房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　英文翻譯</b></p><p>　　題 目 Buying a House and Decision to Use a </p><p>　　Real Estate Broker </p><p>　　決定通過房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買房子

2、</p><p>　　姓 名 </p><p>　　班 級(jí) </p><p>　　學(xué) 號(hào) <

3、/p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師 </p><p><b>　　原文： </b></p><p>　　Buying a House and the Decision to Use a Real Estate Broker</p><p>　　Int

4、roduction</p><p>　　What is it that residential real estate brokers do and why would a home buyer engage their services? As is often the case, answering this question is not a simple task. Home buyers who acq

5、uire their house through a broker do not purchase just a house--they also obtain the services of the broker. In other words, these buyers are consuming a bundled good. One dimension of this good is lower search time, an

6、d thus lower search costs, associated with buying through a broker. Recent research (Baryla </p><p>　　Buying through a broker also increases the supply of houses available to buyers, and provides buyers with

7、 information on the quality of different houses and the neighborhoods in which they are located. Brokers frequently help buyers identify sources of mortgage financing and property insurance, as well as assist buyers in r

8、ecording the title.</p><p>　　All of these services suggest that brokers provide value added to buyers (in addition to providing a service to sellers), something that these buyers would be willing to pay for.

9、 Thus this bundle of services and the house that is purchased would, intuitively, be priced higher than homes purchased without the assistance of a broker. Several studies (Janssen and Jobson 1980; Jud and Frew, 1986) ob

10、serve that buyers pay more for homes listed with brokers. It is not possible, however, to determine wh</p><p>　　If search duration is affected by broker assistance what about price? This study attempts to an

11、swer these questions by developing an empirically testable model of broker choice. In the process, this study should provide important insights into the efficiency of the residential housing market as well as the effecti

12、veness of brokers as market intermediaries. </p><p>　　Specifically, this study examines the effects of a real estate broker by hypothesizing a two-stage process. In the first step a buyer decides whether to

13、engage the services of a broker to assist with the search. Empirically, this decision is modeled as a probity equation where the choice to use a broker is a function of such variables as the cause of the move (i.e. chang

14、es in the household, or work-related moves), the income, age, experience, and market knowledge of the buyer, and other buyer ch</p><p>　　The second step is the purchase. Here selling prices are modeled as a

15、function of house characteristics, buyer characteristics, and whether the sale was broker-assisted. This approach should provide information about the determinants of housing prices. In particular，this model should allow

16、 us to determine whether the broker-assisted buyers and buyers for-sale-by-owner properties constitute segmented markets which would permit the maintenance of housing price differentials. </p><p>　　This stud

17、y uses cross-section data from a nationwide survey of recent homebuyers and sellers conducted by the Research Division of the National Association of Realtors. This database includes both broker-assisted sales and sales

18、by owners, allowing an assessment of the impact of the real estate broker on selling price, and by implication, the value of the marketing services which brokers provide to sellers. </p><p>　　Our results ind

19、icate that indeed buyers who use brokers do pay more for their homes than those who do not buy through a broker. But our results also imply that it is not because these buyers have used a broker. Rather, this group of bu

20、yers would have paid a higher price regardless of the means by which the purchase was consummated. These buyers have higher incomes, are more likely to be from out of town, are more likely to have employer assistance in

21、the purchase--all factors that lead them to p</p><p>　　The layout of this study is as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in section 2.In section 3 the data, variable selection, and model are descri

22、bed. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and the last section contains the conclusions of the study. </p><p>　　Literature review </p><p>　　A broad range of research has focused on the dete

23、rminants of housing prices. These include traditional estimates of housing demand hedonic modeling of housing prices, the determinants of the tradeoff between price and time on the market, and models of the search proces

24、s. Other literature has examined the role of real estate brokers and has focused on the impact of brokers on buyer search, or has examined the welfare and/or moral-hazard implications of broker intermediation. Few studie

25、s have trie</p><p>　　In one of the first empirical studies of broker choice, Janssen and Jobson （1980）find that real estate agents do have an impact on price. Using data from the Canadian housing market, Jan

26、ssen and Jobson results indicate that with real estate firms of comparable size, brokers who list comparable properties for higher prices than competing brokers tend to realize significantly higher selling prices. The hi

27、gher selling prices tend to be associated with transactions involving executive transfers and </p><p>　　In a study of the residential market Jud (1983) estimates the demand for real estate brokerage services

28、. Using housing transactions data from three urban areas in North Carolina, Jud finds that brokers do not affect the prices of the houses which they sell, although they do appear to influence the level of housing consume

29、d by buyers. In a subsequent study Jud and Frew (1986), using different data, find that brokers do obtain higher prices for the homes they sell. Evidence is also presented that </p><p>　　More recent research

30、 by Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) examines the extent to which differences in information and search costs are related in housing prices. Using data from the Baton Rouge market area Turnbull and Sirmans compare the prices

31、paid by first-time and out-of-town buyers to the prices paid for comparable housing by more knowledgeable local and repeat homebuyers. Their results indicate that home prices are similar across buyers with different info

32、rmation sets and search Costs. Since the</p><p>　　Although selling prices are not compared, a study by Baryla and Zumpano (1995), for the first time, uses a national sample of broker-assisted and non-broker

33、sales transactions to assess the impact of intermediation by the agent on search effort. This study indicates that information asymmetries are present in the residential real estate market and that intermediation by agen

34、ts does affect buyer search efforts. First-time buyers and out-of-town buyers search longer than more experienced and local</p><p>　　Data and methodology </p><p>　　This study uses data from a na

35、tionwide survey of home buyers conducted by the National Association of Realtors in 1987. The survey, The Home Buying and Selling Process was mailed to over 30,000 households. After eliminating incomplete or faulty quest

36、ionnaires the database totaled 2495 observations all of which took place in1986. Table 1 displays summary statistics from the survey sample, categorized by whether the transaction was agent-assisted or non-agent-assisted

37、. Table la displays agent usag</p><p>　　Evaluating the impact of the real estate broker on prices paid by home buyers would seem initially a straightforward process: One estimates a price equation using ordi

38、nary least squares, controlling for differences in housing characteristics (as in a hedonic price model) and the impact of buyer characteristics on the price, including a dummy variable defined to indicate whether the bu

39、yer used a broker in the transaction. Or one could estimate separate equations for the broker-assisted and non-br</p><p>　　The presence of selection bias could imply a number of possibilities. One is that th

40、e bias exists and that after taking into account the self-selection by these buyers, housing prices are still higher for the group using a broker (as indicated by the coefficient of the broker variable). This result woul

41、d imply that there are two separate residential real estate markets: one for broker-assisted properties and the second for the for-sale-by-owner (FSBO) properties. This separation could permit the</p><p>　　T

42、he choice of whether to use a broker and its subsequent effect on price is modeled using a Heckman two-stage model. In the first stage, a probity equation is employed to model the decision to choose a real estate broker.

43、 The decision is modeled as a function of eight variables. Buyer income (AINC) is employed as a measure of the opportunity cost of search. It has already been shown that buyer search duration can be reduced by working wi

44、th a real estate broker. If higher income buyers have highe</p><p>　　Source: Leonard V. Zumpano, Harold W. Elder, Edward A.Baryla.1996. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. Academic Publishers13:169

45、-181. 6</p><p><b>　　譯文： </b></p><p>　　決定通過房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買房子</p><p><b>　　簡(jiǎn)介 </b></p><p>　　房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人究竟是做什么的，為什么購房者會(huì)激發(fā)他們的服務(wù)呢？在通常情況下，這是一個(gè)不容易回答的問題。其實(shí)購房者在通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人買房

46、子的過程中買到的不僅僅是房子，而同時(shí)是在取得經(jīng)紀(jì)人的服務(wù)。換言之，這些購買者通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人擁有了一個(gè)很好的的購房途徑。通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人購買房子的一個(gè)好處就是可以減少搜尋房子的時(shí)間，從而降低了買房過程中的成本。最近的研究認(rèn)為（巴雷拉和祖帕諾 1995），通過房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買房子，大大提高了購房者購房的效益，因?yàn)檫@樣這些購房者在尋找房子的過程中更有可能找到稱心如意的房子。</p><p>　　通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人買房子增加了可供購房者選擇

47、的房源，購房者還可以向經(jīng)紀(jì)人提出自己對(duì)房子的要求，如要求的房屋的質(zhì)量以及希望房屋的街道位置。經(jīng)紀(jì)人經(jīng)常會(huì)記錄買家的信息并協(xié)助買家辦理按揭融資和財(cái)產(chǎn)保險(xiǎn)服務(wù)。 </p><p>　　這些服務(wù)都表明，經(jīng)紀(jì)人向買家提供了額外的有價(jià)值的服務(wù)（除了向賣方提供服務(wù)），有時(shí)候，那些買家愿意支付那些額外的費(fèi)用。因此，包含這些服務(wù)的房屋的銷售價(jià)格會(huì)高于無經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)助置業(yè)的房屋的價(jià)格。一些學(xué)者注意到買家對(duì)于那些業(yè)主代理上市的房子會(huì)支付

48、更多。然而，要確定這是否適用于整個(gè)住宅市場(chǎng)是不可能的，因?yàn)檠芯窟@一點(diǎn)要依靠當(dāng)?shù)氐臄?shù)據(jù)資料。較高的價(jià)格預(yù)示著買家相對(duì)于那些直接出售的房子更愿意較多支付那些業(yè)主代理上市的房子。另外，來自自有產(chǎn)權(quán)出售的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可能會(huì)阻止賣家以高價(jià)的形式將委托成本傳遞給買家。因此，問題是業(yè)主輔助銷售是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致價(jià)格的提高。</p><p>　　如果購房者是在經(jīng)紀(jì)人的協(xié)助下搜尋房子的，那么價(jià)格會(huì)是怎么樣呢？本文嘗試從經(jīng)紀(jì)人選擇的發(fā)展經(jīng)驗(yàn)檢驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｊ?/p>

49、來回答這些問題。在這個(gè)過程中，本文對(duì)整個(gè)住宅市場(chǎng)的效率以及經(jīng)紀(jì)中介市場(chǎng)的有效性提供了重要的見解。</p><p>　　具體來說，本文探討的是在以兩階段進(jìn)程的假設(shè)條件下對(duì)一個(gè)房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人的影響。第一步，買方?jīng)Q定是否聘請(qǐng)一個(gè)協(xié)助搜尋房屋的服務(wù)經(jīng)紀(jì)人。根據(jù)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，這個(gè)是由普羅比模型方程決定的，而收入，年齡，經(jīng)驗(yàn)和對(duì)買方市場(chǎng)的認(rèn)識(shí)，以及其他買主的特點(diǎn)都將作為變量引起函數(shù)的移動(dòng)（即改變?cè)诩彝セ蚬ぷ饔嘘P(guān)方面的移動(dòng)），從而影響買

50、方是否選擇使用代理。</p><p>　　第二步是購買。在這里房屋的銷售價(jià)格是根據(jù)房屋的特色，購買者的喜好，以及是否需要提供經(jīng)紀(jì)協(xié)助而確定的。這種方法需要提供相關(guān)決定因素的信息才能確定住宅的價(jià)格。尤其，這個(gè)模型可以讓我們確定買家是否可以接受代理協(xié)助房屋與業(yè)主自行出售房屋之間的差價(jià)。 </p><p>　　本文參考了美國房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)會(huì)研究部對(duì)全國購房者和銷售者所進(jìn)行的調(diào)查的數(shù)據(jù)。該數(shù)據(jù)包括

51、了房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人對(duì)經(jīng)紀(jì)輔助銷售和業(yè)主銷售的兩種模式在影響銷售價(jià)格方面的評(píng)估，并揭示了經(jīng)紀(jì)人為賣方所提供的營銷服務(wù)的價(jià)值。</p><p>　　我們的研究結(jié)果表明，通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人買房的買家的確要比不通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人的買家支付更多的費(fèi)用。但我們的結(jié)果也同樣表明，支付更多的費(fèi)用并不是單單因?yàn)槭褂昧私?jīng)紀(jì)人。相反的，這類買家無論以何種方式購買房子都會(huì)比其他買家花更多的錢。導(dǎo)致他們花更多錢的因素是：可能這些購買者的收入很高，可能他們來自

52、其他地方，也可能是受別人的雇傭而這么做，更有可能的是他們通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人來購買自己的房子從而使自己的房子升值。當(dāng)這些賣家決定使用經(jīng)紀(jì)人來買房時(shí)，他們也并不打算為此而付出更多的錢，并且有一些證據(jù)表明，他們實(shí)際支付的錢比不使用經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)助的賣家要來的少。</p><p>　　本文的布局如下：第二部分的回顧有關(guān)文獻(xiàn)，第三部分對(duì)數(shù)據(jù)、變量選擇和模型進(jìn)行描述，第四部分用實(shí)例證明結(jié)果，最后一部分記載本文的結(jié)論。</p>

53、<p><b>　　文獻(xiàn)綜述</b></p><p>　　大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)都集中在研究房?jī)r(jià)的決定因素，包括對(duì)住房需求，住房?jī)r(jià)格，以及價(jià)格和時(shí)間之間的關(guān)系的研究。當(dāng)然也有一部分文獻(xiàn)研究了房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人的作用，經(jīng)紀(jì)人對(duì)購房者買房的深遠(yuǎn)影響，以及利益和道德對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)中介的影響。但很少有研究試圖衡量房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人對(duì)住房市場(chǎng)的直接影響，因?yàn)樵谌缃竦墓ぷ髦型鶗?huì)產(chǎn)生很多研究文獻(xiàn)相矛盾的結(jié)果。在某種程度上，

54、這些不同的結(jié)果可能反應(yīng)了數(shù)據(jù)的可能性問題，因?yàn)閹缀跛械倪@些早期研究都以本地?cái)?shù)據(jù)為依據(jù)，并且所抽取的樣本的數(shù)量又往往很少，因此很難一概而論來衡量房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人對(duì)住房市場(chǎng)的直接影響。</p><p>　　詹森和喬布森（1980）在關(guān)于經(jīng)紀(jì)人選擇的第一個(gè)實(shí)證研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)，房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人也會(huì)對(duì)價(jià)格產(chǎn)生影響。分析了來自加拿大的房屋市場(chǎng)數(shù)據(jù)后，詹森和喬布森表明，在一定規(guī)模的房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)，對(duì)于同類物業(yè)經(jīng)紀(jì)人會(huì)比競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者列出更高的價(jià)格從

55、而實(shí)現(xiàn)銷售價(jià)格的顯著提高。較高的售價(jià)往往與行政轉(zhuǎn)讓和經(jīng)紀(jì)人安排的再融資有關(guān)。這些結(jié)果可能反過來說明對(duì)于那些了解當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)信息并且對(duì)價(jià)格缺乏敏感的買家，經(jīng)紀(jì)人能賣出高價(jià)格。亞瓦斯和科維爾（1994）認(rèn)為至少在一定程度上賣方想通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人來控制價(jià)格。</p><p>　　喬德（1983）憑借其在住宅市場(chǎng)的研究，他估計(jì)了房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)服務(wù)的作用。根據(jù)來自北卡羅來納州的三個(gè)城市的住房交易數(shù)據(jù)，喬德認(rèn)為，經(jīng)紀(jì)人不影響他們出售的房屋

56、的銷售價(jià)格，即使他們似乎影響了購房者的住房消費(fèi)水平。但在之后的研究中，喬德和佛瑞（1986）使用了不同的數(shù)據(jù)后發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人能將房子賣到更高的價(jià)格。同時(shí)也證實(shí)了有經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)助的買家市場(chǎng)要比非經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)助的買家市場(chǎng)大。根據(jù)以上的結(jié)果他們得出了這樣結(jié)論，他們認(rèn)為在完全沒有信息的市場(chǎng)中經(jīng)紀(jì)人起到了類似廣告的作用。</p><p>　　近期特恩爾和錫爾曼斯（1993）在調(diào)差不同的信息量和搜尋成本與房?jī)r(jià)的關(guān)系。根據(jù)巴吞魯日的市場(chǎng)數(shù)

57、據(jù)，恩布爾和錫爾曼斯把第一次購房的買房者出示的價(jià)格和有著大量的信息量并且有廣闊的購買市場(chǎng)的外鎮(zhèn)買房者出示的價(jià)格進(jìn)行了比較。經(jīng)過比較厚他們發(fā)現(xiàn)嗎，房?jī)r(jià)在不同的信息量和不同搜尋成本的買家中是相近的。恩布爾和錫爾曼斯的結(jié)論針對(duì)的是現(xiàn)有的經(jīng)紀(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)，如大聯(lián)盟，成功地消除了信息不對(duì)稱的影響，從而提高了住房市場(chǎng)的效益。</p><p>　　盡管巴雷拉和祖帕諾（1995）的首次研究沒有比較銷售價(jià)格，而是對(duì)經(jīng)紀(jì)人輔助交易和非經(jīng)紀(jì)人

58、銷售交易進(jìn)行調(diào)查研究。這項(xiàng)研究表明住宅房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的信息是不對(duì)稱的，而且買方代理中介確實(shí)會(huì)影響房屋的搜尋工作。同時(shí)研究還表明，房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人確實(shí)可以減少幾乎所有類型消費(fèi)者的買方過程的時(shí)間，無論是第一次買房的，買房經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的，本地的購房者或者是外地的。</p><p><b>　　數(shù)據(jù)和方法</b></p><p>　　本文使用來自美國房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀(jì)人協(xié)會(huì)在1987年對(duì)全國的購

59、房者進(jìn)行的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)。調(diào)查結(jié)果顯示，在整個(gè)房屋購買和銷售過程中，是郵寄到超過30000戶人家的。在排除不完整或錯(cuò)誤的問卷調(diào)查，共計(jì)2495觀測(cè)數(shù)據(jù)庫，所有這些都發(fā)生在1986年。表1匯總統(tǒng)計(jì)顯示，從調(diào)查樣本中，對(duì)有關(guān)交易是否代理不協(xié)助或者代理輔助進(jìn)行分類。香格里拉表顯示購房者之間的信息和搜尋成本的差異。</p><p>　　選擇性偏見的存在可能暗示了一些可能性。其中之一是偏見存在，并且在考慮到這些購房者的自我選擇，

60、使用一個(gè)代理集團(tuán)的房?jī)r(jià)仍較高（由代理的變量系數(shù)表示）。這一結(jié)果將意味著有兩個(gè)不同的住宅房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)：經(jīng)紀(jì)輔助為其中之一，如果選擇存在偏差，住房?jī)r(jià)格的經(jīng)紀(jì)屬性就越高，價(jià)格差異可能是由于購房者傾向使用經(jīng)紀(jì)人來購買他們的房子。如果沒有選擇性偏見存在，價(jià)格較高的價(jià)值可能是由通過經(jīng)紀(jì)人買房者的購買者來補(bǔ)充。</p><p>　　赫克曼兩階段模型是是否使用代理及其后效應(yīng)對(duì)價(jià)格的影響。在第一階段，采用概率方程來模擬決定選擇一個(gè)房