的公司更有可能制定的股利政策。股利政策主要受到公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)和未來(lái)收益的影響。在研究公司是否有明確的分紅政策的決定因素的估計(jì)中，我們獲得

58、了代理或監(jiān)督動(dòng)機(jī)（需要穩(wěn)定的現(xiàn)金流）的支持，而不是信號(hào)動(dòng)機(jī)，因?yàn)楣居忻鞔_的分紅政策的可能性與所有權(quán)集中度相關(guān)，以及大型長(zhǎng)期私營(yíng)或工業(yè)所有者的存在相關(guān)。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，股利政策的存在與董事長(zhǎng)的年齡負(fù)相關(guān)。對(duì)響應(yīng)函數(shù)描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)的反應(yīng)與表現(xiàn)響應(yīng)之間的行為一致性相對(duì)應(yīng)。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分如下進(jìn)行。可證實(shí)的假設(shè)是在第二部分進(jìn)行的。樣本和調(diào)查方法在第3節(jié)中討論。在第4節(jié)中，我們將結(jié)果與討論結(jié)果一起呈現(xiàn)?？?/p>

59、結(jié)在最后一節(jié)。</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)綜述和假設(shè)的發(fā)展</p><p>　　關(guān)于公司股利政策的研究已有大量的文獻(xiàn)。公司股利政策的主要決定因素包括稅收優(yōu)化,公司盈利能力和盈虧穩(wěn)定性,信令(公司投資政策)和管理或大股東相關(guān)的代理成本。之前就有許多論文研究公司制定股利政策的決定因素。早期結(jié)果表明，如果資本收益和股息的稅收不同, 那么，稅收將發(fā)揮重要作用,但如果他們相同,稅收就發(fā)揮不了重要作用(

60、阿米胡德 &穆?tīng)栙Z,1997)。此外,公司的盈利能力和盈利的穩(wěn)定性在股利政策中扮演著重要的角色(見(jiàn)巴克利，史密斯&瓦茨，1995年；格瑞爾，1993年)。其他重要因素包括,公司的(預(yù)期)增長(zhǎng)率和投資機(jī)會(huì)，公司的投資潛力的質(zhì)量(見(jiàn)法馬和福蘭特,2001年；米夏埃爾，1996年；邁爾斯&邁基里夫，1984年)。最后,洛佩茲，西拉內(nèi)斯，施萊費(fèi)爾和維什尼(1998年)發(fā)現(xiàn)，在中小股東有更多保護(hù)的國(guó)家，公司傾向于支付更高的

61、股息。</p><p>　　股利政策的制定可以采用以下幾種方式。在林特納(1956年)的研究中,最常見(jiàn)的公共規(guī)范是基于股息支付率的長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)。當(dāng)前股息的主要決定因素是現(xiàn)時(shí)盈余。每股股息是另一個(gè)潛在的股利政策目標(biāo),只有通過(guò)企業(yè)才能與贏利實(shí)績(jī)關(guān)聯(lián)起來(lái)。股息也可能與其他可觀察到的措施如公司的股票有關(guān)。常用的股利收益率水平與既定的股利政策形成對(duì)比信號(hào)。除非可以確定“預(yù)期”股息(通過(guò)某些政策制定)，否則無(wú)法區(qū)分“意外”的股息

62、(傳達(dá)信息價(jià)值)。另一方面，非常嚴(yán)格的股利政策留給信號(hào)傳遞的空間很小。例如，一直遵循的特定支付比率，除了通過(guò)披露當(dāng)前收入已經(jīng)傳達(dá)的信息之外，沒(méi)有留下股息的信息價(jià)值。</p><p>　　股利政策也可以用作監(jiān)控工具，以減少自由現(xiàn)金流量，以減少與公司所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離相關(guān)的管理代理成本。 那泊特等 （2000）提出了相反的股利政策預(yù)測(cè)。 根據(jù)“結(jié)果模型”（法次歐等，2001和那泊特等，2000），分紅是由于少數(shù)股東強(qiáng)

63、制公司分配現(xiàn)金，從而減少與自由現(xiàn)金流相關(guān)的代理問(wèn)題。當(dāng)少數(shù)股東擁有更大的法律保護(hù)更高的股息支付時(shí)，所有其他的事情都是平等的。 股息的另一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是將其視為法律保護(hù)的替代品（伊斯特布魯克，1984; 茍門斯，2000）。 根據(jù)這一觀點(diǎn)，企業(yè)盡可能減少股東保護(hù)，從而建立良好待遇的聲譽(yù)。 這一觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為股東保護(hù)較弱的國(guó)家股息流將更高。</p><p><b>　　數(shù)據(jù)</b></p>&

64、lt;p><b>　　調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)</b></p><p>　　本文使用的方法是問(wèn)卷調(diào)查，研究結(jié)果也是以此為基礎(chǔ)的，調(diào)查對(duì)象為所有北歐國(guó)家 (丹麥、芬蘭、冰島、挪威和瑞典) 的公司的董事會(huì)主席。</p><p>　　該調(diào)查分兩個(gè)階段進(jìn)行。在第一階段中，問(wèn)卷被送到了在納斯達(dá)克交易所上市的北歐公司的董事長(zhǎng)手中，包括：丹麥、芬蘭、冰島和瑞典。這發(fā)生在2007年12月初。在

65、第二個(gè)階段，2008年5月，調(diào)查問(wèn)卷被送到在挪威的奧斯陸上市的公司董事長(zhǎng)手中。最終，調(diào)查問(wèn)卷被送到總共780家公司。</p><p><b>　　背景數(shù)據(jù)</b></p><p>　　問(wèn)卷反饋的響應(yīng)度主要與公司金融和所有權(quán)集中度情況有關(guān)。金融數(shù)據(jù)主要從三個(gè)來(lái)源來(lái)收集。我們的主要來(lái)源是Amadeus數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。當(dāng)有些數(shù)據(jù)在Amadeus不可用時(shí)，就到Datastream數(shù)據(jù)

66、庫(kù)收集。最后，從互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上找到的關(guān)于目標(biāo)公司的年度報(bào)告，其內(nèi)容通常含有企業(yè)重要的數(shù)據(jù)和信息，因此，企業(yè)的年度報(bào)告等內(nèi)容資料也是重要的信息和數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)源。所需搜集的財(cái)務(wù)類數(shù)據(jù)的市價(jià)你范圍為，企業(yè)去年報(bào)告完成后，到問(wèn)卷發(fā)出前的這一段時(shí)間。包含丹麥、芬蘭、冰島、挪威和瑞典這幾個(gè)國(guó)家的企業(yè)。財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)的收集不僅來(lái)源于公司,而且也對(duì)整個(gè)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行調(diào)查。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)果</b></p>

67、;<p>　　我們要求所調(diào)查的目標(biāo)公司的董事會(huì)主席，要明確的告知我們，關(guān)于他們公司是否有特定的股息政策。問(wèn)卷的答案有兩種選擇(“是的”和“不”)。根據(jù)收回的情況看，我們總共收到了158個(gè)董事會(huì)主席的反饋答案，其中，有152人提供了一個(gè)明確的答案。在這152家公司中，有110家公司(占到了總數(shù)的72.4%)回復(fù)說(shuō)有一個(gè)特定的股利政策，而另外42人(27.6%)則反饋說(shuō)沒(méi)有。</p><p><b

68、>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　我們對(duì)北歐上市公司股利政策的廣泛調(diào)查，其結(jié)果顯示72%的北歐公司都有特定的股利分配政策。此外，研究結(jié)果還表明，股利政策主要受到公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)和未來(lái)收益的影響。</p><p>　　在研究公司股利政策的決定因素對(duì)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)公司的董事會(huì)主席似乎更喜歡寬松的股利分配承諾，認(rèn)為他們的公司可能不必有一個(gè)特定的股利政策。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，那些規(guī)模更大